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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
Essays on Financial Intermediation 
by 
Yong Kyu Gam 
Doctor of Business Administration in Finance 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2017 
Professor Radhakrishnan Gopalan, Chair 
 
Chapter 1 investigates a regulatory spillover effect of the Basel III liquidity standard on the 
real economy through a series of difference-in-difference estimations. Since the Basel 
Committee’s official endorsement for the new liquidity regulation in December 2010, a bank 
exposed to high liquidity risk reduced its loan proportion significantly, making a negative real 
effect on its surrounding economy via a bank-lending-channel. The new regulation also induced a 
bank with a weak liquid balance sheet to raise its deposit rate aggressively, generating a liquidity 
problem in a nearby local bank through a deposit-competition-channel and ultimately curbing an 
expansion of the local bank's credit supply to the economy. 
In Chapter 2, we introduce a novel measure of decision-making delegation within banks 
based on whether individual branches have the authority to set their own deposit rates (co-authored 
with Jennifer Dlugosz, Radhakrishnan Gopalan and Janis Skarastins).  Using natural disasters as 
shocks to local economies, we show that this aspect of bank organizational structure has real 
effects.  Branches that set rates locally increase deposit rates more and experience larger increases 
in deposit volumes in affected counties following a disaster.  Banks with more branches setting 
rates locally expand mortgage lending more rapidly in affected counties.  House prices recover 
more quickly in affected MSAs with more branches setting rates locally.  These effects are distinct 
 xii 
from those captured by other commonly used measures of decision-making delegation like bank 
size or “localness”.  Our paper highlights the role that delegation of deposit funding decisions has 
on bank behavior and local economic outcomes. 
In Chapter 3, I ask what caused a bank’s failure in managing its liquidity risk at the outset 
of the 07-09 financial crisis? This paper finds the answer from a change in a bank’s exposure to 
an inter-bank network by developing a theory model and conducting an empirical test. As a bank 
gains an easier access to a wide inter-bank funding network, the bank tends to manage its liquidity 
risk less strictly in order to make the best use of its profit opportunity while being less concerned 
about its potential funding difficulty. Once a negative shock occurs, however, the inter-bank 
financing suddenly stops functioning due to an increased uncertainty in the network, generating a 
serious liquidity problem especially to a bank connected to the big network.
 1 
Chapter 1: Basel III LCR: A Regulatory 
Shock on a Bank and Beyond 
 
1.1 Introduction 
A banking system is a crucial link in the network of the national economy by collecting 
deposits from the public and creating credit to the economy. A shock on the banking system has a 
great influence on the real economy through a bank’s behavioral change in funding and credit 
supply. To protect the banking sector from the negative shock and prevent its ripple effect on the 
real economy, the banking industry is highly regulated. However, a regulatory reform can also be 
a shock to the banking system, leading to a substantial spillover effect on the entire economy.  
The 2007-2009 financial crisis triggered a far-reaching reform of the existing banking 
regulatory structure, characterized by reinforcement of capital requirement, introduction of a new 
leverage standard and adoption of a new liquidity regulation through the Basel III framework. The 
regulatory change inevitably could have a substantial effect on a bank’s operation because banks 
are required to adapt to the new regulatory environment. Previously, banking literature has 
addressed the effect of the regulatory change on a bank’s operation and performance (Thakor 
(1996) and other papers). A bank’s behavioral change in its operation consequently has a real effect 
on local economy through its lending channel (Peek and Rosengren (1995) and other papers). 
Further, the impact of regulation on a bank’s operational change makes a spillover effect on other 
competing financial entities because of competition between institutions in the local market 
(Maggio et al. and other papers). In this regard, a regulatory reform makes a widespread ripple 
effect on real economy not only through the direct channel of the regulated bank’s credit supply 
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change but also through the indirect channel via competing other financial entities’ operational 
change. In order to maximize the effectiveness of the regulatory reform, regulators need to 
supplement policy tools that effectively mitigate the side effect of the regulatory change. To this 
end, it is necessary to fully understand the type and the channel of a regulatory ripple effect on the 
real economy, which is investigated in this paper.  
This paper focuses on the Basel III liquidity regulation named Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
(LCR), which is established by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee) 
in December 2010 and has taken effect since January 2015. The LCR is the tool that measures 
whether a bank retains an adequate amount of high quality liquid asset against expected net cash 
outflow during a month following a financial market meltdown. The main objective of the LCR 
standard is to induce banks to improve their liquidity risk management so that the banks could 
absorb the liquidity shocks more effectively during the tumultuous financial situations for 
themselves. This study examines the LCR’s spillover effect on the real economy through the U.S. 
bank’s behavioral change in response to the LCR adoption.  
To meet the minimum requirement of the LCR or improve the ratio, banks need to increase 
the amount of high quality liquid assets, which include cash and marketable securities with high 
quality. This means that the LCR regulation could reduce the incentive for banks to hold illiquid 
assets such as corporate loans. In addition, in order to decrease expected net cash outflow, banks 
are required to change their liability structures by increasing stable funding items such as retail 
term deposits and reducing unstable liability components like short-term wholesale borrowings, 
which are considered to be vulnerable to roll-over risk during the financial distress and are 
unfavorable to the LCR. In this regard, the new LCR regulation can affect a bank’s asset 
composition as well as its liability structure.  
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To test the effect of the regulatory shock on a bank and beyond, I employ a difference-in-
difference approach. The time difference is the interval between the time leading up to the approval 
of the LCR at the end of 2010 and the time following the regulatory shock. Even though the new 
regulation has been implemented officially in 2015, the behavioral change in response to the new 
standard is expected to start from December 2010 when the new LCR requirement was initially 
announced by the Basel Committee. This is because it usually takes a long time for banks to 
reallocate their asset and liability compositions, thus the bank with a less liquidity should start to 
prepare for the new LCR regulation long before the official implementation date of January 2015. 
For these reasons, banks are expected to show the behavioral changes in response to the LCR 
during the transition period from December 2010 to January 2015.  
As for the difference-in-difference analysis regarding a bank’s behavioral change, a bank 
with higher liquidity risk (a high-risk-bank) is selected as the treated bank group. I use loan-to-
deposit ratio as a proxy that measures a bank’s liquidity status. The higher the ratio is, the bank 
holds less liquidity and is more likely to fall below the minimum requirement of the LCR. Thus, I 
select the banks which belong to the top 20 percent on the basis of loan-to-deposit ratio as a high-
risk-bank. As for the difference-in-difference analysis for the ripple effect on the real economy, 
the treated group is assigned as the region (Metropolitan Statistical Area, MSA) where the deposit 
market share of the high-risk-bank is at least 25 percent. Regarding a spillover effect on competing 
local banks, I compare the local bank that is located in the region (county) where the deposit market 
share of the high-risk-banks is higher than 25 percent and the local bank placed in the adjacent 
control region. 
In December 2010, not only the LCR regulation but also other forms of new financial 
regulations were introduced through the Basel III packages. The Basel III framework contains a 
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revision of the existing capital regulation and an adoption of the new leverage ratio besides the 
LCR standard. To effectively control for the influence of other regulatory reform on a bank’s 
operation, I add several control variables, which are a bank’s capital ratio, leverage ratio and the 
interaction terms with time dummy variables. Banks with different levels of capital ratio and 
leverage ratio will respond distinctively to the revised capital regulation and the new leverage ratio 
requirement. In this regard, those control variables are expected to capture the effect of other 
regulatory shocks different from the LCR. Regarding the real effect on the economy, the regression 
model includes the market share of the bank with low capital ratio and the share of the bank with 
high leverage ratio in order to control for the effect of other regulatory reform on the real economy. 
Interaction terms between the market share and the time dummy variables are also included in the 
model.  
With the above regression setting, I conduct three sets of regression analyses. The first set 
is about investigating the consequences of the LCR’s ripple effect on real economy. Annual growth 
rate of small business lending, GDP and house price index in each MSA are used as outcome 
variables. I analyze differences in changes of real economic factors between the treated and control 
regions after the regulatory shock. The second set is about identifying a direct channel of the LCR’s 
spillover effect on the economy through a bank’s credit supply reduction. In this regression, I look 
into whether an introduction of the LCR triggered a change to a high-risk-bank’s asset 
composition. I use quarterly changes in proportions of liquidity holdings and loans over total assets 
as outcome variables. The third set is about examining an indirect channel of the LCR’s effect on 
the economy through an operational change of the high-risk-bank’s nearby competing banks. In 
this analysis, I first highlight a change made to the high-risk-bank’s deposit funding cost in 
response to the regulatory shock. As a next step, I move on to answering the question of whether 
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a change in the high-risk-bank’s deposit rate in response to the LCR made a spillover effect on an 
operation of its nearby competing local bank. A spread on a deposit interest rate and quarterly 
changes in deposit-to-liability and loan-to-asset ratios of a local bank are employed as dependent 
variables. In this regression, I focus on the extent to which the local banks in the treated region 
have changed those outcome variables after the regulatory reform compared to other local banks 
in the control area.  
From regression results of this study, we can identify both a direct bank-lending-channel 
and an indirect deposit-competition-channel through which the LCR made a ripple effect on real 
economy. First, we see consequences of the LCR’s negative real effect on the economy. After 
adoption of the LCR, a treated region where high-risk-banks had dominant shares for a local 
deposit market showed a significantly less economic vitality than a control region in terms of an 
annual growth rate of a small business lending, GDP and house price index. Second, we find a 
direct bank-lending-channel for the LCR’s negative real effect. After the regulatory shock, a high-
risk-bank substantially changed its asset structure by increasing a proportion of liquidity holdings 
and reducing a proportion of loans against total assets compared to a control bank. Third, we 
identify an indirect deposit-competition-channel regarding the LCR’s effect on real economy. 
After an adoption of the new regulation, a high-risk-bank increased a spread on its deposit interest 
rate aggressively compared to a control bank. As a result of the change in a high-risk-bank’s 
funding cost, its neighboring local bank’s deposit funding cost and balance sheet structure were 
also severely affected. If a local bank was placed in a county where a deposit market share of a 
high-risk-bank was large, the local bank raised its deposit interest rate significantly or faced a 
severe reduction in the bank’s deposit proportion among total liability after the regulatory shock 
compared to other local banks in a control region. Consequently, the LCR’s spillover effect on an 
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adjacent local bank via the high-risk bank’s operational change repressed an expansion of the local 
bank’s credit supply into the region, mitigating a possibility of a substitute effect on credit supply 
to the area by alternative banks. In conclusion, an adoption of the Basel III LCR regulation has 
made a negative real effect on the economy not only through reducing a high-risk-bank’s credit 
supply to the economy but also through generating a liquidity problem in a competing local bank.  
A major contribution of this paper is an empirical verification of the LCR’s effect on real 
economy as well as on the banking industry. Since the Basel’s rules text for the LCR framework 
was announced publicly by the Basel Committee in December 2010, there have been many 
concerns from financial market participants and regulators regarding potential side effects from a 
radical change in a bank’s operation to satisfy the new requirement of the LCR. The concerns 
resulted from the outcomes of the quantitative impact study (QIS) conducted by the Basel 
Committee and banking regulators from its member countries. The QIS result demonstrated that 
the LCR ratios of many banks or bank holding companies fell short of the minimum requirement 
level of 100 percent. Among the 209 banks in the monitoring samples, only 47 percent exceeded 
the minimum LCR requirement level as of December 2011 (Basel Committee, 2012). The 
realization of the sudden change in a bank’s behavior and ensuing spillover effect due to the LCR 
is verified empirically in this study.  
This paper is also unique in terms of identifying both a bank’s lending channel from a 
regulatory shock to the real economy through a bank’s asset composition change and a bank’s 
competition channel from the regulatory shock to the nearby competing bank’s operation through 
a bank’s funding structure change comprehensively using a single regulatory shock. The empirical 
results could suggest an important implication in the regulatory impact assessment in a future 
regulatory reform.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 addresses a related literature. 
Section 1.3 introduces the general concept of Basel III liquidity regulation. Section 1.4 explains 
the hypotheses of this study. Section 1.5 presents data and empirical methodologies for this 
research. Section 1.6 describes summary statistics. Section 1.7 represents empirical results. Section 
1.8 concludes.  
1.2 Literature Review  
This paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, this paper analyzes a 
regulatory impact on a bank. Thakor (1996) predicts that capital requirement will increase 
equilibrium credit rationing and lower aggregate lending. Aiyar et al. (2014a) highlights that 
regulated banks reduce lending in response to tighter capital requirements. Peek and Rosenbaum 
(1995) examines a direct link between regulatory enforcement actions and reduction in bank loans 
to sectors that are bank-dependent. Kisin and Manela (2016) finds that as the capital requirement 
increases by one percentage point, a cost of $220 million a year is imposed to all participating 
banks combined. Unlike the literature that focuses on capital adequacy requirement, this paper 
addresses the impact of the new liquidity requirement on banking sector.  
Second, this paper is directly related to literature that focuses on Basel III liquidity 
regulation. Giordana et al. (2011) simulates a bank’s optimal balance sheet adjustment needed to 
adhere to the new Basel III liquidity regulation using Luxembourg banking data. Covas and 
Driscoll (2014) develops a nonlinear dynamic general equilibrium model to study the 
macroeconomic impact of introducing a minimum liquidity standard for banks on top of existing 
capital adequacy requirements. Using a dynamic banking model, Balasubramanyan and VanHoose 
(2013) shows that the LCR constraint has theoretically ambiguous effects on the stability of bank’s 
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optimal dynamic balance-sheet paths. Keister and Bech (2012) finds that the LCR requirement 
does not impair central bank’s ability to implement monetary policy. Most literature that deals 
with LCR’s impact conducts a simulation analysis for a macroeconomic implication, but this paper 
employs empirical analysis to find micro level causal relationship.  
Third, this paper contributes to the discussion on a real effect on the economy through a 
bank lending channel. Peek and Rosenbaum (2000) identifies an exogenous loan supply shock of 
Japanese banking crisis and links the shock to construction activity in the U.S. commercial real 
estates market. Gilge et al. (2016) demonstrates that a bank exposed to liquidity windfall from an 
oil and natural gas shale boom increases mortgage lending in non-boom areas through the bank’s 
branch network. There are many other banking literature on a bank lending channel (Bernanke and 
Blinder (1992), Kashyap and Stein (2000), Khwaja and Mian (1998), Ivashina and Scharfstein 
(2010), Chava and Purnanandam (2011) and Schnabl (2012)). All of the above literature deals with 
the real effect of an exogenous shock via a bank lending channel. Similarly, this paper addresses 
the impact of the Basel III regulation on real economy through a bank’s adaptation to a new 
regulatory environment.  
Finally, this paper is relevant to literature that investigates a spillover effect of a regulatory 
change on other entities through local competition. Di Maggio et al. (2015) suggests that the 
deregulation of credit markets triggers a race to the bottom among financial institutions through 
competition between lenders. On the other hand, this paper focuses on the effect of the regulatory 
shock on the behavior of competing local banks following an introduction of the LCR.  
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1.3 Review of Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio  
The core of the Basel Committee’s regulatory reform on liquidity standard is an 
introduction of a minimum requirement under the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) that a bank 
must meet. The goal of the LCR is to strengthen the liquidity management and measurement of 
banks. According to the Basel Accord, the LCR is designed “to promote short-term resilience of a 
bank’s liquidity risk profile” by making sure that banks have sufficient amounts of high quality 
liquid assets “to survive a significant stress scenario lasting for one month” (BCBS, 2013). By 
introducing the minimum requirement that each bank has to maintain, the banking regulators can 
obtain a stronger tool to force banks to manage liquidity risk and to monitor the condition of each 
bank’s liquidity risk management. The LCR is designed as follows.  
LCR =  
High quality liquid asset
Total net cash outflow over the next 30 calendar days
≥ 100% 
            (1-1) 
The LCR is calculated by dividing the total amount of high quality liquid assets by the total 
net cash outflows over the following 30 calendar days. Minimum requirement for the fully 
implemented LCR is 100 percent. Definition of a high quality liquid asset is an asset that can be 
immediately “converted into cash at little or no loss of value” (BCBS, 2013). The liquidity of an 
asset depends on “the underlying stress scenario, the volume to be monetized and the time frame” 
(BCBS, 2013). Typical examples of high quality liquid assets are cash, central bank reserves, and 
government securities like Treasury bonds. Either no haircut or a minimal haircut rate is applied 
to the principal amount of the liquid assets depending on the degree of liquidity or quality of the 
asset.  
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Net cash outflow over the designated 30 calendar days is calculated by adding expected 
cash outflows from liability items and subtracting anticipated cash inflows to banks from asset 
items for the following thirty calendar days. During a financially distressed situation, depositors 
usually run to banks and withdraw funds from their deposit accounts if the remaining balance is 
not covered by the maximum limit of the national deposit insurance system. At the same time, in 
the credit crunch situation, banks have troubles in rolling over their existing short-term financing. 
Also, banks collect cash from the existing loans or off-balance sheet items by retrieving the credits 
from debtors and making full use of credit-lines from other institutions. Expected cash inflows and 
outflows are computed by multiplying the designated draw-down or inflow rate and the balance 
amount of each asset and liability item, following the Basel III rules text. Finally, by deducting 
expected cash inflows from expected cash outflows, the expected net cash outflow can be 
calculated, being the denominator of the LCR.  
I take a hypothetical example to show how to calculate the LCR. I assume that a bank’s 
total asset is $100 million. $5 million are government bonds and the other $95 million are retail 
loans. Among the retail loans, $15 million will be due within 30 days. The bank’s funding structure 
is assumed to consist of retail deposits ($80 million) and wholesale borrowings ($20 million). 
Among the wholesale borrowing, $10 million will be due within 30 days. According to the Basel’s 
rules text, the government bond is defined to be the high quality liquid asset without any haircut. 
The rules text also says that the cash inflow rate is specified as being 50 percent for the retail loan 
receivable in 30 days. The run-off rates are 5 percent and 100 percent for the retail demand deposit 
and the wholesale borrowing payable in 30 days, respectively. If we apply the LCR rule to this 
hypothetical example, we can obtain the amount of the high quality liquid asset as $5 million and 
 11 
the net cash outflow as $6.5 million (80 × 0.05 + 10 × 1 - 15 × 0.5). Thus, the bank’s LCR is 
calculated as around 76.9 percent (5/6.5).  
1.4 Hypothesis  
The LCR standard is a new prudential regulation for the banking industry. Unlike the 
general business conduct regulation, the prudential regulation does not specify the list of bank’s 
operations that are prohibited or permitted by the regulation. This new regulation only requires the 
bank to maintain the minimum level of the ratio. Once the bank can meet the minimum requirement 
of the LCR, an additional obligation is no longer imposed on the bank by the LCR. In this regard, 
the effect of the LCR on a bank’s behavior can be differentiated depending on the initial status of 
each bank’s liquidity ratio. The bank which is subject to the LCR regulation must maintain the 
minimum requirement of the LCR from January 2015. It takes a long time for a bank to adjust its 
asset and liability composition due to a long-term nature of a bank loan and its huge impact on the 
bank’s performance. In this sense, it is expected that a bank starts to respond to the LCR from 
December 2010, when the adoption of the new regulation was announced, rather than January 
2015, when the LCR became officially effective.  
As a first step, the LCR regulation will make changes to a bank’s asset structure by 
increasing its relative portion of liquid assets such as cash and securities over total assets. As a 
result, the proportion of total loans over total assets will be reduced. Expansion of a bank’s loan is 
not unfavorable to meeting the minimum requirement of the LCR if the loan is financed by a stable 
retail deposit because loans can generate future cash inflows to the bank, which can offset the 
expected cash outflows. More efficient way to increase the LCR, however, is to increase the 
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proportion of liquidity holdings, which will inevitably cause a drop in the proportion of total loans 
over total assets, given a fixed amount of financing.  
According to the Basel III rules text, treatment of liquid assets are quite different from 
handling of loans in calculating the LCR even though both items belong to total assets. For 
example, if a bank purchases a Treasury bill, one of the main liquid securities, 100 percent of the 
purchased amount becomes a high quality liquid asset, which can increase the numerator of the 
LCR by that amount. On the other hand, if a bank makes a loan of the same amount to a wholesale 
borrower, only 50 percent of the loan that is receivable within 30 calendar days will be reflected 
in the cash inflow, which decreases the denominator and increases the overall LCR to some degree. 
The magnitude of a rise in the LCR, however, is bigger in the former case of expanding liquidity 
holdings than in the latter one of making new loans. Thus, we expect that a bank will increase its 
proportion of liquid assets like cash and securities more aggressively and reduce the proportion of 
loans over total assets more sharply after the adoption of the LCR than before if the bank’s liquidity 
ratio is relatively low.  
As a next step, the LCR regulation is expected to induce a bank to increase its proportion 
of retail deposits compared to wholesale funding. Total expected net cash outflow, which is the 
denominator of the LCR, consists of interest and principal repayments from liability items, being 
offset by expected cash inflows from loans and other assets. Total cash outflow is derived by 
multiplying the designated draw-down rates to the balance of each liability item and summing up 
the calculated values. Different run-off rates are applied to individual funding items depending on 
the trait of each item such as its type (retail deposit or wholesale borrowing), coverage of deposit 
insurance and remaining maturity.  
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Run-off rates for retail deposits are quite low varying from 0 to 10 percent. The variability 
is depending on whether the balance is covered by the national deposit insurance program and 
whether there is an established close relationship between the bank and the depositors. In this 
regard, the low run-off rate for the retail deposit means that substantial portions of retail deposits 
are assumed to be able to be rolled over even during the crisis. On the other hand, the range of run-
off rates for wholesale borrowing is wide from 0 to 100 percent. The run-off rate for the wholesale 
borrowing is varied by the specifications of the funding such as whether the counterparty is a 
financial company or not and what kinds of collaterals are used for the funding. These run-off rates 
reflect the underlying assumption that wholesale borrowing is hard to be rolled over during a 
financial distress.  
On average, a draw-down rate to a retail deposit category is more favorable to the LCR in 
terms of reducing total amount of the expected cash outflows. For this reason, it is expected that 
banks have incentives to attract retail deposits more actively than wholesale borrowings after the 
endorsement of the LCR regulation in 2010. In order to expand the balance of retail deposits, the 
deposit interest rate with small balance will be increasing faster for the bank with a higher liquidity 
risk (high-risk-bank) than for the bank with a lower liquidity risk after the adoption of the new 
Basel III regulation.  
As a result of a bank’s operational change in response to the LCR regulation, real economy 
will be affected. The effect on the economy will vary by regions depending on the extent of a 
bank’s behavioral change in response to the LCR and the bank’s relative position in the local credit 
or deposit market. If majority banks reduce credit supply altogether in the region, the overall local 
economy will be affected adversely. This is because borrowers in the region will have difficulties 
in finding substitute funding sources inside of the region in a timely manner. For this reason, the 
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area will experience relatively less economic vitality than other regions after the endorsement of 
the new LCR regulation in 2010. This is the regulatory ripple effect on real economy through a 
direct channel of the regulated bank’s credit supply change.  
A bank’s behavioral change in response to the regulatory shock could make a spillover 
effect on competing local banks. The banks responding to the regulatory shock compete with other 
regional banks in local markets for deposit collection. Thus, a substantial change in a deposit 
interest rate of the high-risk-bank could have a great influence on its competing local bank’s 
deposit collection or funding cost. The spillover effect on a local banks is more conspicuous in a 
region (treated region) where market shares of the high-risk-banks are high than in a region 
(control region) with lower market shares of the high-risk-banks. In the perspective of a competing 
local bank, it will be necessary to raise its deposit interest rates to protect its deposit balance from 
the high-risk-bank that attempts to absorb deposits from the local market after the LCR 
introduction. Otherwise, the competing local bank faces a serious reduction in its deposit balance. 
In this regard, the local bank could increase its deposit interest rate significantly or face a reduction 
in its deposit balance severely following the high-risk-bank’s behavioral change in response to the 
LCR if the local bank is placed in the treated region. In short, the local bank can face a liquidity 
problem after the regulatory shock, which can lead to curbing the expansion of its credit supply to 
the economy. Consequently, it will be less likely that the competing local banks fill the void of the 
credit supply, resulting from reduction of the high-risk-bank’s lending. This is the regulatory ripple 
effect on real economy through the indirect channel via competing other financial entities’ 
operational change.  
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The testable hypothesis in this study is described as follows. Figure 1.1 visualizes both the 
direct and indirect channels of the LCR’s ripple effect on real economy suggested in the 
hypothesis.  
Hypothesis: A region, where majority banks have less liquidity, experiences less 
vitality in real economy after the introduction of the LCR. This is because the LCR 
triggers a credit supply reduction of the bank with less liquidity and creates a new 
liquidity problem of its competing local bank.  
Figure 1.1: Channels of the LCR’s spillover effect on real economy 
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1.5 Data and Empirical Methodology  
1.5.1 Data source  
Various data sources are used for this study. First, I use four different data sources for 
identifying the effect of the regulatory shock on a real economy. With regard to a bank’s annual 
small business lending in each MSA, I employ the data from the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examinations Council (FFIEC). I collect the data of local GDP in each MSA from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA). I collect a house price index for each MSA from the Freddie Mac. 
Regarding a ZIP code level house price index, I obtain the data from the CoreLogic. 
Second, I obtain the U.S. bank’s financial statement data from the Call Report. This data-
set includes balance sheets, income statements, off-balance sheets, and risked-based capital of all 
banks that are regulated by the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Data is available quarterly from 
1976 to present. From this data source, I can identify a bank’s asset and liability composition 
change before and after the adoption of the Basel III liquidity regulation. Other bank-level control 
variables such as each bank’s size, capital ratio, leverage ratio and non-performing loan ratio are 
constructed using this data-set.  
Third, I obtain branch-level deposit interest rates from the RateWatch with regard to the 
effect of the regulatory shock on a bank’s deposit interest rate. From this data source, we can 
observe interest rates for various deposit products including Certificate of Deposit and Money 
Market Account with different maturities and with various balance ranges. The original data set is 
branch × week, but I convert it into a monthly frequency in this study. To calculate a spread on the 
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deposit rate against a risk free rate, I use a time-series data for the yield of 3 month Treasury Bill 
as the risk free rate from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). 
Finally, I obtain information on a deposit market share of each bank in a county or in each 
MSA from the Summary of Deposit provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC). From this data set, I can observe a branch-level deposit balance as of June 30th each year 
and thus calculate each bank’s deposit market share for each county or MSA. The market share is 
a key factor in selecting a treated area (county or MSA) in this study. I also derive the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) on a county-level or an MSA-level deposit market using this data source. 
The HHI and the market share are included as control variables for branch, local bank or regional 
economy level regressions. A local bank is a bank that collects more than 65 percent of deposits 
in a county, which can be identified from this data set.  
1.5.2 Empirical Design  
As the first step, I examine the spillover effect of the adoption of the new liquidity 
regulation on real economy. The regression model is designed as described below.  
Ymsa , y(m) = β0 + β1·Treatedmsa , y  − 1·Posty + β2·Treatedmsa , y  − 1 + Γ·Xmsa , y(m)  
                     + δmsa + δy(m) + εmsa , y(m)        (1-2) 
 
The subscripts msa, y and m refer to MSA, year and year-month, respectively. In this 
regression, I employ three different outcome variables, which are △SBLmsa , y%, △GDPmsa , y% and 
△HPImsa , m%. △SBLmsa , y% is an annual percent change in a small business lending in each MSA. 
△GDPmsa , y% refers to an annual percent change of a local GDP of each MSA. △HPImsa , m% means 
an annual percent change in an MSA-level monthly house-price-index. As for the regression on 
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△SBLmsa , y% and △GDPmsa , y%, I employ a panel of MSA × year and for the regression on 
△HPImsa , m%, the data is formed by a panel of MSA × month. In this regression, I employ the 
difference-in-difference approach. For the time difference, I compare the time before the adoption 
of the new Basel III regulation at the end of 2010 and the period after this time. The time during 
2009-2010 is the period of pre-shock and the time during 2011-2013 is the period of post-shock. 
For the group difference, I compare the MSA where the high-risk-bank (treated bank) defined later 
holds higher deposit market share and the MSA where the high-risk-bank holds lower market 
share. The cut-off level for the market share is 25 percent in this study. The treated region is 
selected based on the high-risk-bank’s market share as of June 30th of the previous year. A control 
region is selected from the MSAs that are placed in the same state with the treated region. Figure 
1.2 maps the treated and control regions as of 2010. Xmsa , y(m) is a vector of MSA level control 
variables, which include MktSharemsa , y  − 1
LowCap, MktSharemsa , y  − 1
HighLev, MktSharemsa , y  − 1
HighNPL 
MktSharemsa , y  − 1
Local, MktSharemsa , y  − 1
Small, MktSharemsa , y  − 1
BHC, HHImsa , y  − 1 and 
Delinquencymsa , y  − 1. Appendix provides the definition of each variable. δmsa, δy and δm refer to 
MSA-fixed, year-fixed and month-fixed effect, respectively.  
Figure 1.2: Treated and Control MSAs 
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As the next step, I focus on the effect of the endorsement of the new Basel III liquidity 
regulation on a bank’s asset composition to identify a bank-lending-channel that connects the 
regulatory shock to real economy. The regression model is as follows.  
Yi , t = β0 + β1·Highi , t  − 1·Posty + β2·Highi , t  − 1 + Γ⋅Xi , t + δi + δt + εi , t   (1-3) 
The subscript i, t and y refer to bank, time (year-quarter) and year, respectively. For this 
analysis, I also employ a difference-in-difference approach. To minimize the effect of the 07-09 
financial crisis on a bank’s behavioral change, the time periods start from the end of 2009. The 
time from 2009-end to 2010-end is the period of pre-shock and the time from 2011 to 2013 is the 
period of post-shock in this regression analysis. As for the difference between groups, I compare 
the bank with higher liquidity risk and the bank with lower liquidity risk. The bank with higher 
liquidity risk (a high-risk-bank) is assigned to a treated group. I use loan-to-deposit ratio as a proxy 
that measures a bank’s liquidity status. The higher the ratio is, the bank holds less liquidity and is 
more likely to fall below the minimum requirement of the LCR. Loan-to-deposit ratio is a widely 
used indicator that measures a general liquidity condition of a bank. Loan-to-deposit ratio is 
obtained simply by dividing total loans by total deposits. If a bank holds too much loans compared 
to the total amount of deposits, the bank will be more likely to experience liquidity deficit during 
the onset of financial crisis. Less amount of total deposits compared to the amount of total loans 
implies that part of the bank’s loans are financed by a wholesale funding, which is vulnerable to 
rollover risk during a financial crisis, leading to liquidity shortfall. In this regard, the bank within 
the top 20 percent in terms of its loan-to-deposit ratio is defined as a high-risk-bank and becomes 
the treated bank in this study. The high-risk-bank is selected based on the bank’s loan-to-deposit 
ratio as of the previous quarter-end.  
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 At the time of the introduction of the new Basel III regulation in December 2010, the scope 
of the application for the U.S. LCR has not been specified yet, which is determined and announced 
in 2014. However, according to the original text of the rules for the Basel III published at the end 
of 2010, the LCR is intended to be applied only to large banks. For this reason, the difference 
between the treated and control banks in their responses to the new LCR adoption could be more 
pronounced among large banks than among entire samples even though the scope of application 
was not determined yet at the end of 2010. In this regard, I run a supplemental regression covering 
only big banks in order to observe more distinctive behaviors between the treated and control 
banks. In this study, a big bank is defined to be the bank that holds total assets more than $10 
billion or affiliated in a bank holding company with total consolidated assets more than $50 billion 
as of the end of 2009 following the criteria of the coverage for the mandatory regular stress test 
under the Dodd-Frank Act enacted in July 2010.  
Yi , t is the set of outcome variables that include ΔLiquidity ⁄ Asset i , t and ΔLoan ⁄ Asset i , t. 
Those are a quarterly change in the composition of key asset items from the previous quarter-end 
to the current quarter-end. Because the main goal of this study is to compare a bank’s operational 
response to the new regulation, I focus on a quarterly change in a bank’s asset structure rather than 
the level itself. In doing so, we can control for a general mean-reverting process, which is when a 
bank facing a big liquidity risk will change its balance sheet structure to the direction of reducing 
the risk in the next quarter.  
Xi , t is a vector of bank-level control variables, which include Sizei , t  − 1, Capitali , t  − 1, 
Leveragei , t  − 1, NPLi , t  − 1, Local i , t  − 1, Smalli , t  − 1 and BHCi , t  − 1. All the control variables are 
selected as of the previous quarter-end. Interaction terms between the above controls and the time 
dummy of Posty are also added as control variables. Appendix provides a description on each 
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variable. δi and δt imply bank-fixed and quarter-fixed effect, respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered at a bank level.  
Next, I run a regression that focuses on the effect of the new regulation on a bank’s deposit 
interest rate spread. The regression model is designed as follows.  
Spreadj , m  = β0 + β1·Highi , t − 1·Posty + β2·Highi, t − 1 + Γ⋅Xj , m + δj + δm + εj , m  (1-4) 
The subscript j refers to branch and m refers to time (year-month). In this model, I use a 
panel of branch × month. Spreadj , m is a deposit rate spread for a Certificate of Deposit (CD) with 
an account size of 10,000 USD against the yield on 30 days Treasury Bills. The vector of control 
variables include county level variables such as MktSharecn , y  − 1
LowCap, MktSharecn , y  − 1
HighLev, 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
HighNPL MktSharecn , y − 1
Local, MktSharecn , y − 1
Small, MktSharecn , y − 1
BHC, 
HHIcn , y  − 1 and MktSharei , cn , y  − 1 beyond the existing bank level variables. Appendix provides the 
definition of each variable. Except for those points, all other specifications are the same as in the 
previous bank-level regression model including definition of the time dummy variables and the 
treated bank (high-risk-bank). 
As the last step, I move on to the regression that highlights the regulatory spillover effect 
on competing local banks to identify an indirect deposit-competition-channel from the regulatory 
shock to real economy via a local competition for deposits among banks. In this study, a local bank 
is the bank that collects more than 65 percent of its total deposit from a single county. The 
regression model is designed as follows.  
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Yi(j), t(m) = β0 + β1·Competecn , y − 1·Posty + β2·Competecn , y  − 1 + Γ⋅Xi(j), t(m) + 
                   δi(j) + δt(m) + εi(j), t(m)        (1-5) 
 
Yi(j), t(m) contains Spread j , m, ΔDeposit ⁄ Liabilityi , t and ΔLoan ⁄ Asset i , t. Spreadj , m is a 
branch level deposit interest rate spread against the risk-free rate. ΔDeposit ⁄ Liabilityi , t and 
ΔLoan ⁄ Asset i , t are quarterly changes in the ratios of a bank’s deposit-to-liability and loan-to-
asset from the previous quarter-end to this quarter-end, respectively. The dummy variable of 
Competecn , y − 1 identifies the local bank that is placed in the county (treated county) where the 
high-risk-bank holds at least 25 percent share of the county’s deposit market as of recent past June 
30th. The control observations are selected from local banks in a county to which the treated county 
is adjoining. This regression employs a set of bank level and county level control variables 
described above. All other specifications on the regression models are the same as the previous 
bank-level or branch-level regression models.  
1.7 Summary Statistics  
This section addresses summary statistics for key dependent and independent variables 
employed in each regression model. Summary statistics are reported in multiple tables. In Table 
1.1, we can see summary statistics for the regression that relates regional economic factors to an 
introduction of the Basel III liquidity regulation. In Panel A, the average annual growth rate in the 
amount of a small business lending in each MSA is around -0.054 percent, meaning that small 
business lending decreased by 5.4 percent annually on average during the period from 2009 to 
2013. An MSA-level GDP increased by 2.4 percent during 2009-2013 on average. The average 
annual percent change of a house price index for each MSA is around -1.3 percent during 2009-
2013. The proportion of the treated observations (treated MSAs) are around 50 percent among the 
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entire samples. Panel B and C show the results of the univariate test for the null hypothesis, which 
is the differences in mean values of key variables between the treated and control groups are equal 
to zero.  
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics for the effect on real economy 
Panel A reports summary statistics for key dependent and independent variables regarding a 
regulatory effect on real economy. This data-set is constructed as an MSA × year or an MSA × 
month level. Panel B and C report results of univariate tests for null hypotheses, which imply 
differences of variables between the treated and control groups are equal to zero. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics  
 
N  Mean  S.D.  Percentile Distribution  
25th  Median  75th  
△SBLmsa , y%  1720 -0.054 0.207 -0.213 -0.039 0.073 
Treatedmsa , y − 1  1786 0.502 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
MktSharemsa , y  − 1
LowCap  1786 0.268 0.212 0.088 0.228 0.412 
MktSharemsa , y  − 1
HighLev  1786 0.419 0.234 0.228 0.396 0.594 
MktSharemsa , y  − 1
HighNPL  1786 0.376 0.256 0.159 0.341 0.561 
MktSharemsa , y  − 1
Local  1786 0.211 0.177 0.077 0.165 0.299 
MktSharemsa , y  − 1
Small  1786 0.302 0.204 0.145 0.263 0.425 
MktSharemsa , y  − 1
BHC  1786 0.903 0.119 0.873 0.941 0.982 
HHImsa , y  − 1  1786 0.164 0.094 0.113 0.140 0.181 
Delinquencymsa , y  − 1  1785 0.147 0.148 0.078 0.114 0.159 
△GDPmsa , y%  1685 0.024 0.038 0.005 0.027 0.044 
Treatedmsa , y − 1  1751 0.494 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 
△HPImsa , m%  19950 -0.013 0.063 -0.044 -0.013 0.017 
Treatedmsa , y − 1  20730 0.512 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
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Panel B: Univariate Test Results (Pre-Shock) 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Diff (t-stat) 
 Treatedmsa , y − 1 = 0 Treatedmsa , y − 1 = 1   
△SBLmsa , y% -0.191 -0.221 -0.208 -0.246 0.017 (1.27) 
MktSharemsa , y  − 1
LowCap 0.303 0.269 0.404 0.392 -0.101*** (-6.13) 
MktSharemsa , y  − 1
HighLev 0.569 0.593 0.577 0.589 -0.008 (-0.49) 
MktSharemsa , y  − 1
HighNPL 0.296 0.237 0.293 0.236 0.003 (0.18) 
MktSharemsa , y  − 1
Local 0.246 0.197 0.224 0.177 0.022 (1.60) 
MktSharemsa , y  − 1
Small 0.323 0.279 0.312 0.267 0.011 (0.71) 
MktSharemsa , y  − 1
BHC 0.890 0.942 0.901 0.946 -0.011 (-1.19) 
HHImsa , y  − 1 0.179 0.152 0.157 0.142 0.022
*** (3.41) 
Delinquencymsa , y  − 1 0.135 0.093 0.127 0.095 0.008 (0.68) 
△GDPmsa , y% 0.011 0.014 0.011 0.014 0.000 (0.03) 
△HPImsa , m% -0.042 -0.029 -0.046 -0.035 0.004*** (3.62) 
 
Panel C: Univariate Test Results (Post-Shock) 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Diff (t-stat) 
 Treatedmsa , y − 1 = 0 Treatedmsa , y − 1 = 1   
△SBLmsa , y% 0.069 0.057 0.035 0.017 0.034*** (3.44) 
MktSharemsa , y  − 1
LowCap 0.189 0.142 0.219 0.186 -0.029** (-2.73) 
MktSharemsa , y  − 1
HighLev 0.323 0.306 0.298 0.262 0.024* (2.09) 
MktSharemsa , y  − 1
HighNPL 0.449 0.460 0.410 0.384 0.039* (2.53) 
MktSharemsa , y  − 1
Local 0.198 0.151 0.194 0.149 0.003 (0.33) 
MktSharemsa , y  − 1
Small 0.303 0.261 0.279 0.252 0.023 (1.87) 
MktSharemsa , y  − 1
BHC 0.904 0.937 0.911 0.942 -0.007 (-0.94) 
HHImsa , y  − 1 0.163 0.135 0.162 0.136 0.002 (0.31) 
Delinquencymsa , y  − 1 0.156 0.125 0.164 0.135 -0.008 (-0.88) 
△GDPmsa , y% 0.036 0.033 0.031 0.031 0.005** (2.59) 
△HPImsa , m% 0.013 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.009*** (8.52) 
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Panel A of Table 1A.1 in Appendices reports summary statistics for the regression that 
relates a change in a bank’s asset composition to the regulatory shock. All variables are constructed 
by the bank-quarter panel. During the sample periods during 2009-end to 2013-end, a bank’s 
liquidity-to-asset increased by 0.3 percentage points each quarter but a bank’s loan-to-asset 
decreased by 0.3 percentage points per quarter. The proportion of treated observations is around 
20 percent among the entire samples. Summary statistics for bank-level control variables are also 
reported. In Panel B and C of Table 1A.1, we can see the univariate test results for each variable 
between the treated and the control groups.  
Table 1A.2 in Appendices reports the summary statistics for the regression regarding the 
regulatory effect on a bank’s deposit interest rate spread. In Panel A, we see that a spread on a 
bank’s deposit interest rate against the risk free rate is around 29 basis points during the sample 
period. The data on a deposit rate spread is a panel of the branch-month. In this study, a bank’s 
deposit rate is the interest rate for the Certificate of Deposit (CD) with 12 months maturity and 
with a balance up to 10,000 USD. Treated observations (high-risk-banks) account for around 26 
percent among entire samples in this regression. We also observe summary statistics for bank-
level and county-level control variables. From Panel B and C, we see the univariate test results for 
each variable between the treated and control groups.  
Finally, Table 1A.3 in Appendices reports summary statistics for the regression that 
highlights a spillover effect of the new Basel III liquidity regulation on a local bank’s operation. 
Panel A reports the summary statistics for a spread on the local bank’s deposit interest rate. The 
mean value of the deposit rate spread of the local banks is around 55 basis points during the sample 
period. The proportion of the treated observations (local banks in treated counties) for this part are 
around 44 percent among total samples. According to Panel B, during the sample period from 
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2009-end to 2013-end, the local bank’s deposit-to-liability ratio increased by 0.1 percent points 
quarterly, on average. On the other hand, during the same period, the mean value for the bank’s 
quarterly change in loan-to-asset ratio is negative 0.3 percentage points. The proportion of the 
treated observations (local banks in treated counties) are around 41 percent among total samples. 
In this regression, the treated observations are selected based on the location of the local bank’s 
main operation. Like the other tables, Panel C through F report the univariate test results.  
1.8 Empirical Results  
In this section, we discuss empirical results of this study. Empirical results are divided into 
five subsections by the regression models. First, we focus on the consequences of the LCR’s real 
effect on the economy by regressing changes in real economic factors on the LCR shock. Second, 
we identify a direct bank-lending-channel for the LCR’s real effect by the regression that relates a 
change in a high-risk-bank’s asset composition to an introduction of the new Basel III liquidity 
regulation. Third, we see whether the regulatory shock affects a spread on the high-risk-bank’s 
deposit funding cost in order to identify an indirect deposit-competition-channel for the LCR’s 
real effect. Fourth, we move on to the regression for a spillover effect of the high-risk-bank’s 
behavioral change in response to the regulatory reform on the competing local bank’s operation 
via the deposit-competition channel. Finally, I conduct robustness tests using stricter fixed effects 
after matching the treated and control observations through the Mahalanobis distance.  
1.8.1 Ripple effect of a regulatory shock on a real economy  
First, we examine the spillover effect of the regulatory shock on real economy predicted in 
the hypothesis. Tables 1.2 to 1.4 report the results of the regression designed in Equation (1-2). 
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The treated group (MSA) is formed based on the deposit market share of the high-risk-banks in 
each region (MSA) as of June 30th of the previous year. In this regression analysis, the coefficient 
of our interest is a set of difference-in-difference estimators, which are Treatedmsa , y  − 1 × Posty, 
Treatedmsa , y − 1 × Posty2011, Treatedmsa, y − 1 × Posty2012 and Treatedmsa, y  − 1 × Posty2013. Those 
interaction terms between a treated dummy and time dummies represent how severely the 
differences between the treated and control regions in real economic factors have changed after 
the adoption of the new Basel III liquidity regulation at the end of 2010.  
In Table 1.2, I employ an annual percent change in the aggregated small business lending 
in each MSA as the outcome variable. In the first column, the estimation result for 
Treatedmsa , y − 1 × Posty is negative and statistically significant. On the other hand, 
Treatedmsa , y − 1 is estimated to be positive and significant. The meaning of those regression results 
is that the annual percent change of small business lending in a treated MSA was higher than the 
change in a control MSA before the adoption of the Basel III liquidity regulation in December 
2010. After the regulatory reform in 2010, however, the annual percent change in small business 
lending in the treated MSA becomes lower than the change in the control MSA. In other words, as 
the market share of the high-risk-banks (treated group) becomes higher in an MSA, the regulatory 
shock’s negative effect on the growth rate of the small business lending in the MSA becomes more 
stringent. In Figure 1.3, we see that the parallel trends between the treated and control MSAs were 
maintained before the regulatory shock for the annual growth rate of the small business lending, 
but the two trends started to diverge after the shock.  
 
 
 28 
Table 1.2: Annual percent change in Small Business Lending to an MSA 
This table reports a regression that relates an annual percent change in a small business lending 
to an introduction of Basel III liquidity regulation in 2010. The regression model is designed as 
follows.  
 
△SBLmsa, y% = β0 + β1Treatedmsa, y  − 1∙Posty + β2∙Treatedmsa, y  − 1 + Γ⋅Xmsa, y + FEs + εmsa, y 
 
Xmsa, y is a vector of MSA level control variables, which include MktSharemsa, y  − 1LowCap, 
MktSharemsa, y  − 1HighLev, MktSharemsa, y  − 1HighNPL, MktSharemsa, y  − 1Local, MktSharemsa, y  − 1Small, 
MktSharemsa, y  − 1BHC, HHImsa, y  − 1 and Delinquencymsa, y  − 1. To conserve the space, Xmsa, y are 
not reported. FEs includes MSA and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at an MSA 
level. Appendix provides a description of each variable. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. The t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
 △SBLmsa , y% 
 (1) (2) 
Treatedmsa , y − 1 × Posty -0.046*** 
 
 (-2.81) 
 
Treatedmsa , y − 1 × Posty2011 
 
-0.020 
 
 
(-0.85) 
Treatedmsa , y − 1 × Posty2012 
 
-0.061*** 
 
 
(-2.83) 
Treatedmsa , y − 1 × Posty2013 
 
-0.065*** 
 
 
(-3.13) 
Treatedmsa , y − 1 0.032
** 0.033** 
 (2.13) (2.19) 
Observations 1711 1711 
Adjusted R2 0.478 0.479 
MSA FE Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
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Figure 1.3: Trend of annual growth rate for MSA level Small Business Lending 
 
 
Table 1.3 replaces an annual percent change in the aggregated small business lending with 
an annual growth rate of GDP in each MSA as the dependent variable. In the first column, we see 
the estimation result for Treatedmsa , y  − 1 is positive but the interaction term of 
Treatedmsa , y − 1 × Posty is estimated to be negative. Interestingly, the absolute value of 
Treatedmsa , y − 1 × Posty is larger than that of Treatedmsa , y  − 1. Both the coefficients are 
statistically significant. The interpretation for those regression results is that an annual growth rate 
of GDP in the treated MSA is higher than the GDP growth rate in the control MSA before the 
introduction of the liquidity regulation, but, after this time, it reverses. This result means that the 
new regulation affects real economic factors in a negative way through an operational change of a 
high-risk-bank. In column 2, we still observe statistically significant results on the difference-in-
difference coefficients. In Figure 1.4, we can identify that there were parallel trends for the MSA 
level annual GDP growth rate between the treated and control MSAs before the regulatory shock, 
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but the trend line of the treated MSAs becomes lower than the line of the control MSAs after the 
LCR shock.  
Table 1.3: Annual percent change in local GDP of an MSA 
This table reports a regression that relates an annual growth rate in a local GDP to an 
introduction of Basel III liquidity regulation in 2010. The regression model is designed as 
follows. 
 
△GDPmsa, y% = β0 + β1∙Treatedmsa, y  − 1∙Posty + β2∙Treatedmsa, y  − 1 + Γ⋅Xmsa, y + FEs + εmsa, y 
 
Xmsa, y is a vector of MSA level control variables, which are the same as Table 1.2. To conserve 
the space, Xmsa, y are not reported. FEs includes MSA and year fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered at an MSA level. Appendix provides a description of each variable. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. The t-
statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
 △GDPmsa , y% 
 
(1)  (2)  
Treatedmsa , y − 1 × Posty  -0.016*** 
 
 
(-3.87) 
 
Treatedmsa , y − 1 × Posty2011  
 
-0.014*** 
  
(-2.89) 
Treatedmsa , y − 1 × Posty2012  
 
-0.015*** 
  
(-2.83) 
Treatedmsa , y − 1 × Posty2013  
 
-0.019*** 
  
(-4.20) 
Treatedmsa , y − 1  0.007
** 0.007** 
 
(2.05) (2.07) 
Observations  1676 1676 
Adjusted R2  0.222 0.222 
MSA FE  Y  Y  
Year FE  Y  Y  
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Figure 1.4: Trend of annual growth rate for MSA level GDP 
 
 
The next step of this section is comparing annual percent changes of the monthly house 
price indices between MSAs. Table 1.4 reports the regression results. In column 1, we find that 
the coefficient of Treatedmsa , y  − 1 is statistically insignificant but Treatedmsa , y  − 1 × Posty is 
estimated as being negative and significant. The results imply that there is no significant difference 
in the annual percent change of the monthly HPI between the treated and the control regions before 
the regulatory shock but the HPI of the treated MSA decreases more severely or increase less 
steeply than the HPI of the control MSA after the endorsement of the new regulation. The results 
in column 2 are also similar. The conclusion of this analysis is that as the market share of high-
risk-banks is larger, the growth rate of the HPI of the MSA becomes lower after the regulatory 
shock at the end of 2010 than before compared to the growth rate of the HPI in other MSAs. In 
Figure 1.5, we can identify whether and how the trends of the house price index changed after the 
regulatory shock in the treated and control regions.  
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Table 1.4: Annual percent change in Housing Price Index of an MSA 
This table reports a regression that relates an annual percent change of monthly house price 
index to an introduction of Basel III liquidity regulation in 2010. The regression model is 
designed as follows. 
 
△HPImsa, m% = β0 + β1Treatedmsa, y  − 1∙Posty + β2Treatedmsa, y  − 1 + ΓXmsa, m + FEs + εmsa, m 
 
Xmsa, y is a vector of MSA level control variables, which are the same as Table 1.2. To conserve 
the space, Xmsa, y are not reported. FEs includes MSA and month fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered at an MSA level. Appendix provides a description of each variable. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. The t-
statistics are in parenthesis.  
 
 △HPImsa , m% 
 
(1)  (2)  
Treatedmsa , y − 1 × Posty  -0.013*** 
 
 
(-2.87) 
 
Treatedmsa , y − 1 × Posty2011  
 
-0.004 
  
(-1.21) 
Treatedmsa , y − 1 × Posty2012  
 
-0.009* 
  
(-1.81) 
Treatedmsa , y − 1 × Posty2013  
 
-0.029*** 
  
(-3.72) 
Treatedmsa , y − 1  0.005 0.006 
 
(1.19) (1.33) 
Observations  19938 19938 
Adjusted R2  0.668 0.672 
MSA FE  Y  Y  
Month FE  Y  Y  
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Figure 1.5: Trend of annual growth rate for MSA level House Price Index 
 
 
The results in Tables 2 to 4 are also economically significant because the estimated values 
for Treated × Post have opposite sign to the mean or are around 85 to 100 percent of the mean. 
In this sub-section, we find that, if a group of banks with higher liquidity risk has dominant market 
power in a region, the area’s real economic factors such as small business lending, GDP and house 
price indices are negatively affected by the LCR regulatory shock. Next, we will see the specific 
channels of the spillover effect from the regulatory shock to the real economy through a bank’s 
behavioral change.  
1.8.2 Effect of a regulatory shock on a bank’s asset structure  
Tables 1.5 and 1.6 report the test results of Equation (1-3) to address whether the LCR 
affects a bank’s asset structure. In columns 1 and 2, the treated and control observations are 
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selected from the entire samples. In columns 3 and 4, the regression focuses on the large banks 
which are expected to be subject to the new regulation more likely at the time of the LCR 
introduction in 2010. In this regression, the main coefficient of our interest is a set of interaction 
terms between treated and time dummy variables, which are Highi , t  − 1 × Posty, 
Highi , t − 1 × Posty2011, Highi , t  − 1 × Posty2012 and Highi , t − 1 × Posty2013. Those interaction terms 
are the difference-in-difference coefficients, which represent how severely the difference between 
treated and control banks in the quarterly change of the bank’s asset composition has transformed 
after the regulatory shock. All of the above specifications are applied equally to Tables 6 and 7. 
The only difference between the two tables are the outcome variable. To conserve space, I suppress 
control variables and constants in the tables.  
In Table 1.5, the dependent variable is a quarterly change of a bank’s liquidity-to-asset 
ratio. As we can see from the first column of this table, the coefficient of Highi , t  − 1 ×Posty is 
positive and statistically significant. This result means that an annual increase or decrease of the 
high-risk-bank’s liquidity-to-asset ratio becomes larger or smaller, respectively, after the 
regulatory shock in 2010 than before compared to that of the control bank. In other words, the 
bank facing higher liquidity risk measured by its loan-to-deposit ratio has increased the proportion 
of liquidity among total assets more severely or cut the liquidity portion less than the bank with 
lower liquidity risk in response to the endorsement of the new Basel III liquidity regulation. In the 
second and fourth column, we can also find statistically significant results on the difference-in-
difference coefficients. The most significant results are found in 2013 in both columns 2 and 4. 
Another interesting finding is that the difference-in-difference coefficients in columns 3 and 4 are 
larger in their magnitudes than the results in columns 1 and 2. This is because the large banks are 
expected to be regulated by the LCR standard most likely even though the specific coverage of the 
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new regulation’s application was not determined yet in the U.S. at the time of the LCR 
introduction. As a result, the difference in the bank’s behavioral change in response to the regulatory 
shock between the treated (high-risk-bank) and the control groups is more distinctive among large 
banks (columns 3 and 4) than when encompassing the entire samples (columns 1 and 2). 
Table 1.5: Quarterly change in Liquidity-to-Asset 
This table reports a regression that relates a quarterly change in a bank’s asset structure to an 
introduction of Basel III liquidity regulation in 2010. The regression model is designed as 
follows. 
 
△Liquidity ⁄ Asset i , t = β0 + β1∙Highi , t  − 1∙Posty + β2∙Highi , t  − 1 + Γ⋅Xi , t + FEs + εi , t  
 
Xi , t is a vector of bank level control variables, which include Sizei , t  − 1, Capitali , t  − 1, 
Leveragei , t  − 1, NPLi , t  − 1, Local i , t  − 1, Smalli , t  − 1 and BHCi , t  − 1. To conserve the space, Xi , t 
are not reported. FEs includes bank-fixed and quarter-fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at a bank level. Appendix provides a description of each variable. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. The t-
statistics are in parenthesis. Coefficients of control variables and constant are not reported.  
 
 
△Liquidity ⁄ Asset i , t   
All  Large Banks  
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Highi , t − 1 × Posty  0.004*** 
 
0.010** 
 
 
(8.07) 
 
(2.56) 
 
Highi , t − 1 × Posty2011  
 
0.002*** 
 
0.010** 
  
(2.99) 
 
(2.26) 
Highi , t − 1 × Posty2012  
 
0.004*** 
 
0.006 
  
(6.14) 
 
(1.37) 
Highi , t − 1 × Posty2013  
 
0.007*** 
 
0.014*** 
  
(11.75) 
 
(3.38) 
Highi , t − 1  0.012
*** 0.012*** 0.004 0.004 
 
(19.06) (18.76) (0.82) (0.79) 
Observations  105604 105604 1539 1539 
Adjusted R2  0.035 0.036 0.040 0.041 
Bank FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Quarter FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  
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In Table 1.6, the outcome variable is replaced with a quarterly change of a bank’s loan-to-
asset ratio. In this table, we find quite opposite results for the difference-in-difference coefficients 
to those in the previous table. In the first column of this table, we see the estimated value for the 
coefficient of Highi , t  − 1 ×Posty is negative and statistically significant. According to the estimated 
value for Highi , t  − 1 in the first column, there is also a decrease in the quarterly change of the loan-
to-asset ratio between the treated (high-risk-bank) and control groups before 4Q of 2010. From 
this result, we see a mean reverting process that a bank with weak liquidity position tends to change 
its asset structure in a direction of strengthening its liquidity risk management by increasing 
liquidity portion and reducing loan proportion even before the regulatory shock. However, the 
difference-in-difference estimator of Highi , t  − 1 ×Posty tells us that the mean-reverting process 
becomes stronger after the regulatory shock at the end of 2010. In other words, an annual decrease 
or increase of loan-to-asset ratio of the bank with a weak liquidity status becomes larger or smaller, 
respectively, after the adoption of the LCR in 2010 than before compared to that of the bank with 
the stronger liquidity position. In all other columns 2 to 4, we also find statistically significant 
results for the difference-in-difference estimators. 
Table 1.6: Quarterly change in Loan-to-Asset 
This table reports a regression that relates a quarterly change in a bank’s asset structure to an 
introduction of Basel III liquidity regulation in 2010. The regression model is designed as 
follows. 
 
△Loan ⁄ Asset i , t = β0 + β1∙Highi, t  − 1∙Posty + β2∙Highi , t − 1 + Γ⋅Xi , t + FEs + εi , t  
 
Xi , t is a vector of bank level control variables, which are the same as Table 1.5. To conserve the 
space, Xi , t are not reported. FEs includes bank-fixed and quarter-fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered at a bank level. Appendix provides a description of each variable. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. The t-
statistics are in parenthesis. Coefficients of control variables and constant are not reported. 
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△Loan ⁄ Asset i , t   
All  Large Banks   
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Highi , t − 1 × Posty  -0.003*** 
 
-0.010*** 
 
 
(-6.26) 
 
(-3.18) 
 
Highi , t − 1 × Posty2011  
 
-0.001** 
 
-0.010***   
(-1.97) 
 
(-2.93) 
Highi , t − 1 × Posty2012  
 
-0.003*** 
 
-0.007*   
(-4.14) 
 
(-1.75) 
Highi , t − 1 × Posty2013  
 
-0.006*** 
 
-0.014***   
(-9.92) 
 
(-3.60) 
Highi , t  − 1  -0.020
*** -0.020*** -0.003 -0.003  
(-31.76) (-31.42) (-0.60) (-0.57) 
Observations  105604 105604 1539 1539 
Adjusted R2  0.093 0.094 0.048 0.049 
Bank FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Quarter FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  
 
The results in Tables 1.5 and 1.6 are also economically significant because the estimated 
values for Highi , t  − 1 ×Posty are around 100 to 133 percent of the mean. The conclusion of this 
sub-section is that there is a significant effect of the regulatory shock of the new Basel III liquidity 
regulation on a bank’s asset structure if the bank is relatively weak in its liquidity position. If a 
bank’s loan-to-deposit ratio is relatively high, the bank increases the proportion of its liquidity and 
reduces the proportion of loans among total assets significantly in response to the regulatory shock 
compared to the bank with a better liquidity position.  
1.8.3 Effect of a regulatory shock on a bank’s deposit interest rate  
As the next step, I investigate the regulatory impact on a bank’s deposit rate spread. Table 
1.7 reports the regression results relating a spread on a bank’s deposit interest rate to the 
introduction of the new Basel III liquidity regulation. The data used in the regression is a panel of 
branch × month. This is the test result of the model designed in Equation (1-4) that addresses 
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whether the LCR affects a bank’s funding cost. The reason why I use the branch-level data is that 
the deposit interest rate could be differentiated not only by the bank that the branch belongs to but 
also by the location of the branch. Thus, in this regression, I add area-level control variables such 
as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for the county-level deposit market and the bank’s 
deposit market share in a county. All other specifications are the same as previous tables.  
In this regression, the difference-in-difference estimators are the main coefficients of our 
interest. In the first column, Highi , t  − 1 × Posty is estimated to be 0.033 and strongly significant. 
This value is around 11.4 percent of the mean. This result needs to be compared with the estimated 
value for Highi , t  − 1, which is - 0.045 and also statistically different from zero. This result implies 
that a spread on a high-risk-bank’s deposit interest rate is lower by 4.5 basis points than a spread 
of a control bank before the regulatory shock. However, the difference between the high-risk-bank 
and the control bank in a deposit rate spread was reduced after the regulatory shock in 2010. If we 
turn to columns 3 and 4, where the regression focuses on large banks, the results becomes more 
significant both statistically and economically. The implication of this result is that if the samples 
are selected from large banks that were expected to be subject to the LCR most likely, the 
distinction between the high-risk-bank and the control bank in their deposit rates becomes more 
significant after the LCR introduction in 2010.  
The regulatory shock has a different effect on a bank’s deposit interest rate spread 
depending on the level of a bank’s liquidity risk by inducing the high-risk-bank to increase its 
deposit rate more aggressively after the regulatory shock than before compared to the control bank. 
This is because the high-risk-bank needs to expand the portion of the stable retail deposit balance 
instead of the wholesale borrowing as its funding source in order to meet the minimum requirement 
set by the LCR regulation. Columns 2 to 4 also represent similar regression results. 
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Table 1.7: Spread on Deposit interest rate  
This table reports a regression that relates a spread on a deposit interest rate to an introduction 
of Basel III liquidity regulation in 2010. The regression model is designed as follows. 
Spreadj , m = β0 + β1∙Highi , t − 1∙Posty + β2∙Highi , t − 1 + Γ⋅Xj , m + FEs + εj , m 
Xj , m is a vector of bank level control variables, which are the same as Table 1.5, and county 
level control variables, which include MktSharecn, y − 1LowCap, MktSharecn, y  − 1HighLev, 
MktSharecn, y  − 1HighNP, MktSharecn, y − 1Local, MktSharecn, y − 1Small, MktSharecn, y − 1BHC, 
HHIcn, y  − 1 and MktSharei , cn, y  − 1. To conserve the space, Xj , m are not reported. FEs includes 
branch and month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at a branch level. Appendix 
provides a description of each variable. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. The t-statistics are in parenthesis. Coefficients of 
control variables and constant are not reported. 
 
 
 
Spreadj , m 
 
All  Large Banks  
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Highi , t − 1 × Posty  0.033*** 
 
0.075*** 
 
 
(21.47) 
 
(38.67) 
 
Highi , t − 1 × Posty2011  
 
0.014*** 
 
0.061*** 
  
(8.66) 
 
(32.65) 
Highi , t − 1 × Posty2012  
 
0.035*** 
 
0.071*** 
  
(20.95) 
 
(34.28) 
Highi , t − 1 × Posty2013  
 
0.058*** 
 
0.098*** 
  
(31.07) 
 
(44.20) 
Highi , t  − 1  -0.045
*** -0.047*** -0.108*** -0.109*** 
 
(-25.80) (-26.78) (-52.10) (-52.34) 
Observations  2377676 2377676 1371963 1371963 
Adjusted R2  0.895 0.896 0.822 0.823 
Branch FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Month FE Y  Y  Y  Y  
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1.8.4 Spillover Effect on local banks  
1.8.4.1 Deposit interest rate  
In this sub-section, I report the results of the regression described in Equation (1-5) in order 
to address an indirect channel of the LCR shock on real economy through a competing local bank’s 
operation. To this end, as a first step, I relate a deposit interest rate of a local bank to an introduction 
of Basel III liquidity regulation in 2010. The regression results are reported in Table 1.9. The 
sample of this regression is a panel of branch × month. In this regression, samples are restricted to 
branches of a local bank. The treated group is selected based on location of the branches. If a 
branch is placed in a county where a group of banks with higher loan-to-deposit ratio has a 
dominant market power, the branch becomes the treated group. Dominant market power is defined 
to be the situation where the deposit market share is higher than 25 percent in the county.  
In Table 1.8, the first and second columns encompass entire samples of local banks and the 
third and fourth columns focus on independent local banks that are not affiliated in any bank 
holding company. In the first column, we see that the coefficient of Competecn , y  − 1 × Posty is 
estimated to be 0.014 and statistically significant at 1 percent level. The result implies that, as for 
a local bank, the deposit interest rate of the branches in the treated region increased by 14 basis 
points more after the regulatory shock than before compared to the rate of the branches in the 
control region. In other words, local banks increased deposit interest rates significantly after the 
introduction of the LCR regardless of the bank’s liquidity status if the local bank faced severe 
deposit competition with the high-risk-banks in the local market. In conclusion, there is a spillover 
effect of the regulatory shock on the local bank through an aggressive increase of the high-risk-
bank’s deposit rate.  
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Table 1.8: Spread on Deposit interest rate (Spillover to Local Banks)  
This table reports a regression that relates a spread on a deposit rate of a local bank to an 
introduction of Basel III liquidity regulation in 2010. The regression model is designed as 
follows. 
Spreadj , m = β0 + β1∙Competecn, y  − 1∙Posty + β2∙Competecn, y − 1 + Γ⋅Xj , m + FEs + εj , m  
Xj , m is a vector of bank level and county level control variables, which include Highi , t  − 1 and 
all of the control variables used in Table 1.7. To conserve the space, Xj , m are not reported. FEs 
includes branch and month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at a branch level. 
Appendix provides a description of each variable. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. The t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
Coefficients of control variables and constant are not reported. 
 
 
 
Spreadj , m 
 
All  Independent  
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Highi , t − 1 × Posty  0.014*** 
 
-0.005 
 
 
(3.41) 
 
(-0.50) 
 
Highi , t − 1 × Posty2011  
 
0.008** 
 
-0.016 
  
(2.12) 
 
(-1.65) 
Highi , t − 1 × Posty2012  
 
0.016*** 
 
-0.007 
  
(3.59) 
 
(-0.59) 
Highi , t − 1 × Posty2013  
 
0.020*** 
 
0.013 
  
(3.98) 
 
(0.98) 
Highi , t  − 1  0.006 0.006 0.052
*** 0.050*** 
 
(1.58) (1.39) (4.84) (4.59) 
Observations  305413 305413 42399 42399 
Adjusted R2  0.898 0.898 0.905 0.905 
Branch FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Month FE Y  Y  Y  Y  
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In columns 3 to 4, we move on to the analysis for a regulatory spillover effect on an 
independent local bank that is not affiliated in any BHC. This bank is truly local because the bank 
is not able to gain access to a geographical branch network across regions and to utilize the inter-
company network formed through the BHC. All the specifications are the same as in columns 1 
and 2 except for the sample coverage. In the third column of the table, the estimation results for 
the difference-in-difference estimator, Competecn , y  − 1 × Posty, is statistically insignificant. The 
result means that, even though a branch of the independent local bank was located in the treated 
county, the branch did not respond severely to the aggressive increase in the majority high-risk-
bank’s deposit interest rate. This is because the independent local bank has a difficulty in shifting 
its increased deposit funding cost from one location to another region due to the limitation in its 
accessibility to geographical branch network as well as within-BHC network.  
1.8.4.2 Balance Sheet Structure  
As a final stage, I investigate a spillover effect of the regulatory shock on the balance sheet 
structure of a local bank. In the first and second columns of Table 1.9, I employ a quarterly change 
in a deposit-to-liability ratio of a local bank as an outcome variable. Like the previous regression, 
the first two columns encompass entire samples of local banks and the last two columns focus on 
independent local banks which are not affiliated in any BHC. Treated group consists of the local 
banks that are placed in a county where a deposit market share of the high-risk-bank is more than 
25 percent. All other specifications on the regression model and reporting format are the same as 
the regression results in Table 1.9. In the first column, the estimated value for 
Competecn , y − 1 × Posty is not statistically significant. The implication is that we cannot find any 
significant difference in the quarterly change of the deposit proportion for the local banks placed 
in the treated region after the regulatory shock compared to the local banks in the control area. 
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This is because the local bank in the treated region tends to readjust its deposit interest rate quickly 
given a tougher deposit competition with the high-risk-banks after the introduction of the LCR.  
On the other hands, the regression results for the independent local banks are quite 
different. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 1.9 report the results. The estimated value for 
Competecn , y − 1 × Posty is negative and statistically significant. This results means that, if the 
independent local bank operated in a treated county where the deposit market share of the high-
risk-banks was large, the local bank faced a reduction in deposit proportion against total liabilities 
after the regulatory shock. This is because, as seen in Table 1.9, the independent local bank did 
not increase its deposit interest rate flexibly despite an aggressive increase of the deposit interest 
rate by the nearby high-risk-bank. As a result of its lower flexibility in its deposit rate adjustment, 
the independent local bank should face a reduction in its deposit portion among total liabilities.  
Table 1.9: Quarterly change in Deposit-to-Liability (Spillover to Local Banks) 
This table reports a regression that relates a quarterly change in deposit-to-liability ratio of a 
local bank to an introduction of Basel III liquidity regulation in 2010. The regression model is 
designed as follows. 
△Deposit ⁄ Liability i, t = β0 + β1∙Competecn, y  − 1∙Posty + β2∙Competecn, y  − 1 + Γ⋅Xi, t + FEs + εi, t  
Xi , t is a vector of bank level and county level control variables, which are the same as Table 1.8.  
To conserve the space, Xi , t are not reported. FEs includes bank and quarter fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at a bank level. Appendix provides a description of each variable. 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
The t-statistics are in parenthesis. Coefficients of control variables and constant are not 
reported. 
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ΔDeposit ⁄ Liabilityi , t  
All  Independent 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Competecn , y − 1 × Posty  -0.000 
 
-0.002** 
 
 
(-0.27) 
 
(-2.17) 
 
Competecn , y − 1 × Posty2011  
 
-0.000 
 
-0.002* 
  
(-0.17) 
 
(-1.96) 
Competecn , y − 1 × Posty2012  
 
0.000 
 
-0.001 
  
(0.69) 
 
(-1.24) 
Competecn , y − 1 × Posty2013  
 
-0.001 
 
-0.003** 
  
(-1.18) 
 
(-2.28) 
Competecn , y − 1  -0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.002  
(-0.12) (-0.07) (1.60) (1.62) 
Observations  35997 35997 5793 5793 
Adjusted R2  0.025 0.025 0.019 0.019 
Bank FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Quarter FE Y  Y  Y  Y  
 
Finally, the outcome variable is replaced with a quarterly change in a bank’s loan-to-asset 
ratio. Table 1.10 reports the results. Except for the dependent variable, all other specifications are 
the same as in Table 1.9. The regression results are also similar to those in Table 1.9. In the first 
two columns, in which the regression encompasses entire samples of local banks, we cannot find 
any statistically significant results. On the other hand, in the last two columns, in which only the 
independent local banks are employed, we see a negative and significant estimation results for 
Competecn , y − 1 × Posty. The implication is that an independent local bank in the treated region 
could not flexibly readjust its deposit interest rate even when facing a severe deposit competition 
with a nearby high-risk-bank after the regulatory shock, leading to a decrease in deposit proportion 
and loan proportion against total liabilities and total assets, respectively.  
The bottom line of this section is that there was a spillover effect of the regulatory shock 
on the local bank’s funding cost and balance sheet structure. An improvement of liquidity risk 
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management for the high-risk-bank through the new requirement given by the new Basel III rule 
brought about an increase in funding cost or an expansion of liquidity problem to nearby local 
banks. Accordingly, the local banks were less likely to be substitute lenders that could fill the void 
of the credit supply to the local economy.  
Table 1.10: Quarterly change in Loan-to-Asset (Spillover to Local Banks) 
This table reports a regression that relates a quarterly change in loan-to-asset ratio of a local 
bank to an introduction of Basel III liquidity regulation in 2010. The regression model is 
designed as follows. 
△Loan ⁄ Asset i , t = β0 + β1∙Competecn, y − 1∙Posty + β2∙Competecn, y − 1 + Γ⋅Xi , t + FEs + εi , t  
Xi , t is a vector of bank level and county level control variables, which are the same as Table 1.8. 
To conserve the space, Xi , t are not reported. FEs includes bank and quarter fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at a bank level. Appendix provides a description of each variable. 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
The t-statistics are in parenthesis. Coefficients of control variables and constant are not 
reported. 
 
 
ΔLoan ⁄ Asset i , t  
All  Independent  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Competecn , y − 1 × Posty  -0.001 
 
-0.003* 
 
 
(-1.13) 
 
(-1.65) 
 
Competecn , y − 1 × Posty2011  
 
-0.001* 
 
-0.004**   
(-1.77) 
 
(-2.24) 
Competecn , y − 1 × Posty2012  
 
-0.000 
 
-0.001   
(-0.33) 
 
(-0.69) 
Competecn , y − 1 × Posty2013  
 
-0.001 
 
-0.003   
(-0.65) 
 
(-1.18) 
Competecn , y − 1  0.002
** 0.001* 0.002 0.002  
(2.01) (1.94) (1.31) (1.24) 
Observations  35997 35997 5793 5793 
Adjusted R2  0.180 0.180 0.149 0.149 
Bank FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Quarter FE Y  Y  Y  Y  
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1.8.5 Robustness  
I conduct several robustness tests for this study. The first part is to match treated and control 
observations on market level, bank level characteristics or both. The nearest neighboring matching 
through the Mahalanobis distance is employed to select control observations. Regarding the real 
effect regressions, samples are matched on MSA-level variables such as a market share of low-
capital banks and that of high-levered banks in each MSA. In the bank level regressions, treated 
and control banks are matched on bank-level characteristics such as a bank's size, capital ratio and 
leverage ratio. With regard to the branch level regressions, individual branches are matched not 
only on bank-level characteristics but also on market-level characteristics such as a deposit market 
share of the bank in the county and a county-level HHI for a deposit market. Finally, in the 
regressions for competing local banks, samples are also matched on both bank-level and market-
level dimensions used in the branch level regressions. Samples in the local bank regressions are 
additionally matched on each bank's liquidity status measured by the bank's loan-to-deposit ratio. 
Table 1A.4 in Appendices presents the regression results. We can see the results are still robust 
after matching treated and control samples.  
As a next step, I employed stricter fixed effects to the baseline regressions together with 
matching. Regarding the real effect regressions, I add year × division fixed effect to compare 
movements of real economic factors between groups in geographical proximity to each other. 
There are totally 9 U.S. census divisions, which are New England, Middle Atlantic, East North 
Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain, 
and Pacific. As for the branch level regressions, I compare changes of deposit interest rates around 
the regulatory shock between treated and control samples (branches) within the same county by 
adding month × county fixed effect instead of month fixed effect. With regard to the local bank 
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level regressions, I compare deposit interest rates and balance sheet structures between local banks 
in treated counties and the banks in their adjacent counties within the same state by adding time 
(month or quarter) × state fixed effect. According to Table 1A.4 in Appendices, even after 
employing stricter fixed effects, the regression results are robust or even more significant both 
economically or statistically than our baseline results. 
Next, regarding the LCR’s real effect, the analysis moves deeper into the zip code level 
house price indices. Table 1A.5 in Appendices reports the results of the regression. In the first two 
columns, the regression model includes zip code and month fixed effects. In those two columns, 
the difference-in-difference estimator, Treatedmsa , y  − 1 × Posty is estimated as being negative and 
significant. This result means that the house price index of the treated zip code area decreases more 
severely or increase less steeply than the house price indices of the control zip code area after the 
LCR shock. In column 3 and 4, I use stricter fixed effects of both zip-county and month-county 
level. This regression model compares the house price indices between the treated and control zip 
code areas within the same county. We can still observe that Treatedmsa , y − 1 × Posty is estimated 
as being negative and significant in column 3 and 4. From the results, we can identify that the 
negative real effect is coming from the credit supply shock rather than due to the credit demand 
shock. It is less likely that there is a significant difference in a change of a credit demand across 
zip code areas within the same county. According to the regression results in column 3 and 4, the 
house price indices moved in a significantly different way around the time of the regulatory shock 
across the zip code areas even within the same county. The different movement of the indices is 
highly related to the market share of the high-risk-banks in each zip code area. In this regard, the 
results can imply that the negative effect on the house price indices or real economy after the LCR 
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shock is due to the high-risk-bank’s credit supply reduction in response to the LCR introduction 
rather than a decrease in the credit demand of the region.  
Finally, I compare deposit funding costs between branches of non-local control banks in 
treated regions and those in control regions. From Table 1A.5 in Appendices, we can see whether 
a deposit competition caused by the introduction of the LCR regulation had a significant effect 
even on the deposit funding cost of non-local control banks, which can easily obtain liquidities 
through their geographical branch networks beyond their local deposit markets. This regression 
compares the deposit funding costs between branches within the same bank by adding time × bank 
fixed effect after matching the samples on market-level characteristics. The difference-in-
difference coefficient, Competej , t  − 1 × Postt, is estimated to be positive and statistically 
significant. This result implies that a branch in treated regions increases its deposit interest rate 
more significantly than the bank’s other branches in control regions after the regulatory shock even 
though the bank’s branch network across regions can relieve the liquidity problem of the branch 
in the treated region. In other words, the LCR regulation makes a spillover effect not only to the 
nearby local bank but also neighboring non-local bank in terms of the bank’s deposit funding cost 
and liquidity problem.  
1.9 Conclusion  
The purpose of the study is to find the effect of the introduction of the Basel III liquidity 
regulation, called the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), on a bank’s behavior and beyond. From 
the regression results, we find that the regulatory shock of the LCR has made a negative real effect 
on the economy directly through the regulated bank’s credit supply reduction and indirectly 
through the competing financial institution’s liquidity problem.  
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First, we observe that, after the endorsement of the Basel III liquidity regulation, the region 
where a bank with high liquidity risk (high-risk-bank) had a dominant share for the local deposit 
market showed a significantly less economic vitality after the regulatory shock than before 
compared to control regions. Second, this study identifies the direct bank-lending-channel from 
the LCR shock to the real economy via a reduction in the high-risk-bank’s credit supply to the 
economy. After the regulatory shock, the loan-to-asset ratio of the high-risk-bank decreased more 
severely than before compared to that of a control bank. Third, we see the indirect channel of the 
LCR’s spillover effect on real economy through a bank’s deposit competition. After the regulatory 
shock, the high-risk-bank increased a spread on its deposit interest rate more aggressively than a 
control bank to attract more retail deposits. Increase in the high-risk-bank’s deposit funding cost 
affected its neighboring local bank’s operation. If a local bank was placed in the area where a 
deposit market share of the high-risk-bank was large, the local bank also increased its deposit 
funding cost significantly or faced a deterioration of its liquidity problem after the regulatory shock 
than before compared to other local banks in the control regions. Ultimately, the local banks in the 
treated area suppressed the expansion of credit supply to the real economy.  
From the findings of this study, we understand that the effect of the new banking regulation 
would not be localized to solving the existing problems in the regulated sector. There is a 
widespread spillover effect on real economy not only through the regulated bank’s behavior but 
also through its competing local bank’s operation. These ripple effects were not intended to be 
consequences when the Basel Committee initially endorsed the Basel III regulation even though 
those effects might have been anticipated. In order to maximize the effectiveness of the LCR 
regulation as a tool that guarantees a financial stability, its regulatory shock should be confined to 
fixing a bank’s liquidity risk management problem and its ripple effect on real economy and other 
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financial institutions should be minimized. In this sense, how to mitigate the ripple effect during a 
regulatory change will be an important task to be examined and accomplished by financial 
regulators or policy makers.  
Due to the concern about the shock by the new Basel III liquidity regulation, the Basel 
Committee permitted a new grace period from 2015 to 2019 by amending the text of the original 
rules in 2013. During this new grace period, the LCR regulation becomes partially effective with 
a lower minimum requirement. The minimum level is set to be 60 percent according to the Basel 
Accord but was raised to 80 percent by the U.S. as of 2015. There would be step-wise increases in 
the minimum requirement to 100 percent until the full implementation. In the U.S., the LCR would 
be fully implemented in 2017, and other Basel member countries have different grace periods until 
2019. It would be another matter of interest how banks will behave differently during the new 
grace periods.  
The findings of this study leave several questions related to the Basel III LCR regulation. 
If the new regulation in effect causes a transformation of a bank’s balance sheet composition and 
reduces the growth of loans, how do these changes affect real activities of firms, i.e. the corporate 
financing and investment for a bank-dependent company? How does the increased demand for 
high quality liquid assets by banks affect the relative prices and spreads of various types of 
securities? If the new LCR regulation strengthens banks’ average liquidity status, can we say that 
a bank’s ability to absorb a liquidity shock has been improved, i.e. that a bank’s reaction to a 
financial crisis after 2010 is different from the responses before this time? Finally, how do the 
greater liquidity holdings within the banking industry affect the transmission of monetary policy 
through the bank lending channel? All of these topics can become an area of future research.  
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1.11 Appendices  
1.11.1 Variable Definition 
Variable* Definition Source** 
△SBLmsa , y%  
Annual percent change in small business 
lending to an MSA from the previous year to 
this year. This variable is winsorised at 1 and 
99 percent level each year.  
CRA  
△GDPmsa , y%  
Annual percent change in gross domestic 
products (GDP) of an MSA from the 
previous year to this year. This variable is 
winsorised at 1 and 99 percent level each 
year.  
BEA  
△HPImsa(zip), m%  
Annual percent change in a monthly Housing 
Price Index (HPI) of an MSA (a ZIP code 
area) from the same month last year to the 
current month. This variable is winsorised at 
1 and 99 percent level each quarter.  
FMHPI  
Treatedcn(msa, zip), y  − 1  
Dummy variable that identifies a county (an 
MSA or z ZIP code area) where the high-
risk-banks hold at least 25 percent for deposit 
market share as of June 30th of the previous 
year (or recent past June 30th from the same 
month last year). The high-risk-bank is the 
bank that belongs to top 20 percent among all 
sample banks in terms of loan-to-deposit 
ratio as of the recent June 30th.  
Call & SOD  
Delinquencymsa(zip), y  − 1  
Annual average delinquency rate for the 
aggregated Fannie Mae mortgages for an 
MSA level or ZIP code area level during the 
previous year.  
FMLP  
MktSharecn(msa , zip), y  − 1
LowCap  
A deposit market share of a bank with low 
capital ratio in a county (an MSA or a ZIP 
code area) as of June 30th of the previous 
year (or recent past June 30th from the same 
month last year). A bank with low capital 
Call & SOD  
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Variable* Definition Source** 
ratio is the bank that belongs to bottom 20 
percent among all sample banks in terms of 
its capital ratio (sum of tier 1 and 2 capital 
over risk weighted assets).  
MktSharecn(msa , zip), y  − 1
HighLev  
A deposit market share of a bank with high 
leverage ratio in a county (an MSA or a ZIP 
code area) as of June 30th of the previous 
year (or recent past June 30th from the same 
month last year). A bank with high leverage 
ratio is the bank that belongs to top 20 
percent among all sample banks in terms of 
its leverage ratio (total asset over tier 1 
capital).  
Call & SOD  
MktSharecn(msa , zip), y  − 1
HighNPL  
A deposit market share of a bank with high 
NPL ratio in a county (an MSA or a ZIP code 
area) as of June 30th of the previous year (or 
recent past June 30th from the same month 
last year). A bank with high NPL ratio is the 
bank that belongs to top 20 percent among all 
sample banks in terms of its NPL ratio (non-
performing loans over total loans).  
Call & SOD  
MktSharecn(msa , zip), y  − 1
Local  
A deposit market share of a local bank in a 
county (an MSA) as of June 30th of the 
previous year (or recent past June 30th from 
the same month last year). A local bank is the 
bank that collects more than 65 percent of 
deposits in a county.  
SOD  
MktSharecn(msa , zip), y  − 1
Small  
A deposit market share of a small bank in a 
county (an MSA or a ZIP code area) as of 
June 30th of the previous year (or recent past 
June 30th from the same month last year). A 
small bank is the bank that holds total asset 
less than $2 billion.  
Call & SOD  
MktSharecn(msa , zip), y  − 1
BHC  
A deposit market share of a bank affiliated in 
a bank holding company (BHC) group in a 
county (an MSA or a ZIP code area) as of 
June 30th of the previous year (or recent past 
June 30th from the same month last year).  
Call & SOD  
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Variable* Definition Source** 
HHIcn(msa , zip), y  − 1  
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for a county (an 
MSA or a ZIP code area) level deposit 
market where the branch is located as of June 
30th of the previous year (or recent past June 
30th from the same month last year).  
SOD  
MktSharei , cn, y  − 1  
Deposit market share of a bank in a county as 
of June 30th of the previous year (or recent 
past June 30th from the same month last 
year).  
SOD  
MktSharecn , y  − 1
HighLTD  
A deposit market share of a bank with high 
loan-to-deposit ratio in a county as of June 
30th of the previous year (or recent past June 
30th from the same month last year). A bank 
with high loan-to-deposit ratio is the bank 
that belongs to top 20 percent among all 
sample banks in terms of its loan-to-deposit 
ratio.  
Call & SOD  
ΔLiquidity ⁄ Asset i , t  
Quarterly change in the ratio of a bank’s 
liquidity over the bank’s total asset from the 
previous quarter-end to the current quarter-
end. Liquidity is sum of cash and securities. 
This variable is winsorised at 1 and 99 
percent level each quarter.  
Call  
ΔLoan ⁄ Asset i , t  
Quarterly change in the ratio of a bank’s total 
loan over the bank’s total asset from the 
previous quarter-end to the current quarter-
end. This variable is winsorised at 1 and 99 
percent level each quarter.  
Call  
ΔDeposit ⁄ Liability i , t  
Quarterly change in the ratio of a bank’s total 
deposit over the bank’s total liability from 
the previous quarter-end to the current 
quarter-end. This variable is winsorised at 1 
and 99 percent level each quarter.  
Call  
Spreadj , m  
Spread of a deposit rate for a Certificate of 
Deposit (CD) with an account size of 10,000 
USD against the yield on 30 days Treasury 
Bills. This variable is winsorised at 1 and 99 
percent level each month.  
RW & 
FRED  
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Variable* Definition Source** 
Highi , t − 1  
Dummy variable that identifies a bank (high-
risk-bank) that belongs to top 20 percent 
among all sample banks in terms of loan-to-
deposit ratio as of the previous quarter-end. 
Control group consists of the banks which 
belong to the bottom 80 percent among the 
entire samples.  
Call  
LTDi , t  − 1  
Ratio of a bank’s loan-to-deposit as of the 
previous quarter-end.  
Call  
Sizei , t − 1  
Log of a bank’s total asset as of the previous 
quarter-end.  
Call  
Capital i, t − 1  
Ratio of a bank’s regulatory capital (sum of 
tier 1 and tier 2 capital) over the bank’s total 
risk-weighted asset as of the previous 
quarter-end.  
Call  
Leveragei , t  − 1  
Ratio of a bank’s total asset over the bank’s 
tier 1 capital as of the previous quarter-end.  
Call  
NPL i , t  − 1  
Ratio of non-performing loan over total loan 
as of the previous quarter-end.  
Call  
Local i , y  − 1  
Dummy variable that identifies a bank that 
collects more than 65 percent of deposits in a 
county as of recent June 30th.  
SOD  
Small i , t  − 1  
Dummy variable that identifies a bank whose 
total asset is less than $2 billion as of recent 
quarter-end.  
Call  
BHCi , t − 1  
Dummy variable that identifies a bank that is 
affiliated in a bank holding company (BHC) 
group as of recent quarter-end.  
Call  
Competecn , t  − 1  
Dummy variable that identifies a local bank 
that is located in the county where the high-
risk-banks hold at least 25 percent for deposit 
market share as of recent June 30th. The 
high-risk-bank is the bank that belongs to top 
20 percent among all sample banks in terms 
Call & SOD  
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Variable* Definition Source** 
of loan-to-deposit ratio as of the recent June 
30th.  
Posty  
Time dummy variable that identifies the time 
of 2011-2013.  
 
Posty
2011(2012, 2013)  
Time dummy variable that identifies the year 
of 2011 (2012 or 2013).  
 
 
* i= bank , j = branch, cn = county, msa = metropolitan statistical area, y = year, t = quarter, m = month 
  
** Call = Call report, SOD = Summary of Deposit by FDIC, BEA = Bureau of Economic Analysis, CRA = 
Community Reinvestment Act by FFEIC, FMLP = Fannie Mae Loan Performance Data, FMHPI = Freddie 
Mac House Price Index, RW = RateWatch and FRED = Federal Reserve Economic Data by St. Louis Fed  
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1.11.2 Additional Tables 
Table 1A.1: Summary Statistics for the effect on a bank’s asset structure 
Panel A reports summary statistics for key dependent and independent variables regarding a 
regulatory effect on a bank’s asset structure. This data-set is constructed as a bank × quarter level. 
Panel B and C report results of univariate tests for null hypotheses, which imply differences of 
variables between the treated and control groups are equal to zero. Statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics  
    
Percentile Distribution  
 
N  Mean  S.D.  25th  Median  75th  
ΔLiquidity ⁄ Asset i , t  106273 0.003 0.032 -0.014 0.002 0.020 
ΔLoan ⁄ Asset i , t  106284 -0.003 0.031 -0.019 -0.002 0.014 
Highi , t − 1  106292 0.200 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sizei , t − 1  106284 12.105 1.322 11.260 11.965 12.755 
Capital i, t − 1  106139 0.212 1.878 0.133 0.157 0.196 
Leveragei , t  − 1  106140 10.765 16.624 8.843 10.466 11.929 
NPL i , t  − 1  105841 0.027 0.036 0.006 0.016 0.034 
Local i , y  − 1  106292 0.767 0.423 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Small i , t  − 1  106284 0.956 0.206 1.000 1.000 1.000 
BHCi , t − 1  106284 0.801 0.400 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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Table 1A.1 - Continued 
Panel B: Univariate Test Results (Pre-Shock)  
 
Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean Diff  (t-stat)  
 
Highi , t − 1 = 0  Highi , t − 1 = 1  
  
ΔLiquidity ⁄ Asset i , t  0.004 0.003 0.007 0.003 -0.003*** (-5.68) 
ΔLoan ⁄ Asset i , t  -0.004 -0.003 -0.010 -0.007 0.006*** (13.36) 
Sizei , t − 1  11.950 11.820 12.429 12.270 -0.480
*** (-24.59) 
Capital i, t − 1  0.212 0.151 0.156 0.131 0.056
* (2.27) 
Leveragei , t  − 1  11.189 10.800 10.610 10.642 0.580
*** (5.68) 
NPL i , t  − 1  0.030 0.018 0.029 0.020 0.001 (1.67) 
Local i , y  − 1  0.793 1.000 0.752 1.000 0.041
*** (6.75) 
Small i , t  − 1  0.965 1.000 0.935 1.000 0.030
*** (10.08) 
BHCi , t − 1  0.800 1.000 0.793 1.000 0.007 (1.25) 
 
Panel C: Univariate Test Results (Post-Shock)  
 
Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean Diff  (t-stat)  
 
Highi , t − 1 = 0  Highi , t − 1 = 1  
  
ΔLiquidity ⁄ Asset i , t  0.002 0.002 0.005 0.001 -0.002*** (-7.82) 
ΔLoan ⁄ Asset i , t  -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.003 0.004*** (16.20) 
Sizei , t − 1  12.021 11.890 12.546 12.350 -0.525
*** (-44.94) 
Capital i, t − 1  0.228 0.165 0.165 0.143 0.063
*** (3.60) 
Leveragei , t  − 1  10.816 10.464 10.005 10.039 0.811
*** (4.78) 
NPL i , t  − 1  0.026 0.015 0.024 0.015 0.002
*** (5.94) 
Local i , y  − 1  0.768 1.000 0.733 1.000 0.035
*** (9.08) 
Small i , t  − 1  0.965 1.000 0.915 1.000 0.050
*** (26.87) 
BHCi , t − 1  0.809 1.000 0.769 1.000 0.041
*** (11.36) 
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Table 1A.2: Summary Statistics for the effect on deposit interest rate spread 
Panel A reports summary statistics for key dependent and independent variables regarding a 
regulatory effect on a spread on a bank’s deposit interest rate. This data-set is constructed as a 
branch × month level. Panel B and C report results of univariate tests for null hypothesis, which 
implies differences of variables between the treated and control groups are equal to zero. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics  
    
Percentile Distribution  
 
N  Mean  S.D.  25th  Median  75th  
Spread on Deposit Ratej , m  2377776 0.288 0.321 0.053 0.176 0.430 
Highi , t − 1  2437623 0.257 0.437 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Sizei , t − 1  2437593 16.865 3.427 13.486 17.793 20.227 
Capital i, t − 1  2437593 0.148 0.068 0.129 0.139 0.155 
Leveragei , t  − 1  2437593 12.003 3.117 10.362 11.794 12.879 
NPL i , t  − 1  2437581 0.039 0.029 0.018 0.032 0.058 
Local i , y  − 1  2437623 0.218 0.413 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Small i , t  − 1  2437593 0.339 0.473 0.000 0.000 1.000 
BHCi , t − 1  2437593 0.957 0.203 1.000 1.000 1.000 
HHIcn , y  − 1  2437623 0.183 0.110 0.115 0.149 0.212 
MktSharei , cn, y  − 1  2437623 0.144 0.136 0.041 0.108 0.206 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
HighLTD  2437623 0.228 0.180 0.103 0.183 0.319 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
LowCap  2437623 0.212 0.186 0.058 0.163 0.337 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
HighLev  2437623 0.330 0.215 0.161 0.307 0.472 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
HighNPL  2437623 0.414 0.252 0.199 0.429 0.604 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
Local  2437623 0.228 0.210 0.066 0.158 0.324 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
Small  2437623 0.310 0.281 0.084 0.203 0.469 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
BHC  2437623 0.900 0.122 0.862 0.941 0.982 
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Table 1A.2 - Continued  
Panel B: Univariate Test Results (Pre-Shock)  
 
Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean Diff  (t-stat)  
 
Highi , t − 1 = 0  Highi , t − 1 = 1  
  
Spread on Deposit Ratej , m  0.548 0.490 0.493 0.357 0.054
*** (39.38) 
Sizei , t − 1  16.683 16.398 16.483 17.876 0.200
*** (18.23) 
Capital i, t − 1  0.146 0.138 0.131 0.125 0.015
*** (37.96) 
Leveragei , t  − 1  12.635 12.382 12.308 12.298 0.327
*** (35.00) 
NPL i , t  − 1  0.049 0.047 0.037 0.037 0.012
*** (120.31) 
Local i , y  − 1  0.255 0.000 0.216 0.000 0.040
*** (29.04) 
Small i , t  − 1  0.381 0.000 0.315 0.000 0.067
*** (43.64) 
BHCi , t − 1  0.956 1.000 0.952 1.000 0.004
*** (6.05) 
HHIcn , y  − 1  0.188 0.158 0.188 0.153 0.000 (0.72) 
MktSharei , cn, y  − 1  0.155 0.119 0.125 0.082 0.030
*** (68.58) 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
HighLTD  0.205 0.165 0.340 0.300 -0.135*** (-235.02) 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
LowCap  0.180 0.144 0.209 0.167 -0.029*** (-56.85) 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
HighLev  0.467 0.478 0.446 0.449 0.020*** (26.79) 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
HighNPL  0.471 0.499 0.459 0.481 0.012*** (13.31) 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
Local  0.257 0.185 0.256 0.187 0.001 (1.54) 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
Small  0.345 0.245 0.333 0.245 0.012*** (13.20) 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
BHC  0.932 0.968 0.929 0.968 0.003*** (10.08) 
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Table 1A.2 - Continued  
Panel C: Univariate Test Results (Post-Shock)  
 
Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean Diff  (t-stat)  
 
Highi , t − 1 = 0  Highi , t − 1 = 1  
  
Spread on Deposit Ratej , m  0.219 0.153 0.208 0.116 0.011
*** (27.88) 
Sizei , t − 1  16.960 17.309 16.854 17.959 0.106
*** (18.70) 
Capital i, t − 1  0.152 0.143 0.140 0.134 0.012
*** (185.51) 
Leveragei , t  − 1  12.178 11.883 10.903 10.986 1.275
*** (248.97) 
NPL i , t  − 1  0.040 0.036 0.027 0.025 0.013
*** (296.88) 
Local i , y  − 1  0.229 0.000 0.158 0.000 0.071
*** (105.51) 
Small i , t  − 1  0.367 0.000 0.231 0.000 0.136
*** (176.64) 
BHCi , t − 1  0.960 1.000 0.950 1.000 0.010
*** (31.17) 
HHIcn , y  − 1  0.182 0.147 0.178 0.146 0.004
*** (23.95) 
MktSharei , cn, y  − 1  0.151 0.118 0.119 0.078 0.032
*** (144.80) 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
HighLTD  0.194 0.161 0.314 0.281 -0.120*** (-428.48) 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
LowCap  0.213 0.165 0.239 0.197 -0.025*** (-80.33) 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
HighLev  0.293 0.275 0.289 0.264 0.004*** (13.46) 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
HighNPL  0.403 0.421 0.383 0.381 0.020*** (51.08) 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
Local  0.224 0.152 0.204 0.135 0.020*** (59.74) 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
Small  0.312 0.199 0.270 0.180 0.043*** (92.64) 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
BHC  0.892 0.933 0.886 0.926 0.005*** (25.82) 
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Table 1A.3: Summary Statistics for the spillover effect on local banks 
Panel A and B report summary statistics for key dependent and independent variables regarding 
the new regulation’s spillover effect on a deposit rate spread and balance sheet structure of a local 
bank. Data-set is constructed as a branch × month in Panel A and as a bank × quarter level in Panel 
B, respectively. Panel C to F report results of univariate tests for null hypotheses, which imply 
differences of variables between the treated and control groups are equal to zero. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.  
Panel A: Summary Statistics (Deposit Rate Spread)  
    
Percentile Distribution  
 
N  Mean  S.D.  25th  Median  75th  
Spread on Deposit Ratej , m  305462 0.550 0.353 0.283 0.466 0.756 
Competecn , y  − 1  328436 0.442 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000 
LTDi , t  − 1  328418 0.762 0.175 0.654 0.771 0.877 
Sizei , t − 1  328418 12.620 1.099 11.856 12.496 13.281 
Capital i, t − 1  328418 0.166 0.164 0.132 0.151 0.182 
Leveragei , t  − 1  328418 10.891 4.064 9.310 10.666 11.964 
NPL i , t  − 1  328418 0.027 0.029 0.008 0.018 0.035 
Small i , t  − 1  328418 0.939 0.239 1.000 1.000 1.000 
BHCi , t − 1  328418 0.853 0.354 1.000 1.000 1.000 
HHIcn , y  − 1  328436 0.197 0.123 0.114 0.163 0.243 
MktSharei , cn, y  − 1  328436 0.177 0.174 0.038 0.121 0.273 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
LowCap  328436 0.215 0.192 0.064 0.161 0.334 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
HighLev  328436 0.292 0.216 0.117 0.259 0.438 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
HighNPL  328436 0.314 0.247 0.109 0.265 0.504 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
Local  328436 0.413 0.237 0.222 0.392 0.566 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
Small  328436 0.506 0.299 0.236 0.487 0.770 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
BHC  328436 0.890 0.144 0.832 0.949 1.000 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics (Balance Sheet Structure)  
   
Percentile Distribution  
 
N  Mean  S.D.  25th  Median  75th  
ΔDeposit ⁄ Liability i , t  36000 0.001 0.015 -0.002 0.000 0.004 
ΔLoan ⁄ Asset i , t  36000 -0.003 0.027 -0.018 -0.002 0.013 
Competecn , y − 1  36002 0.408 0.491 0.000 0.000 1.000 
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Table 1A.3 - Continued  
Panel C: Univariate Test Results (Deposit Rate Spread, Pre-Shock)  
 
Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean Diff  (t-stat)  
 
Competecn , y  − 1 = 0  Competecn , y  − 1 = 1  
  
Spread on Deposit Rate j , m  0.932 0.914 0.911 0.888 0.021
*** (8.29) 
LTDi , t  − 1  0.757 0.778 0.855 0.862 -0.098
*** (-86.19) 
Sizei , t − 1  12.498 12.356 12.674 12.577 -0.176
*** (-22.65) 
Capital i, t − 1  0.162 0.146 0.156 0.137 0.007
** (3.08) 
Leveragei , t  − 1  11.056 11.017 11.169 11.087 -0.112
*** (-5.28) 
NPL i , t  − 1  0.030 0.019 0.027 0.020 0.002
*** (10.16) 
Small i , t  − 1  0.944 1.000 0.943 1.000 0.001 (0.34) 
BHCi , t − 1  0.871 1.000 0.839 1.000 0.032
*** (13.12) 
HHIcn , y  − 1  0.221 0.188 0.186 0.150 0.035
*** (41.53) 
MktSharei , cn, y  − 1  0.211 0.159 0.152 0.091 0.059
*** (48.30) 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
LowCap  0.184 0.141 0.229 0.194 -0.045*** (-36.35) 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
HighLev  0.389 0.379 0.389 0.374 -0.000 (-0.25) 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
HighNPL  0.343 0.304 0.343 0.283 -0.001 (-0.29) 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
Local  0.470 0.459 0.401 0.390 0.069*** (41.79) 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
Small  0.572 0.598 0.481 0.448 0.091*** (44.57) 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
BHC  0.921 0.974 0.913 0.967 0.008*** (9.15) 
 
Panel C: Univariate Test Results (Balance Sheet Structure, Pre-Shock)  
 
Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean Diff  (t-stat)  
 
Competecn , y − 1 = 0  Competecn , y − 1 = 1  
  
ΔDeposit ⁄ Liabilityi , t  0.002 0.000 0.004 0.001 -0.001*** (-3.63) 
ΔLoan ⁄ Asset i , t  -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 0.001 (0.92) 
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Table 1A.3 - Continued  
Panel E: Univariate Test Results (Deposit Rate Spread, Post-Shock)  
 
Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean Diff  (t-stat)  
 
Competecn , y − 1 = 0  Competecn , y − 1 = 1  
  
Spread on Deposit Ratej , m  0.428 0.386 0.420 0.389 0.008
*** (7.69) 
LTDi , t  − 1  0.706 0.719 0.804 0.815 -0.098
*** (-143.57) 
Sizei , t − 1  12.579 12.442 12.705 12.614 -0.126
*** (-28.30) 
Capital i, t − 1  0.175 0.158 0.161 0.149 0.014
*** (55.99) 
Leveragei , t  − 1  10.768 10.582 10.881 10.517 -0.113
*** (-6.36) 
NPL i , t  − 1  0.027 0.018 0.025 0.016 0.003
*** (23.51) 
Small i , t  − 1  0.939 1.000 0.937 1.000 0.001 (1.12) 
BHCi , t − 1  0.866 1.000 0.834 1.000 0.032
*** (21.90) 
HHIcn , y  − 1  0.205 0.171 0.181 0.149 0.024
*** (48.73) 
MktSharei , cn, y  − 1  0.193 0.142 0.150 0.097 0.042
*** (60.73) 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
LowCap  0.195 0.141 0.251 0.205 -0.056*** (-71.02) 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
HighLev  0.271 0.250 0.242 0.212 0.029*** (36.38) 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
HighNPL  0.321 0.284 0.283 0.216 0.037*** (38.43) 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
Local  0.425 0.399 0.377 0.361 0.048*** (50.03) 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
Small  0.534 0.550 0.451 0.403 0.083*** (68.39) 
MktSharecn , y  − 1
BHC  0.881 0.942 0.879 0.938 0.003*** (4.26) 
 
 
Panel F: Univariate Test Results (Balance Sheet Structure, Post-Shock)  
 
Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean Diff  (t-stat)  
 
Competecn , y − 1 = 0  Competecn , y − 1 = 1  
  
ΔDeposit ⁄ Liabilityi , t  0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 (-1.58) 
ΔLoan ⁄ Asset i , t  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 (-1.33) 
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Table 1A.4: Matching and Stricter Fixed Effects 
These tables report the robustness test results. In these regressions from Panel A to F, the treated 
and control observations are matched on market level, bank level characteristics or both using 
the Mahalanobis distance. In Panel A and C to F, stricter fixed effects such as time × area 
(census division, county and state) are employed instead of time fixed effect itself.  
 
Panel A: Real Effect 
 △SBLmsa , y% △GDPmsa , y% △HPImsa , m% 
Treatedmsa , y − 1 × Posty -0.078*** -0.056*** -0.021*** -0.015*** -0.024*** -0.022*** 
 (-3.25) (-2.60) (-3.75) (-3.19) (-3.39) (-3.39) 
Observations 1707 1707 1701 1701 20388 20388 
Adjusted R2 0.560 0.593 0.370 0.429 0.723 0.802 
MSA FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time FE Y N Y N Y N 
Time × Division FE N Y N Y N Y 
 
 
Panel B: Bank’s Balance Sheet Structure  
 
△Liquidity ⁄ Asset i , t  △Loan ⁄ Asset i , t  
 
All  Large  All  Large  
Highi , t − 1 × Posty  0.003*** 0.010** -0.003*** -0.011*** 
 
(4.16) (2.13) (-4.16) (-3.12) 
Observations  41676 1827 41676 1827 
Adjusted R2  0.095 0.061 0.135 0.073 
Bank FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Quarter FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  
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Table 1A.4 - Continued  
Panel C: Bank’s Deposit Interest Rate  
 
Spreadj , m  
 
All  Large Banks  
Highi , t − 1 × Posty  0.061*** 0.021*** 0.096*** 0.041*** 
 
(14.01) (6.12) (12.72) (9.05) 
Observations  1227826 1214500 793911 779282 
Adjusted R2  0.913 0.953 0.885 0.960 
Branch FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Month FE  Y  N  Y  N  
Month × County FE  N  Y  N  Y  
 
Panel D: Spillover to Local Banks (Deposit Interest Rate)  
 
Spreadj , m  
 
All  Independent  
Competecn , y − 1 × Posty  0.013* 0.013** 0.008 0.019 
 
(1.95) (2.16) (0.60) (1.33) 
Observations  274499 274496 44185 44153 
Adjusted R2  0.915 0.927 0.923 0.945 
Branch FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Month FE  Y  N  Y  N  
Month × State FE  N  Y  N  Y  
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Table 1A.4 - Continued  
Panel E: Spillover to Local Banks (Liability Structure)  
 
ΔDeposit ⁄ Liabilityi , t  
 
All  Independent  
Competecn , y − 1 × Posty  -0.000 -0.000 -0.002* -0.004** 
 
(-0.63) (-0.07) (-1.70) (-2.28) 
Observations  29250 29219 5199 5060 
Adjusted R2  0.083 0.111 0.070 0.149 
Bank FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Quarter FE  Y  N  Y  N  
Quarter × State FE  N  Y  N  Y  
 
Panel F: Spillover to Local Banks (Asset Structure)  
 
ΔLoan ⁄ Asset i , t  
 
All  Independent  
Competecn , y − 1 × Posty  -0.002* -0.002** -0.005** -0.009*** 
 
(-1.74) (-2.11) (-2.11) (-3.31) 
Observations  29250 29219 5199 5060 
Adjusted R2  0.214  0.264  0.203  0.298  
Bank FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Quarter FE  Y  N  Y  N  
Quarter × State FE  N  Y  N  Y  
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Table 1A.5: Annual percent change in Housing Price Index of a ZIP Code Area 
This table reports a regression that relates an annual percent change of monthly house price 
index to an introduction of Basel III liquidity regulation in 2010. The regression model is 
designed as follows. 
 
△HPIzip, m% = β0 + β1Treatedzip, y  − 1∙Posty + β2Treatedzip, y − 1 + ΓXzip, m + FEs + εzip, m 
 
Xzip, m is a vector of Zip-code area level control variables, which include MktSharezip, y  − 1LowCap, 
MktSharezip, y  − 1HighLev, MktSharezip, y  − 1HighNPL, MktSharezip, y  − 1Local, MktSharezip, y  − 1Small, 
MktSharezip, y  − 1BHC, HHIzip, y  − 1 and Delinquencyzip, y  − 1. To conserve the space, Xzip, m are not 
reported. FEs includes ZIP code (or ZIP code × county) fixed effect and month (or 
month × county) fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at an ZIP code (or ZIP 
code × county) level. Appendix provides a description of each variable. Statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. The t-statistics are in 
parenthesis. 
 
  △HPIzip , m%   
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Treatedzip , y  − 1 × Posty  -0.007*** 
 
-0.002** 
 
 
(-4.97) 
 
(-2.43) 
 
Treatedzip , y  − 1 × Posty2011  
 
-0.003** 
 
-0.002** 
  
(-2.10) 
 
(-2.32) 
Treatedzip , y  − 1 × Posty2012  
 
-0.004*** 
 
-0.002* 
  
(-2.79) 
 
(-1.70) 
Treatedzip , y  − 1 × Posty2013  
 
-0.014*** 
 
-0.002* 
  
(-7.27) 
 
(-1.93) 
Treatedzip , y  − 1  0.004
*** 0.004*** 0.002** 0.002** 
 
(2.99) (3.20) (2.38) (2.37) 
Observations  419466 419466 487800 487800 
Adjusted R2  0.595 0.596 0.834 0.834 
ZIP code FE  Y  Y  N  N  
Month FE  Y  Y  N  N  
ZIP code × County FE  N  N  Y  Y  
Month × County FE  N  N  Y  Y  
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Table 1A.6: Spread on Deposit interest rate (Spillover to non-Local Banks)  
This table reports a regression that relates a spread on a deposit rate of a non-local bank to an 
introduction of Basel III liquidity regulation in 2010. The regression model is designed as 
follows. 
Spreadj , m = β0 + β1∙Competecn, y  − 1∙Posty + β2∙Competecn, y − 1 + Γ⋅Xj , m + FEs + εj , m  
Xj, m is a vector of county level control variables, which are listed in Table 1.7. To conserve the 
space, Xj, m are not reported. FEs includes branch and month × bank fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered at a branch level. Appendix provides a description of each variable. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. The t-
statistics are in parenthesis. Coefficients of control variables and constant are not reported. 
 
 
Spreadj , m   
All  Independent   
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Competecn , y  − 1 × Posty  0.021*** 
 
0.015*** 
 
 
(4.30) 
 
(3.08) 
 
Competecn , y − 1 × Posty2011  
 
0.018*** 
 
0.009*   
(3.63) 
 
(1.73) 
Competecn , y − 1 × Posty2012  
 
0.026*** 
 
0.021***   
(4.25) 
 
(3.57) 
Competecn , y − 1 × Posty2013  
 
0.024*** 
 
0.023***   
(4.07) 
 
(3.88) 
Competecn , y − 1  -0.012
** -0.013*** -0.006 -0.007*  
(-2.55) (-2.67) (-1.36) (-1.75) 
Observations  261014 261014 126815 126815 
Adjusted R2  0.992 0.992 0.973 0.973 
Branch FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Month × Bank FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  
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Chapter 2: Decision-making delegation in 
banks 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
A large theoretical literature in organizational economics highlights the important effect 
organizational structure can have on the behavior and performance of organizations.1  The extent 
to which decision-making is delegated can affect the quality of an organization’s decisions and its 
ability to respond to a changing environment (Alonso et al. (2008)). Despite the vast theoretical 
literature, empirical evidence on how decision-making delegation affects organizational behavior 
is limited, likely due to a lack of information on organizations’ internal decision making processes.  
Most of the empirical literature uses multidivisional firms or large firms as examples of 
organizations that practice centralized decision making to test the predictions of the theories. In 
this paper, we study banking organizations for which we have detailed information on where 
product prices are set to understand the role of organizational structure on firm behavior.  
We obtain our data from RateWatch which conducts a weekly survey of bank branches 
about interest rates offered on deposit and loan products.  Along with providing interest rate quotes, 
RateWatch also identifies whether a branch sets its own rate or follows rates set by another branch 
in its organization.  We use this information to classify bank branches according to whether they 
set rates locally, i.e., in the county in which they are located, or not.  We employ natural disasters 
                                                 
1 We cannot possibly do justice to this very large literature in a footnote, but relevant work includes Grossman and 
Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), Aghion and Tirole (1997), among others. 
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as a shock to the local economy and examine whether decision-making delegation affects how 
branches (and banks) respond to natural disasters in the United States between 1999 and 2013. 
A key feature of natural disasters is that they result in property damage.  Property damage 
can result in an immediate demand for liquidity from the local population which must be satisfied 
through withdrawals of deposits or drawdowns of credit lines.  A natural disaster also likely 
increases loan demand for reconstruction (Cortes and Strahan (2014)).  There are several reasons 
why branches with authority to set rates locally might respond differently to these shocks than 
other branches, all else equal.  Branches that set rates locally may simply have more ability to 
respond, or to tailor their rates to local conditions. In addition, information sets across the two 
subgroups could differ.  For example, branches that set deposit rates locally could have superior 
information about the price elasticity for deposits in the local market, or greater ability to assess 
loan opportunities in the post-disaster environment.  In sum, we expect branches that set rates 
locally to be more proactive in responding to local shocks.  
We begin by documenting that our proxy for decision-making delegation in deposit rate 
setting can explain observed heterogeneity in deposit rates across a bank’s branches.  Focusing on 
the most frequently quoted types of accounts in RateWatch — money market accounts requiring 
a minimum balance of $10,000 and 12-month CDs requiring a minimum balance of $10,000 — 
we show that deposit rates are more uniform across branches when fewer branches have authority 
to set their own rates.  This highlights that when branches are allowed to set their own rates, they 
tailor the rates to the supply and demand conditions in the local market.  An implication of our 
result is that local deposit markets are segmented. This is consistent with the assumption in most 
of the banking literature (Gilje at al. (2016), etc.). Furthermore, the effect of decision-making 
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centralization on deposit rate variability is larger for the larger banks in our sample. This is 
reasonable because large banks are more likely to operate in more diverse deposit markets.  
Having established the relevance of our proxy for delegation, we examine whether 
delegation affects branches’ deposit rate response to natural disasters.  We focus on the subset of 
natural disasters declared major disasters by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), consistent with other papers (Cortes and Strahan (2015)).  Our empirical setting is a triple 
differences-in-differences specification.  The treatment sample consists of branches located in a 
county affected by a natural disaster in a given month.2  The control sample consists of branches 
in adjacent counties that were unaffected by a disaster in a seven-month window centered on the 
event.  We restrict attention to cases where a county was affected and all adjacent counties were 
unaffected, which we refer to as “localized disasters”. We show that, following a disaster, branches 
that set rates locally offer rates that are roughly 2.6 – 2.9 basis points higher on money market 
accounts in the affected county. The effect is economically significant at nearly 7 – 8% of the mean 
rate offered in our sample.  In a dynamic specification, we find that the response is quick and short-
lived, lasting for only three months after the month of the disaster declaration. 
A higher deposit rate, all else equal, should translate into higher deposit volumes. Branch-
level deposit data is only available on an annual basis as of June 30th from the FDIC’s Summary 
of Deposits barring a high-frequency analysis of deposit levels.  Instead, we examine how annual 
(June-June) deposit growth is affected by natural disasters occurring in the second quarter of a 
calendar year.  The previous analysis showed that the deposit rate response to a natural disaster 
lasts four months (including the disaster month), and we expect to observe the deposit volume 
                                                 
2 We use the date of the FEMA disaster declaration which typically occurs with a lag of a couple weeks from the 
actual natural event. 
 75 
response in the same timeframe. We find that annual deposit growth is roughly 1.9 – 2.6 percentage 
points higher at branches that set rates locally in affected counties after a disaster. Again, the effect 
is economically significant representing a 27 – 36% increase relative to mean annual deposit 
growth. 
A natural disaster will not only be a negative shock to liquidity in the local market but is 
also likely to be a shock to the investment opportunities. The loss from the disaster is likely to 
increase the importance of local knowledge and soft information in lending decisions. This is likely 
to increase the cost of centralization. Compounding this will be the lower deposit growth that 
branches that do not set rates locally experience. To test if lending volume is affected by the degree 
of centralization in bank decision making, we use mortgage lending by a bank in a county as a 
proxy for local lending.  We find that mortgage lending grows faster after a disaster in affected 
counties when banks have more branches setting rates locally within the county.  The effect is 
economically significant, suggesting that the growth rate of mortgage lending by local rate setters 
is about 103-166% larger relative to mean annual growth. 
In our final set of tests, we examine the effect on house prices.  To do this, we focus on 
monthly changes in house prices at the MSA level and find that relative to other MSAs in the same 
state, MSAs that experience a natural disaster experience house price declines and these declines 
are mitigated if a majority of bank branches in the MSA set rates locally.  House price declines are 
3-8 basis points smaller, or 20 – 51% smaller relative to relative to mean house price changes.  
Thus, our results indicate that the extent of delegation in bank decision-making has real effects in 
terms of mortgage lending and house price recovery following natural disasters.  
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Our results highlight the role that the delegation of deposit funding decisions to branches 
has on bank behavior and local economic outcomes.  We also show that the effects we find are 
distinct from those captured by other commonly used measures of decision-making delegation like 
bank size or “localness”.  The predictive power of our measure of decision-making delegation for 
deposit rates, deposit growth, mortgage lending, or house price appreciation is not subsumed by 
controls for bank size or “localness”.   
Our paper adds to the existing empirical literature on organizational design of banks. A 
large stream of literature argues that as banks become larger and organizationally complex, they 
decrease lending to retail customers and small businesses (Berger and Udell (1995); Berger et al. 
(1999); Strahan and Wetson (1998); Berger et al. (1998); Berger et al. (2001); Berger et al. (2005); 
Degryse et al. (2009)). Others argue that hierarchy (Liberti and Mian (2009); Qian et al. (2015); 
Skrastins and Vig (2016)) and distance (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Petersen and Rajan, 2002; 
Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Mian, 2006) impairs banks’ ability to lend to soft information 
borrowers. Our paper is closest to Canales and Nanda (2012) who cross-sectionaly document that 
banks with less discretionary power at branch offices are less responsive to the competitive 
environment in lending. A key distinguishing feature of our paper is that we focus on the deposit 
gathering, rather than lending, side of bank decisions which is the focus of the aforementioned 
papers. Our results imply that organizational design affects not only lending but also the 
effectiveness of raising deposits. 
We also contribute to the literature that exploits natural disasters in banking. Using shocks 
from natural disasters, Morse (2011) investigates the role of payday loans in mitigating these 
shocks. Cortes and Strahan (2015) document that small banks relocate funds from unaffected to 
shocked areas. Cortes (2014) finds that areas with a greater relative presence of local lenders 
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improves job retention and creation at young and small firms. We investigate how setting deposit 
rates locally affects banks’ ability to raise deposits after a natural disaster and its effect on 
economic outcomes. 
Although we employ natural disasters as an exogenous shock, the degree of decision-
making delegation within banks is likely to be endogenous. Banks that give branches the authority 
to set rates locally may be systematically different from banks that do not set rates locally. While 
we try to control for this by focusing on banks in adjacent counties and include a number of bank 
characteristics as controls, we acknowledge some unobserved differences across the two groups 
of banks (or markets) could bias our results. To this extent one should be careful in imputing a 
causal interpretation on our findings. Despite this, we believe it is important to document if and 
how the extent of centralization in bank decision making affects lending decisions.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data sources.  
Section 2.3 describes the empirical methodology.  Section 2.4 provides summary statistics on the 
sample and verifies the relevance of our proxy for decision-making delegation.  Section 2.5 
presents the results.  Section 2.6 concludes.  
2.2 Data 
We compile data from several sources: 
Natural disasters:  Our data on natural disasters comes from two sources.  From the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), we gather data on counties included in major disaster 
declarations.  Major disaster declarations are made by the President, at the request of a governor 
or tribal leader, in response to a natural event determined to have caused damage of such severity 
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that it is beyond the capabilities of state and local governments to respond.  A FEMA disaster 
declaration provides access to federal assistance programs, which can be directed towards 
individuals or infrastructure.  We join the FEMA disaster declarations to information on property 
damage from these events in the Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the United States 
(SHELDUS).  By limiting attention to FEMA disaster declarations, we are focusing on larger 
natural disasters, consistent with other papers (Cortes and Strahan (2015)).   
Deposit rates:  We obtain information on deposit rates from RateWatch.  RateWatch 
provides weekly branch-level data on rates offered on various types of deposit products.  We 
collapse the data to the monthly frequency by taking the average.  We focus on the most frequently 
quoted types of accounts consistent with other papers (Drechsler, Savov, Schnabl (2016)), which 
are money market accounts requiring a minimum balance of $10,000 and 12-month certificates of 
deposit (CDs) requiring a minimum balance of $10,000.  RateWatch covers a significant portion 
of the branches in our sample, about 50%, by deposits, on average.  RateWatch also provides the 
data that we use to construct our proxy for decision-making delegation.  We observe whether a 
branch sets its own deposit rates (account type-specific) or follows another branch in the 
organization and, if so, which one.  We use this to construct a variable that measures whether a 
branch has the authority to set rates locally.  The RateSet dummy takes the value of 1 if a branch 
sets its own rate or follows another branch in the same county, and 0 otherwise.   
Deposit levels:  We obtain branch-level data on deposit balances at the annual frequency 
(as of June 30th) from the FDIC’s Summary of Deposits.  We use this data to calculate one of our 
key dependent variables, annual deposit growth at the branch level, and other independent 
variables like the competitiveness of the deposit market (county-level Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI)), and the geographic footprint of the bank (number of branches). 
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Mortgage originations:  We obtain data on mortgage lending from loans reported to 
regulators under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA).  The HMDA data is thought to 
capture the bulk of residential mortgage lending activity in the United States (Cortes and Strahan 
(2015)).  The data contains information on the location of the property and the lender.  We use this 
to construct mortgage originations at the bank and county level.  The data is available at the annual 
frequency for the calendar year.3   
House price index:  We obtain data on house prices at the MSA level at the monthly 
frequency from the Freddie Mac House Price Index (FMHPI).  The FMHPI is a repeat-sales index 
that measures average price changes in repeat sales or refinancings on the same properties.  
Properties included in the index are single-family properties whose mortgages have been 
purchased or securitized by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.    
Bank structure and financial condition:  We obtain data on bank financial condition and 
structure from the quarterly Call Report.   
2.3 Empirical Methodology  
Our goal is to explore whether decision-making delegation affects branch (and bank) 
behavior and performance.  Delegation is, of course, endogenous.  We employ natural disasters as 
a shock to the local economy and examine whether organizational structure affects branch (and 
bank) responses to a shock.  Natural disasters result in property damage.  Property damage can 
result in an immediate demand for liquidity from the local population which must be satisfied 
                                                 
3 A confidential version of the data provides precise information on the date the loans were made, but the public 
version simply provides the year of the loan.   
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through withdrawals of deposits or drawdowns of credit lines.  A natural disaster also likely 
increases loan demand for reconstruction (Cortes and Strahan (2014)).   
Our empirical methodology involves a triple differences-in-differences regression.  For the 
deposit rate analysis, the treatment group includes counties that had major disaster declarations by 
FEMA between 1999 and 2013.  The event window consists of a seven-month window centered 
on the disaster declaration month.  Adjacent counties that were unaffected by disasters in the event 
window serve as the control group.  We focus on “localized” disasters by imposing the requirement 
that all adjacent counties be unaffected in the event window.  An underlying assumption of our 
empirical design is that adjacent counties provide a good counterfactual for treated counties in the 
absence of the disaster.   
We estimate the following regression: 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑖×𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑐,𝑡×𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑖×𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑐,𝑡 +  𝛽7𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑖×𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑐,𝑡×𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑐,𝑡
+Λ × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠  + 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
            (2- 1) 
where the subscript i refers to the branch, c refers to the county, t refers to month.  
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑖 takes the value of 1 if a branch sets rates locally (within the county), 0 otherwise, and is 
set before the start of the event window.  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑐,𝑡 equals 1 for disaster counties and 0 for 
adjacent control counties.  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑐,𝑡  is 1 in the disaster declaration month and for three 
months thereafter, and 0 otherwise.  Controls include bank-level financial condition or structure 
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variables including bank size (log(total assets)), deposits (log(total deposits)), geographic 
footprint (Number of counties), whether the bank is part of a bank-holding company (BHC), and 
the average competitiveness of the deposit markets in which the bank has branches ((HHI(bank 
average)).  We also control for the competitiveness of the local deposit market (HHI (county)) out 
of an abundance of caution.  We estimate two variants of the model that differ based on the fixed 
effects employed. The first version includes branch fixed effects and month fixed effects. The 
second version includes branch-shock fixed effects and shock-month fixed effects. The former 
model compares all shocked counties with all adjacent unaffected counties. The latter compares 
each shocked county to its adjacent unaffected counties only, thereby improving the match 
between treatment and control groups.  Standard errors are clustered at the branch level in both 
models. Our coefficient of interest is β7 which measures the extent to which deposit rates are 
different in the affected county in the post-shock period for branches that set rates locally and those 
that do not. 
The other dependent variables of interest — deposit levels, mortgage lending, and house 
prices — are reported at different levels or frequencies than the deposit rates.  We modify the 
specifications accordingly, while maintaining the basic differences-in-differences setup.  These 
regression specifications are explained in more detail later when we present the results. 
2.4 Sample description  
2.4.1 Summary Statistics 
Figure 2.1 maps the location of disaster counties for “localized” disasters in the continental 
U.S. (no disasters met our conditions in Alaska, Hawaii, or any U.S. territories).  It is apparent 
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from this map that the disasters are reasonably well spread across the United States, with every 
major region of the country represented, which is further supported by Table 2.1 Panel A which 
tabulates disasters by region.   
Figure 2.1: Location of Disaster Counties 
The graph maps the counties that were subject to localized natural disasters during 1999-2014. 
The shaded counties are the disaster counties.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1 also presents additional summary statistics on the disasters in our sample.  Panel 
B tabulates the disasters by type of event: Fire, Flood, Hurricane, Snow, Storm, and Other.  The 
other category, created by us, combines several less frequently observed categories including 
Dam/Levee Break, Earthquake, Mud/Landslide, Multiple, and Other. Relative to the full sample 
of FEMA disaster declarations, our sample of “localized” disasters includes fewer hurricanes and 
storms which tend to have broad geographic impacts and includes more events in the “other” 
category.  Table 2.1 Panel C tabulates disasters by monetary damages and Table 2.1 Panel D 
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presents summary statistics on disasters.  The average (median) disaster in our sample involved 
$5.3 billion ($163 million) in damages.  While our initial sampling of FEMA disaster declarations 
selects larger natural disasters, our methodology which focuses on “localized” disasters selects 
relatively smaller events from among the population of FEMA events.  In comparison, the average 
(median) FEMA disaster declaration involved $23 billion ($324 million) in damages.   
Table 2.1: Number of Natural Disasters  
We employ a disaster declaration by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as a 
shock treatment. In this study, we select only a localized shock treatment (county-month level), 
meaning that both the pre- and post-shock period of a disaster declaration are not overlapped 
with another pre- and post-shock period not only within the same county but also in its adjacent 
counties. Pre-shock period is up to three months before the month of the FEMA’s disaster 
declaration and post-shock period is up to three months after the month of the FEMA’s disaster 
declaration. 
  
Panel A: By Regions   
Mid-West  North  South  West  Total  
1999  0 0 0 2 2 
2000  3 0 3 1 7 
2001  2 0 2 2 6 
2002  1 0 2 1 4 
2003  3 0 2 5 10 
2004  1 0 2 9 12 
2005  1 0 0 0 1 
2006  2 0 6 3 11 
2007  8 1 9 6 24 
2008  3 1 5 5 14 
2009  3 0 17 7 27 
2010  3 1 4 7 15 
2011  5 2 10 5 22 
2012  2 0 11 4 17 
2013  9 7 1 2 19 
Total  46 12 74 59 191 
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Panel B: By Types   
Fire  Flood  Hurricane  Snow  Storm  Tornado  Other  Total  
1999  1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
2000  2 0 0 0 4 0 1 7 
2001  4 0 0 0 2 0 0 6 
2002  3 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 
2003  5 0 0 0 3 0 2 10 
2004  5 0 1 1 3 0 2 12 
2005  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2006  4 0 0 0 7 0 0 11 
2007  10 0 0 0 13 0 1 24 
2008  4 0 0 0 10 0 0 14 
2009  13 0 0 0 13 0 1 27 
2010  4 2 1 0 8 0 0 15 
2011  8 2 1 0 11 0 0 22 
2012  5 0 0 0 11 0 1 17 
2013  1 3 1 0 12 2 0 19 
Total  69 7 4 1 99 3 8 191 
 
Panel C: By Monetary Damages (Million USD)   
>10,000  >2,000  >1,000  >500  >100  <100  Unknown  Total  
1999  0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
2000  2 1 0 0 0 1 3 7 
2001  0 0 0 1 0 2 3 6 
2002  0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 
2003  1 1 0 0 0 1 7 10 
2004  0 1 0 0 0 0 11 12 
2005  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
2006  2 2 0 0 2 2 3 11 
2007  0 1 1 1 2 4 15 24 
2008  0 1 0 0 3 5 5 14 
2009  1 3 2 0 4 6 11 27 
2010  2 1 1 1 2 3 5 15 
2011  1 1 0 2 1 5 12 22 
2012  1 0 1 2 3 3 7 17 
2013  2 0 0 2 4 5 6 19 
Total  12 12 5 9 21 37 95 191 
 
Panel D: Summary Statistics for Monetary Damages  
N Mean S.D. 25th Median 75th 
Monetary Damages (Million USD) 96 5322.010 15908.141 38.885 163.214 1880.603 
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Table 2.2 presents summary statistics on the branch-month panel used in the deposit rate 
analysis, which includes monthly branch-level observations in treated and control counties in a 
seven-month window centered on disaster declaration months. Panel A presents summary statistics 
for this sample. The average money market deposit rate is 35.1 basis points and the average 12-
month CD rate is 1.01%.  This is not surprising given that during a large part of our sample period 
of 1999-2014, interest rates were very low.  The mean value of Treated is 0.199 which means that 
19.9% of branch-month observations come from shocked counties and 80.1% from control 
counties. The RateSet variables indicates that 41.1% of observations pertain to branches that set 
rates locally while 58.9% did not.  The mean (median) value of bank assets in our sample is $374 
billion ($64 billion). This is very large, corresponding to the top 0.05% (0.40%) of the bank size 
distribution observed in Call Report data for our sample period, 1999-2014. This partly reflects 
how banks with larger branch networks show up more frequently in a branch-month sample.  If 
we limit our dataset to unique bank and month observations, the average (median) bank has $35 
billion ($362 million) in assets which corresponds to the top 0.60% (20%) of the bank size 
distribution.  The average bank in our sample overwhelmingly finances itself with deposits which 
can be seen from the fact that the mean value of log(total deposits) is similar to the mean value of 
log(total assets).  96% of observations correspond to branches belonging to banks that are part of 
a bank-holding company and the median observation belongs to a bank-holding company.  By 
comparison, about 70% of banks observed in the Call Report during our sample period belong to 
a bank-holding company. 30.7% of observations correspond to branches that belong to small 
banks, with assets under $2 billion, and 18.7% belong to local banks, defined as those that raise 
more than 65% of deposits from a single market (Cortes (2014)).  Table 2 Panel B compares 
summary statistics for branches with authority to set rates and those without.  Branches with 
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authority to set rates on average are more likely to belong to smaller banks (44% versus 21%) or 
local banks (34% versus 8%) and banks with a branch presence in fewer counties (202 versus 323).  
They are also less likely to belong to banks that are part of a bank-holding company (93% versus 
98%).  Branches with authority to set rates tend to be located in slightly less competitive deposit 
markets (county HHI of 0.21 versus 0.186), but their parent banks face similarly competitive 
deposit markets overall (bank average HHI of 0.218 versus 0.221).   
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics  
Panel A reports summary statistics for key dependent and independent variables of the 
regression that relates a branch’s deposit interest rate to a degree of the bank’s decision making 
delegation given a local natural disaster. This data-set is constructed as a branch × month level. 
Panel B reports results of univariate tests for null hypotheses that mean differences of variables 
between the treated and control groups are equal to zero.  
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
 
N  Mean  S.D.  25th  Median  75th  
Money Market Rate (monthly ave.)  104566 0.351 0.497 0.050 0.200 0.400 
12 Month CD Rate (monthly ave.)  107436 1.010 1.129 0.200 0.550 1.500 
Treated  107674 0.199 0.399 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RateSet  107674 0.411 0.492 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Small  107674 0.307 0.461 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Local  107674 0.187 0.390 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ImportantMarket  107674 0.390 0.488 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Log (total assets)  107674 17.081 3.299 13.830 17.992 20.059 
Total assets (billion USD)  107674 374.471 558.979 0.984 63.584 514.853 
Log (total deposits)  107674 16.796 3.221 13.614 17.686 19.691 
BHC  107674 0.959 0.198 1.000 1.000 1.000 
HHI (bank average)  107674 0.220 0.074 0.182 0.212 0.238 
Number of counties  107674 273.412 299.787 6.000 121.000 542.000 
HHI (county)  107674 0.196 0.112 0.131 0.164 0.230 
County share of bank deposits  107674 0.195 0.313 0.004 0.031 0.206 
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Table 2.2 - Continued  
 
Panel B: Univariate Test Results 
 
Rate Not Set Locally  Rate Set Locally  Difference  
 
N  Mean  Median  SD  N  Mean  Median  SD  Diff  (t-stat)  
Money Market Rate (monthly ave.)  61068 0.338 0.160 0.482 43498 0.369 0.200 0.516 -0.032*** (-10.19) 
12 Month CD Rate (monthly ave.)  63252 0.974 0.500 1.102 44184 1.061 0.600 1.165 -0.088*** (-12.51) 
Treated  63371 0.186 0.000 0.389 44303 0.216 0.000 0.412 -0.030*** (-12.33) 
Small  63371 0.214 0.000 0.410 44303 0.440 0.000 0.496 -0.226*** (-81.59) 
Local  63371 0.081 0.000 0.273 44303 0.340 0.000 0.474 -0.259*** (-113.19) 
ImportantMarket  63371 0.158 0.000 0.365 44303 0.721 1.000 0.448 -0.564*** (-226.86) 
Log (total assets)  63371 17.769 18.598 3.032 44303 16.097 15.817 3.414 1.672*** (84.53) 
Total assets (billion USD)  63371 452.967 119.445 589.208 44303 262.191 7.295 491.320 190.776*** (55.90) 
Log (total deposits)  63371 17.472 18.258 2.962 44303 15.830 15.592 3.328 1.642*** (85.03) 
BHC  63371 0.979 1.000 0.142 44303 0.930 1.000 0.255 0.049*** (40.30) 
HHI (bank average)  63371 0.221 0.212 0.063 44303 0.218 0.211 0.086 0.003*** (6.86) 
Number of counties  63371 323.190 211.000 308.551 44303 202.209 29.000 271.354 120.981*** (66.49) 
HHI (county)  63371 0.186 0.152 0.110 44303 0.210 0.174 0.113 -0.023*** (-33.94) 
County share of bank deposits  63371 0.059 0.009 0.115 44303 0.389 0.186 0.395 -0.329*** (-198.10) 
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2.4.2 Relevance of our proxy for delegation in deposit rate setting 
We begin by documenting that our proxy for decision-making delegation in deposit rate 
setting can explain heterogeneity in deposit rates across a bank’s branches.  We construct a bank-
level variable called Centralization that measures the fraction of a bank’s branches that do not set 
deposit rates locally.  We calculate the standard deviation in deposit rates across a bank’s branches 
in a given month, separately for the two different types of deposit accounts (money market and 
12-month CD).  In Table 2.3, columns (1) and (3) we report the results from a regression of the 
standard deviation of deposit rates on Centralization, with our standard controls for bank condition 
and month fixed effects. In both specifications, the coefficient on Centralization is negative and 
significant, suggesting that rates are more uniform when branches do not have authority to set their 
own rates.  Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in Centralization (0.16) is associated 
with a 0.036 (= -0.224 * 0.16) decline in the standard deviation of money market rates across 
branches and a 0.034 (= -0.213 * 0.16) decline in the standard deviation of 12-month CD rates, 
both roughly 500% declines relative to their average. This highlights that when branches are 
allowed to set their own rates, they tailor the rates to the supply and demand conditions in the local 
market.  An implication of our result is that local deposit markets are segmented, consistent with 
the assumption in most of the banking literature (Gilje at al. (2016), etc.).  The effect of 
centralization on deposit rate heterogeneity may depend on bank size.  In columns (2) and (4) we 
examine this possibility.  We divide the banks in our sample into quintiles based on the number of 
branches.  Banks in Quintile 1 have the fewest branches and banks in Quintile 5 (the omitted 
category) have the most branches.  We re-estimate the regression with dummy variables for 
quintiles and interactions between each quintile and the centralization proxy.  The results show 
that centralization tends to reduce deposit rate heterogeneity most in banks with the largest branch 
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networks, which is reasonable because such banks are more likely to operate in more diverse 
deposit markets. 
Table 2.3: Heterogeneity of deposit rates across branches within a bank  
This table reports a regression that relates a standard deviation of deposit rates across branches 
within the same bank to the degree of centralization of the bank for setting its deposit rate. 
Samples are divided to five different groups based on total numbers of branches of each bank. 
NumBranches_Quintile1 is the banks within bottom 20 percent and NumBranches_Quintile5 is 
the banks within top 20 percent in terms of total numbers of branches of the bank. To suppress 
the space, this table drops the results of bank-level control variables, which include Log (Total 
Asset), Log (Total Deposit), BHC, HHI (Bank average) and Number of counties. 
Appendix provides a description of each variable. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. The t-statistics are in parenthesis.  
 
 
Standard Deviation of Deposit rates  
 
Money Market Rates  12-month CD Rates  
 
(1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  
Centralization  -0.224***  -0.371***  -0.213***  -0.337***  
 
(-9.17)  (-6.15)  (-8.43)  (-6.38)  
Centralization × NumBranches_Quintile1  
 
0.300***  
 
0.280***  
  
(4.56)  
 
(5.29)  
Centralization × NumBranches_Quintile2  
 
0.122*  
 
0.104  
  
(1.85)  
 
(1.60)  
Centralization × NumBranches_Quintile3  
 
0.079  
 
0.126**  
  
(1.04)  
 
(2.09)  
Centralization × NumBranches_Quintile4  
 
0.067  
 
-0.036  
  
(1.10)  
 
(-0.67)  
Observations  363408  363408  341687  341687  
Adjusted R2  0.366  0.425  0.300  0.347  
Month FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  
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2.5 Results  
This section presents the main results of our paper. 
2.5.1 Deposit rate response 
Table 2.4 presents the results of estimating equation (2-1).  The first two columns report 
the results using money market rates as the dependent variable, the second two columns use 12-
month CD rates as the dependent variable.  Specifications marked (1) include branch and month 
fixed effects while specifications marked (2) include branch-shock and shock-month fixed effects.  
Across all specifications, we find a positive and statistically significant coefficient on PostShock 
x Treated x RateSet indicating that branches that set rates locally offer higher rates after disasters 
than other branches.  Money market rates are 2.6-2.9 bps higher on average, a roughly 7-8% 
increase relative to their mean, and 12-month CD rates are 4.0-5.3 bps higher, a roughly 4-5% 
increase relative to their mean.  These effects are economically significant.     
Table 2.4: Effect of natural disasters & bank centralization on deposit rate  
This table reports a regression that relates a branch’s deposit interest rate to a degree of the 
bank’s decision making delegation for setting its deposit rate given a local natural disaster on 
a county where the branch is located. Control group is the branches in the counties that are 
adjacent to the shock county and are not subject to any other natural disaster shock during the 
same shock-period. To suppress the space, this table drops the results of bank-level control 
variables, which include Log (Total Asset), Log (Total Deposit), BHC, HHI (Bank average) 
and Number of counties, and a market-level control variable of HHI (county). Appendix 
provides a description of each variable. Standard errors are clustered at a branch level. 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
The t-statistics are in parenthesis.  
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Deposit Rate   
Money Market Rates  12-month CD Rates   
(1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  
PostShock  0.020*** 
 
-0.007** 
 
 
(4.93) 
 
(-2.01) 
 
Treated  0.040 
 
-0.040* 
 
 (1.18)  (-1.78)  
RateSet 0.167  0.143   
(1.37) 
 
(1.16) 
 
PostShock × Treated  -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.002 -0.014***  
(-3.32) (-3.22) (-0.48) (-2.95) 
PostShock × RateSet  -0.009*** -0.008*** 0.010** 0.001  
(-2.98) (-2.82) (2.55) (0.27) 
Treated × RateSet  -0.011 
 
0.072** 
 
 
(-0.24) 
 
(2.05) 
 
PostShock × Treated × RateSet  0.026*** 0.029*** 0.040*** 0.053***  
(4.29) (4.75) (4.80) (5.88) 
Observations  104566 104566 107436 107436 
Adjusted R2  0.887 0.956 0.980 0.987 
Branch FE  Y  N  Y  N  
Month FE  Y  N  Y  N  
Branch-Shock FE  N  Y  N  Y  
Month-Shock FE  N  Y  N  Y  
 
Table 2.5 presents a dynamic version of the specifications in Table 2.4 with branch-shock 
and shock-month fixed effects.  Figure 2.2 plots the results graphically.  In these regressions, we 
replace the PostShock dummy with a set of monthly dummies, PostShock(t), and their 
corresponding interactions.  In the first column, we see that money market rates begin to respond 
in the month of the disaster declaration and the effect dies out by the end of the third month 
following the declaration. Branches with authority to set rates locally set money market rates 
between 3.0-6.0 bps higher in affected counties during these months.  In the second column, we 
see a longer CD rate response.  CD rates begin to respond two months before the disaster and 
remain elevated six months afterwards.  While the response in the disaster month is noticeably 
larger than in prior months (about 11 bps versus 2-6 bps), we cannot rule out an underlying trend 
in the CD rates of rate setters.    
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Table 2.5: Effect of natural disasters & bank centralization on deposit rate (Dynamics)  
This table reports a regression that relates a branch’s deposit interest rate to a degree of the 
bank’s decision making delegation for setting its deposit rate given a local natural disaster on 
a county where the branch is located. PostShock is decomposed to a set of dummy variables of 
PostShock(k), where k ranges from -2 to +6. All other specifications are the same as in Column 
2 and 4 in Table 4. To suppress the space, this table reports only the triple interaction terms of 
PostShock(k) × Treated × RateSet and drops the results of the interaction terms, which are 
PostShock(k) × Treated and PostShock(k) × RateSet, and bank-level and market-level 
control variables, which are the same as in Table 5. Appendix provides a description of each 
variable. Standard errors are clustered at a branch level. Statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. The t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
 
Deposit Rate  
 
Money Market Rates  12-month CD Rates  
PostShock ( − 2) × Treated × RateSet  -0.018*** 0.023*** 
 
(-3.65) (3.66) 
PostShock ( − 1) × Treated × RateSet  0.009 0.067*** 
 
(1.40) (5.75) 
PostShock ( + 0) × Treated × RateSet  0.057*** 0.111*** 
 
(5.72) (5.81) 
PostShock ( + 1) × Treated × RateSet  0.060*** 0.115*** 
 
(5.02) (6.08) 
PostShock ( + 2) × Treated × RateSet  0.047*** 0.105*** 
 
(3.83) (5.54) 
PostShock ( + 3) × Treated × RateSet  0.030** 0.091*** 
 
(2.16) (4.88) 
PostShock ( + 4) × Treated × RateSet  0.023 0.094*** 
 
(1.53) (5.18) 
PostShock ( + 5) × Treated × RateSet  0.024 0.095*** 
 
(1.59) (5.35) 
PostShock ( + 6) × Treated × RateSet  0.025 0.085*** 
 
(1.55) (4.56) 
Observations  82720 85650 
Adjusted R2  0.935 0.983 
Branch-Shock FE  Y  Y  
Month-Shock FE  Y  Y  
 
 
 93 
Figure 2.2: Dynamics for coefficients regarding deposit rate around the disaster  
The graph plots the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the coefficients for the 
triple interaction term, PostShock(k)⋅Treated⋅RateSet, where k ranges from -2 to +6. The first 
graph uses the MM rate and the second graph employs the CD rate as the outcome variables 
 
a. Money Market Rates 
 
b. 12-month CD Rates 
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The banking literature suggests that small or local banks behave differently from large 
banks.  Small banks have a comparative advantage in lending on soft information (Stein (2002), 
Berger et. al. (2005)).  Local banks help speed recoveries after natural disasters (Cortes (2014)).  
One might be concerned that our proxy for decision-making delegation is simply capturing these 
existing features of organizational structure.  To account for this possibility, we introduce controls 
for small bank and local bank, and their interactions, into the regression and examine whether our 
proxy retains explanatory power for deposit rates.  One might also be concerned that rate setting 
authority simply proxies for the importance of the market to the bank.  Cortes and Strahan (2014) 
find that banks shield their core markets from natural-disaster driven lending reallocation.  To 
address this possibility, we introduce a control for the importance of the market to the bank.  
Important Market takes the value of 1 if a county is in the top quartile of markets for a bank, in 
terms of deposit production.4  Table 2.6 Panel A presents these results for money market rates and 
Table 2.6 Panel B presents the results for CD rates.  As shown in column (1) of Panels A and B, 
adding a dummy for Small and its interactions into the regression hardly changes the magnitude 
or statistical significance of our key coefficient.  The coefficient on PostShock x Treated x RateSet 
is 0.029 for money market rates (versus 0.029 in Table 4) and 0.042 for CD rates (versus 0.04 in 
Table 4).  As shown in column (2) of Panels A and B, adding a dummy for Local has a similarly 
negligible effect on our coefficient of interest. Interestingly, we do not find any evidence that 
branches of small banks or local banks set deposit rates differently in affected counties after a 
disaster.  The coefficients on PostShock x Treated x Small and PostShock x Treated x Local are 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. When we add a dummy for whether the market is 
                                                 
4 Cortes and Strahan (2014) define core markets as counties where banks have branches. We can only observe 
deposit rates in markets where banks have branches so we attempt to distinguish between relatively more and less 
important markets conditional on a branch presence.  
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important for the bank, the effect of delegation is a bit larger, but similar in magnitude to our 
baseline result.  In column (4) of Table 2.6, Panels A and B, we all three controls — Small, Local, 
and Important Market — and their interactions to the regression at once.  The coefficient on 
PostShock x Treated x RateSet is statistically significant and similar in magnitude to our baseline 
result.   
Table 2.6: Effect of natural disasters & bank centralization on deposit rate  
This table reports a regression that relates a branch’s deposit interest rate to a degree of the 
bank’s decision making delegation for setting its deposit rate given a local natural disaster on 
a county where the branch is located. Control group is the branches in the counties that are 
adjacent to the shock county and are not subject to any other natural disaster shock during the 
same shock-period. To suppress the space, this table drops the results of bank-level and market-
level control variables, which are the same as in Table 5. Appendix provides a description of 
each variable. Standard errors are clustered at a branch level. Statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. The t-statistics are in 
parenthesis. 
 
Panel A  Money Market Rates  
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Z=  Small  Local  ImportantMarket  Everything  
PostShock × Treated  -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.009** -0.009** 
 
(-2.90) (-3.04) (-1.97) (-1.97) 
PostShock × RateSet  -0.008** -0.008** -0.016*** -0.015*** 
 
(-2.54) (-2.57) (-4.74) (-4.37) 
PostShock × Treated × RateSet  0.029*** 0.030*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 
 
(4.59) (4.61) (5.88) (5.57) 
PostShock × Z  -0.002 -0.001 0.013*** 
 
 
(-0.48) (-0.21) (4.21) 
 
PostShock × Treated × Z  -0.005 -0.007 -0.024*** 
 
 
(-0.74) (-0.98) (-3.78) 
 
Observations  104566 104566 104566 104566 
Adjusted R2  0.956 0.956 0.956 0.956 
Branch-Shock FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Month-Shock FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  
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Panel B  12 − month CD Rates  
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Z=  Small  Local  ImportantMarket  Everything  
PostShock × Treated  -0.012** -0.014*** -0.009* -0.007 
 
(-2.27) (-2.77) (-1.69) (-1.33) 
PostShock × RateSet  0.001 -0.001 -0.008* -0.008** 
 
(0.33) (-0.28) (-1.93) (-2.00) 
PostShock × Treated × RateSet  0.055*** 0.056*** 0.070*** 0.069*** 
 
(6.01) (6.30) (6.63) (6.55) 
PostShock × Z  -0.002 0.007 0.015*** 
 
 
(-0.36) (1.37) (3.78) 
 
PostShock × Treated × Z  -0.012 -0.009 -0.031*** 
 
 
(-1.16) (-0.68) (-3.16) 
 
Observations  107436 107436 107436 107436 
Adjusted R2  0.987 0.987 0.987 0.987 
Branch-Shock FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Month-Shock FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  
 
In summary, our proxy for decision-making delegation appears to be capturing an aspect 
of organizational structure not captured by existing proxies in the literature.  We include these 
controls and their interactions in all remaining specifications by default. 
2.5.2 Deposit growth 
A higher deposit rate, all else equal, should translate into higher deposit volumes. Since 
branch-level deposit data is only available on an annual basis as of June 30th from the FDIC’s 
Summary of Deposits, we examine how annual (June-June) deposit growth is affected by natural 
disasters occurring in the second quarter of a calendar year.  Specifically, treated branches are 
those located in counties that experienced at least one natural disaster in the second quarter of a 
year and no disasters in the prior three quarters.  Control branches are those in adjacent counties 
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that did not experience a natural disaster during the year (June-June).  The rationale for the setup 
is that the previous analysis showed that the deposit rate response lasts roughly three months.  We 
expect to observe the deposit volume response in the same timeframe, and we are more likely to 
be able to observe such an effect if it happens towards the end of the reporting year. 
We run regressions of the following form: 
%∆𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑄2𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑄2𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑄2𝑖×𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑄2𝑐,𝑡
+Λ × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠  + 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(2- 2) 
where i indexes branches, and t indexes years.  The dependent variable is a branch’s annual 
(June-June) deposit growth.  RateSetQ2 takes the value of 1 if a branch sets rates locally, 0 
otherwise, and this variable is measured as of June 30th in the calendar year prior to the disaster.  
TreatedQ2 is 1 for disaster counties and 0 for adjacent control counties.  Controls include our 
standard bank and market level controls as well as Small, Local, and Important Market, and all of 
their interactions.  Fixed effects are alternately branch and year, or shock, or shock and branch, 
with the third specification being the most rigorous.  Standard errors are clustered by branch. 
We find that annual deposit growth is 1.9 - 2.6 percentage points higher at branches that 
set rates locally in affected counties after a disaster.  However, the result is only significant at the 
10% level with branch and shock fixed effects, which is likely due to the smaller number of treated 
counties in comparison to our results on deposit rates. This effect is economically significant 
representing an almost 27 - 36% increase relative to mean annual deposit growth. 
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Table 2.7: Effect of natural disasters & bank centralization on deposit growth 
This table reports a regression results that relates a branch’s deposit balance to a degree of the 
bank’s decision making delegation in terms of setting its deposit rate given a local natural 
disaster on a county where the branch is located. Control group is the branches in the counties 
that are adjacent to the shock county and do not have any shock during last 12 months until 
June 30 of current year. To suppress the space, this table drops the results of bank-level and 
market-level control variables, which are the same as in Table 5. Appendix provides a 
description of each variable. Standard errors are clustered at a branch level. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. The t-
statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
 
△Deposit (%)  
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  
TreatedQ2  -0.673 1.039** -0.858 
 
(-0.99) (2.06) (-0.97) 
RateSetQ2  -15.762** -2.019*** -21.422*** 
 
(-2.51) (-3.63) (-3.67) 
RateSetQ2 × TreatedQ2  1.906* 2.621*** 2.325* 
 
(1.75) (3.30) (1.77) 
Small  1.598 3.897*** 1.719 
 
(0.60) (4.94) (0.61) 
Small × TreatedQ2  -0.338 -0.249 0.314 
 
(-0.31) (-0.32) (0.23) 
Local  2.773 0.904 4.351** 
 
(1.48) (1.47) (2.22) 
Local × TreatedQ2  1.361 0.272 1.525 
 
(1.14) (0.33) (1.12) 
ImportantMarket  1.847 -1.177** 1.296 
 
(1.19) (-2.05) (0.67) 
ImportantMarket  × TreatedQ2  -1.648 -2.595*** -2.168 
 
(-1.38) (-3.16) (-1.52) 
Observations  37072 53228 37034 
Adjusted R2  0.539 0.030 0.555 
Branch FE  Y  N  Y  
Year FE  Y  N  N  
Shock FE  N  Y  Y  
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2.5.3 Mortgage lending 
To test if lending volume is affected by the degree of centralization in how deposit rates 
are set, we use mortgage lending by a bank in a county as a proxy for local lending.  Data on 
mortgage originations is available by bank and county, but only at the annual frequency for the 
calendar year.  We therefore need to aggregate our branch-level proxy for organizational structure 
to the bank level.  We construct a dummy variable called RateSetAbvMedCounty, which takes the 
value of 1 if more than 50% of a bank’s branches (by deposits) in a county set deposit rates locally, 
and 0 otherwise.  We then examine how annual (calendar year) growth in mortgage lending 
responds to natural disasters occurring in the first half of the year.  Based on the previous results, 
we expect a deposit rate and deposit volume response within one quarter of the natural disaster, 
but mortgage lending may take longer to respond.  We focus on disasters in the first half of the 
year because related lending is likely to be reflected by the end of the year.   
 Treated counties are those that experienced at least one natural disaster in the first half of 
a calendar year and no disasters in the prior year (which would have affected the prior year’s 
mortgage lending and hence this year’s growth rate).  Control counties are adjacent counties that 
did not experience a disaster in the year or the prior year.  We then run regressions of the following 
form: 
%∆𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑗,𝑐,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑏𝑣𝑀𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑐 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐻1𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑏𝑣𝑀𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑐×𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐻1𝑐,𝑡 +Λ × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠  + 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
               (2- 3) 
where j indexes banks, c counties, and t years.  The dependent variable is annual growth in 
mortgage lending by bank and county.  TreatedH1 is 1 for disaster counties and 0 for adjacent 
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control counties.  Controls include our standard bank and market level controls as well as Small, 
Local, and Important Market, and all of their interactions. RateSetAbvMedCounty and bank 
controls are set in the year prior to the disaster.  Fixed effects are alternately bank-county and year, 
or shock, or shock and bank-county.  Standard errors are clustered by bank-county. 
Table 2.8 displays the results.  We find that mortgage lending grows faster by 25 – 41 
percentage points, after a disaster in affected counties when banks have more branches setting rates 
locally within the county.  The effect is economically significant, suggesting that the growth rate 
of mortgage lending by local rate setters is about 103-166% times larger, relative to mean annual 
growth in mortgage lending. 
Table 2.8: Effect of natural disasters & bank centralization on mortgage lending  
This table reports a regression results that relate a bank’s mortgage lending in a county to a 
degree of the bank’s decision making delegation in terms of setting its deposit rate given a local 
natural disaster on a county where the mortgage lending is made. Control group is the bank in 
the counties that are adjacent to the shock county and do not have any shock both in the current 
year and in the previous year. To suppress the space, this table drops the results of bank-level 
and market-level control variables, which are the same as in Table 5. Appendix provides a 
description of each variable. Standard errors are clustered at a bank-county level. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. The t-
statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
 
△Mortgage (%)  
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  
TreatedH1  -15.095** 3.801 -16.023 
 
(-2.51) (0.63) (-1.17) 
RateSetAbvMedCounty   -46.829 -16.373 -28.283 
 
(-1.52) (-1.11) (-0.60) 
RateSetAbvMedCounty  × TreatedH1  25.354* 29.503* 40.702** 
 
(1.72) (1.85) (2.00) 
Small  24.523 12.712 16.910 
 
(1.15) (0.77) (0.58) 
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△Mortgage (%)  
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  
Small × TreatedH1  2.521 -4.630 1.539 
 
(0.18) (-0.41) (0.08) 
Local  -0.799 -18.327 5.923 
 
(-0.04) (-1.34) (0.24) 
Local × TreatedH1  -5.509 4.623 -22.120 
 
(-0.34) (0.32) (-1.02) 
ImportantMarket  19.456 27.947 57.482* 
 
(0.70) (1.31) (1.68) 
ImportantMarket  × TreatedH1  -26.398 -54.124** -41.524* 
 
(-1.43) (-2.43) (-1.87) 
Observations  3910 6136 3450 
Adjusted R2  0.673 -0.013 0.651 
Bank-County FE  Y  N  Y  
Year FE  Y  N  N  
Shock FE  N  Y  Y  
 
2.5.4 House prices 
In our final set of tests, we examine the effect on house prices.  The house price index is 
available at the monthly frequency at the MSA level.  Since the data is monthly, we use the same 
setup that was used for the original deposit rate regressions, which looks at the effect in a seven-
month window around a natural disaster declaration.  But because the index is available at the 
MSA, not county, level, we aggregate our branch and bank-level variables to the MSA level.  We 
construct a dummy variable called RateSetAbvMedMSA, which takes the value of 1 if more than 
50% of branches in an MSA (by deposits) set deposit rates locally (within the MSA), and 0 
otherwise.  Bank characteristics are also aggregated to the MSA level, as described in the Variable 
Definitions table in the Internet Appendix.  
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 Treated MSAs are those that experienced a natural disaster declaration in a month.  Control 
MSAs are other MSAs in the same state that did not experience a disaster in a seven-month window 
around the disaster.  We run regressions of the following form: 
%∆ 𝐻𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑚 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑚,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑚×𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑚,𝑡×𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑚,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑚×𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑚,𝑡 +  𝛽7𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑚×𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑚,𝑡×𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑚,𝑡
+Λ × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠  + 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑚,𝑡 
             (2- 4) 
where m indexes MSAs, and t months.  The dependent variable is annual percentage change 
in the house price index in the MSA.  Treated is 1 for disaster MSAs and 0 for control MSAs.  
PostShock takes the value of 1 in the disaster declaration month and three months thereafter, and 
0 otherwise.  Controls include our standard bank and market level controls aggregated to the MSA 
level as well as Small, Local, and Important Market aggregated to the MSA level, and all of their 
interactions. RateSetAbvMedMSA and all bank controls are set at the beginning of the event 
window and are time invariant in the event window.  Fixed effects are alternately MSA and month, 
or MSA-shock and shock-month.  Standard errors are clustered by MSA. 
Table 2.9 displays the results.  House prices decline in MSAs affected by natural disasters, 
but having a larger share of branches in the MSAs with authority to set rates mitigates the decline.  
Specifically, the house price decline is 3-8 basis points smaller, or 20 - 51% smaller relative to 
relative to mean, in MSAs with an above-media presence of rate setters.  Our results indicate that 
the extent of delegation in bank decision-making has real effects in terms of mortgage lending and 
house price recovery following natural disasters.  
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Table 2.9: Effect of natural disasters & bank centralization on house price changes  
This table reports a regression that relates MSA-level house price index to a degree of a bank’s 
decision making delegation in terms of setting its deposit rate given a local natural disaster on 
a the MSA. Standard errors are clustered at a MSA level. Control group is a group of MSAs that 
belong to the same state where the treated MSA is placed and that are not subject to any FEMA 
disaster declaration during the same shock period of the treated MSA. To suppress the space, 
this table drops the results of the control variables, which are SmallMSA, LocalMSA, 
ImportantMarketMSA, and interaction terms with TreatedMSA and PostShock. HHI 
(MSA) is included as a control variable, but not reported in this table. Appendix provides a 
description of each variable. Standard errors are clustered at an MSA level. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. The t-
statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
 
△HPI (%)  
 
(1)  (2)  
TreatedMSA  -0.112 
 
 
(-1.41) 
 
PostShock  -0.016 
 
 
(-0.52) 
 
TreatedMSA × PostShock  0.026 -0.033* 
 
(0.54) (-1.93) 
RateSetAbvMedMSA  0.083 
 
 
(1.32) 
 
RateSetAbvMedMSA × TreatedMSA  0.041 
 
 
(0.64) 
 
RateSetAbvMedMSA × PostShock  -0.076*** -0.020* 
 
(-3.19) (-1.82) 
RateSetAbvMedMSA × PostShock × TreatedMSA  0.078* 0.031* 
 
(1.96) (1.82) 
Observations  34412 34412 
Adjusted R2  0.630 0.990 
MSA FE  Y  N  
Month FE  Y  N  
MSA-Shock FE  N  Y  
Month-Shock FE  N  Y  
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2.5.5 Robustness  
As a robustness check, we repeat our mortgage lending results using different data on 
originations from Fannie Mae. The underlying mortgages are 30-year, fixed rate, fully 
documented, single-family amortizing loans that are owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae.  This 
data is useful because originations are reported monthly so we can observe lending on a finer time 
scale.  The drawback is that we do not have data on the originating bank, and we only know the 
location of the property at the MSA (not county) level.  The dependent variable is the monthly 
percent change in Fannie Mae originations.  We use the proxy for bank organizational structure 
aggregated to the MSA level, RateSetAbvMedMSA, and all other independent variables are the 
same as in the house price regression shown in equation (2-4).  As shown in Table 2.10, mortgage 
lending grows 16-22 percentage points faster in affected MSAs with a higher proportion of 
branches that set rates locally, within the MSA.  This is economically significant, suggesting that 
growth is about 57-78 % larger, relative to mean growth. 
Table 2.10: Effect of natural disasters & bank centralization on mortgage origination  
This table reports a regression that relates MSA-level aggregated mortgage origination to a 
degree of a bank’s decision making delegation in terms of setting its deposit rate given a local 
natural disaster on a the MSA. Standard errors are clustered at an MSA level. Control group is 
a group of MSAs that belong to the same state where the treated MSA is placed and that are not 
subject to any FEMA disaster declaration during the same shock period of the treated MSA. To 
suppress the space, this table drops the results of the control variables, which are the same as 
in Table 2.9. Appendix provides a description of each variable. Standard errors are clustered at 
an MSA level. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and 
***, respectively. The t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
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△FannieMortgage (%)   
(1)  (2)  
TreatedMSA  -11.186 
 
 
(-0.84) 
 
PostShock  7.896 
 
 
(0.68) 
 
TreatedMSA × PostShock  -9.255 -20.290  
(-0.66) (-1.00) 
RateSetAbvMedMSA  -0.274 
 
 
(-0.04) 
 
RateSetAbvMedMSA × TreatedMSA  -11.902 
 
 
(-1.60) 
 
RateSetAbvMedMSA × PostShock  -10.749* -11.324  
(-1.90) (-1.15) 
RateSetAbvMedMSA × PostShock × TreatedMSA  16.121* 21.786*  
(1.80) (1.80) 
Observations  13745 13741 
Adjusted R2  0.070 -0.048 
MSA FE  Y  N  
Month FE  Y  N  
MSA-Shock FE  N  Y  
Month-Shock FE  N  Y  
 
2.6 Conclusion  
Our paper introduces a novel measure of decision-making delegation within banks:  
whether branches have authority to set their own deposit rates.  Using natural disasters as a shock 
to local conditions, we show that delegation of rate-setting authority to branches has real effects.  
Branches that set rates locally raise deposit rates more and experience faster deposit growth.  Banks 
with more branches setting their own rates increase mortgage lending to affected counties more, 
mitigating the depressing effect of natural disasters on house prices.  The effects we find are 
distinct from those of other commonly used proxies for organizational structure like bank size or 
“localness”.  Our paper highlights the role that delegation of deposit funding decisions has on bank 
behavior and local economic conditions.  
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2.8 Appendices 
2.8.1 Variable Definition 
Variable  Definition  Level  
Standard deviation of 
deposit rates  
Standard deviation of deposit interest rates across 
branches of a bank  
Bank  
Centralization  Fraction of a bank’s branches that do not set their 
own deposit rate  
Bank  
RateSet  Dummy variable that equals 1 if a branch sets its 
own deposit rates or follows the rate set by another 
branch in the same county. Account-type specific. 
Set three months before a disaster month.  
Branch  
RateSetQ2  Dummy variable that equals 1 if a branch sets its 
own deposit rates or follows the rate set by another 
branch in the same county. Account type specific. 
Set as of June 30th in the year prior to a disaster.  
Branch  
RateSetAbvMedCounty  Dummy variable that equals 1 if more than 50% of 
a bank’s branches (by deposits) in the county set 
their own deposit rates or follow rates set by other 
branches within the county. Set as of June 30th in 
the year prior to a disaster.  
Bank-  
County  
RateSetAbvMedMSA  Dummy variable that equals 1 if more than 50% of 
branches in the MSA (by deposits) set their own 
deposit rates or follow rates set by other branches 
within the same MSA. Set three months before a 
disaster month.  
MSA  
Treated  Dummy variable that equals 1 for counties that 
experienced a natural disaster.  
County  
TreatedQ2  Dummy variable that equals 1 for counties that 
experienced a natural disaster during the second 
quarter of a year.  
County  
TreatedH1  Dummy variable that equals 1 for counties that 
experienced a natural disaster in the first half of a 
year.  
County  
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Variable  Definition  Level  
TreatedMSA  Dummy variable that equals 1 for MSAs that 
experienced a natural disaster.  
MSA  
PostShock  Dummy variable that equals 1 for treatment and 
control entities (counties or MSAs) at the month of 
a natural disaster or in a three-month period after 
the disaster.  
County or 
MSA  
Market controls  
  
HHI (County)  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for a county level 
deposit market as of June 30th  
County  
HHI (MSA)  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for an MSA level 
deposit market as of June 30th  
MSA  
Bank level controls  
  
Number of Counties  Number of counties in which a bank has a branch  Bank  
Log (Total Assets)  The logarithm of a bank’s total assets  Bank  
Log (Total Deposits)  The logarithm of a bank’s total deposits  Bank  
HHI (Bank Average)  Deposit-weighted average of HHIs in counties in 
which a bank has a branch.  
Bank  
BHC  A dummy that equals 1 if a bank is part of a bank-
holding company  
Bank  
Small  Dummy variable that equals 1 if a bank has less 
than 2 billion in assets.  
Bank  
SmallMSA  Share of deposits in an MSA held by small banks  MSA  
Local  Dummy variable that equals 1 if a bank obtains 
more than 65% of its deposits from a single county.  
Bank  
LocalMSA  Share of deposits in an MSA held by local banks  MSA  
ImportantMarket  Dummy variable that equals 1 if a county is in the 
top quartile of deposits among the counties in which 
a bank has branches.  
Bank-  
County  
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Variable  Definition  Level  
ImportantMarketMSA  Share of deposits in an MSA held by banks for 
which the MSA is an important MSA, defined as 
the MSA being in the top quartile of MSAs in 
which a bank has branches in terms of the bank’s 
deposit balance  
MSA  
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2.8.2 Additional Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Effect on heterogeneity of deposit rate across branches (bank × month)  
 
N  Mean  S.D.  25th  Median  75th  
Standard Deviation of MM rates  331559  0.007  0.059  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Standard Deviation of CD rates  340898  0.007  0.048  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Central  508013  0.719  0.163  0.500  0.750  0.857  
Total Asset (Million USD)  508013  2324.124  39452.529  97.207  182.151  383.666  
Log (Total Assets)  508013  12.287  1.242  11.485  12.113  12.858  
Total Deposit (Million USD)  508013  1628.291  26359.726  81.567  152.846  316.632  
Log (Total Deposits)  508013  12.097  1.219  11.309  11.937  12.665  
BHC  508013  0.845  0.362  1.000  1.000  1.000  
HHI (Bank Average)  507918  0.227  0.120  0.145  0.200  0.277  
Number of Counties  508013  4.543  23.748  1.000  2.000  3.000  
 
 
Panel B: Effect on annual deposit balance growth (branch × year)  
 
N  Mean  S.D.  25th  Median  75th  
△Deposit (%)  53228 7.166 24.261 -3.540 2.948 11.062 
Treated  53228 0.380 0.485 0.000 0.000 1.000 
RateSet  53228 0.467 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Small  53228 0.461 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Local  53228 0.285 0.452 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ImportantMarket  53228 0.431 0.495 0.000 0.000 1.000 
HHI (County)  53228 0.209 0.117 0.134 0.176 0.254 
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Panel C: Effect on annual mortgage lending growth (bank × county × year)  
 
N  Mean  S.D.  25th  Median  75th  
△Mortgage (%)  6561 24.592 120.019 -25.066 4.124 37.789 
Treated  6561 0.524 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 
RateSetAbvMedCounty   6561 0.408 0.491 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Small  6561 0.522 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Local  6561 0.310 0.463 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ImportantMarket  6561 0.328 0.469 0.000 0.000 1.000 
HHI (County)  6561 0.213 0.117 0.140 0.183 0.248 
 
 
 
 
Panel E: Effect on monthly Fannie Mortgage growth (MSA × month)  
 
N  Mean  S.D.  25th  Median  75th  
△FannieMortgage(%)  13745 28.081 121.768 -28.955 1.325 44.589 
TreatedMSA  13745 0.199 0.399 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RateSetAbvMedMSA  13745 0.403 0.490 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SmallMSA  13745 0.305 0.191 0.155 0.261 0.432 
LocalMSA  13745 0.192 0.172 0.066 0.143 0.269 
ImportantMarketMSA  13745 0.537 0.281 0.321 0.527 0.777 
HHI (MSA)  13745 0.169 0.064 0.132 0.160 0.188 
 
Panel D: Effect on monthly HPI growth (MSA × month)  
 
N  Mean  S.D.  25th  Median  75th  
△HPI (%)  34412 0.153 0.888 -0.328 0.209 0.709 
TreatedMSA  34412 0.157 0.363 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RateSetAbvMedMSA  34412 0.427 0.495 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SmallMSA  34412 0.328 0.202 0.166 0.290 0.454 
LocalMSA  34412 0.208 0.174 0.074 0.162 0.294 
ImportantMarketMSA  34412 0.513 0.271 0.318 0.496 0.726 
HHI (MSA)  34412 0.169 0.076 0.127 0.153 0.188 
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Chapter 3: Inter-Bank Network and 
Liquidity Crisis 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
During the onset of the 07-09 financial crisis, many banks suffered from a liquidity crisis. 
Even though serious runs on banks by retail depositors were not observed during this crisis, banks 
had troubles from liquidity evaporation by the frozen inter-bank money market. From this 
phenomenon, we can ask the following question: Why did a bank become vulnerable to the 
liquidity risk and what drove the malfunction of a bank’s liquidity risk management at the outset 
of the financial crisis? This study focuses on a transformation of the inter-bank network in terms 
of its size and its entity composition as the main cause that brought about individual banks’ 
liquidity risk mismanagement.  
Over a decade, a bank experienced a substantial change in its funding structure. A capital 
market and direct financing became important funding sources for a bank beyond the traditional 
retail deposit financing. As shown in Figure 1, the U.S. local banks’ average ratio of total deposit 
over total liability declined until before the onset of the financial crisis in 2007. On the other hand, 
the banks’ average ratio of total borrowings over total liabilities increased substantially during the 
same period. A bank’s asset composition also underwent a dramatic transformation. From Figure 
3.1, we see that the U.S. local banks’ average ratio of liquidity holdings decreased but the average 
ratio of total loans increased during the same period. All of those phenomena implies that a bank’s 
asset and liability structure became prone to a liquidity shock before the financial crisis.  
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Figure 3.1: Trend of the U.S. local bank’s asset and liability structures 
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This study finds a root cause of the bank’s failure in managing its liquidity risk from an 
expansion and transformation of the inter-bank lending and borrowing network. During the 2000s 
until before the financial crisis, the financial industry experienced a dramatic expansion of its 
funding network. The network expansion had diverse forms such as growth of the asset 
securitization and emergence of gigantic financial groups with various financial companies. If a 
bank belonged to a bigger network, the bank could access an additional liquidity more easily from 
the far-reaching network beyond the boundary of the existing local deposit market when the bank 
faced an urgent money demand. Thus, the bank becomes less concerned about a potential money 
deficit due to an easier access to the wide inter-bank funding network.  
In general, if a bank manages its liquidity risk strictly, the bank usually has to sacrifice its 
profitability. A bank’s liquidity risk and the bank’s profitability have a positive relationship. For 
example, if the amount of liquid assets increases, the probability of the bank’s liquidity shortage 
will be reduced but its profitability can also diminish because of the lower yield from the liquid 
asset. Also, if a bank manages its liquidity risk strictly by maintaining its loan-to-deposit ratio 
within a specified upper-bound, the probability that the bank faces a roll-over risk from the 
wholesale borrowing becomes lower but the bank has to forgo profitable projects because the bank 
cannot finance the projects without additional wholesale funding given a fixed amount of deposit.  
In this study, I assume that each bank has a reservation level of liquidity risk, which is the 
maximum level of liquidity risk that the bank can endure. The liquidity risk is defined to be a 
bank’s expected amount of net money deficit after deducting the expected amount of borrowing 
from the network and the amount of liquidity holdings given the event of net cash outflow. After 
the expansion of the network, a bank’s liquidity risk can drop lower than its existing reservation 
level because the bank’s expected amount of borrowing increases in the wide network. In this 
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situation, the bank will have an incentive to reorganize its asset and liability structure to improve 
the bank’s profitability while restoring the liquidity risk up to the reservation level again. The 
transformation of a bank’s asset and liability structure means a reduction in the proportion of liquid 
assets and an expansion of the wholesale borrowings.  
This strategy of a bank’s asset and liability reorganization to improve its profitability works 
well as long as the market condition for the inter-bank borrowing is favorable. In other words, if 
the transactions among individual banks within the network are active enough to make sure that a 
bank can find a lender easily, the bank can enjoy better profitability by weakening the liquidity 
management without a concern about the potential funding difficulty. However, if there is a 
negative shock on the economy like the event of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the active 
transaction within the inter-bank network will suddenly stop. The entities that hold enough cash 
no longer lend their money to other entities in the network due to the increased uncertainty in the 
market. Then, many banks will suddenly face serious troubles in borrowings from the 
counterparties in the network. In this case, the bank has to survive the situation by relying on its 
own liquidity, but the network expansion incentivized each bank to reduce its liquidity holdings. 
In addition, the liability structure of the bank in a wide network is prone to a severe roll-over risk 
due to the bank’s excessive dependence on wholesale direct borrowing rather than stable insured 
retail deposits. Consequently, a bank’s excessive dependence on the inter-bank funding network 
results in the bank’s liquidity crisis.  
As the next step, this study conducts an empirical test for several testable predictions to 
support the findings of the theoretical analysis. First, this paper focuses on whether a bank 
connected to a wider network experiences a weaker liquidity status in terms of its asset and liability 
composition. In this study, a bank’s affiliation in a bank holding company (BHC) group that 
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participates actively in a loan syndication arrangement proxies for a bank’s exposure to a big inter-
bank network. Six different financial ratios – liquidity-to-asset, loan-to-asset, credit-to-asset, 
deposit-to-liability, borrowing-to-liability and loan-to-deposit – are employed to measure a bank’s 
vulnerability to a liquidity risk. In this study, I select samples from the U.S. local banks that are 
affiliated in the U.S. BHC group. A local bank is defined as the bank that collects at least 65 percent 
of its total deposit from a single county. I divide total samples of local banks into a treated and a 
control groups. The treated group consists of the banks that have exposures to big networks 
measured by the number of relationships with other financial institutions made through the parent 
BHC’s arrangement in a loan syndication.  
According to the regression results, we find that loan-to-asset, credit-to-asset, borrowing-
to-liability and loan-to-deposit ratios maintain at a higher level but liquidity-to-asset and deposit-
to-liability ratios remain at a lower level if the bank is affiliated in a BHC that makes relationship 
with many other institutions actively through a loan syndication. In short, as a bank is exposed to 
a big network, the bank’s liquidity status, which is measured by its asset and liability structure, 
becomes weaker.  
The second part of the empirical analysis is whether a bank’s exposure to a wide inter-bank 
network leads to a more serious funding problem to the bank during a market stress. A spread on 
a bank’s deposit interest rate against the risk free rate is employed to measure the relative cost of 
funding and the degree of the bank’s difficulty in its external financing. The results suggest that if 
a bank is affiliated in a BHC group that makes a relationship actively with many other lenders 
through a loan syndication, the bank would face a greater difficulty in financing due to a higher 
spread on its deposit interest rate against the risk free rate.  
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This paper is part of a growing literature in several fields. First, this paper is related to the 
literature that explains the key factors that brought about the 07-09 financial crisis. Thakor (2012, 
2015a, 2015b) addresses various underlying forces that led to the crisis such as financial innovation 
and behavioral bias. Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013) show that a contractual externality between 
long-term and short-term debtholders can bring about a shortening of the maturity structure for a 
financial institution, leading to a liquidity crisis. Acharya and Naqvi (2012) deal with an agency 
problem generated from the managerial compensation for a bank’s loan officer as a cause of a 
bank’s excessive credit supply before the crisis. This study proposes a new idea that a dramatic 
expansion of the inter-bank network ultimately made banks vulnerable to the liquidity crisis.  
Second, this paper is also related to the literature that addresses the phenomenon of the 
financial contagion through the network. Allen and Gale (2000), Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-
Salehi (2015), and Allen and Babus (2009) analyze why and how an interconnected financial 
network among banks causes a financial contagion and market collapse. Unlike the existing 
literature that mostly focuses on the solvency risk through the direct claim between banks, this 
paper addresses a bank’s liquidity risk that is caused by a sudden malfunction of an active inter-
bank funding network at the onset of the financial crisis.  
Finally, this study is related to the literature that analyzes a bank’s unique function of a 
liquidity provision. Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002), Gatev and Strahan (2006), and Acharya and 
Mora (2015) show what causes a malfunction of a bank’s liquidity provision. In this study, a bank’s 
heavy dependence on the inter-bank market is considered as a key factor that can have a great 
influence on the bank’s liquidity provision during the early stage of the financial crisis.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents theoretical analysis on 
the effect of the change in an inter-bank network on a bank’s incentive to manage liquidity risk. 
Section 3.3 deals with extensions of the analysis. Section 3.4 shows the results of empirical 
analysis. Section 3.5 concludes.  
3.2 Theoretical Analysis  
This section addresses a theoretical analysis on a research question of why inter-bank 
network weakens an incentive for a bank to strictly manage its liquidity risk.  
3.2.1 A bank’s asset allocation given a surplus  
As the first step, this section demonstrates how much portion of a money surplus would be 
allocated to an inter-bank lending given a net cash inflow to a bank at time 0. A money surplus or 
a net cash inflow is a remainder made after offsetting all cash inflows from all cash outflows during 
a day. It is assumed that there are two types of assets in which the surplus money can be invested 
in by the bank. One is a risk free asset, and the other one is a short-term lending to another bank 
within the network. Investments in commercial papers or ABCPs issued by other financial entities 
or banks via MMFs are also regarded as the short-term lending to another bank because those 
issuing entities are the end user of the investment funds. The amount of the risk free assets is x and 
the amount of the short-term lending to another bank is y. Both x and y are numeraire. The bank 
makes an investment of the surplus only during one time period until time 1 because there will be 
new cash flows in time 1 through its regular banking operation. Thus, the maturity of a short-term 
lending to another bank is due at time 1. At time 1, both the risk free asset and short-term lending 
will be liquidated to cover cash outflows made at time 1 such as a credit line drawdown by 
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borrowers and cash withdrawal by depositors. The bank also can have additional surplus at time 1 
such as a collection of new deposits or retrieval of existing loans. In this case, the bank will allocate 
the surplus into risk free assets and inter-bank lending again until time 2.  
The bank with a money surplus will make an asset allocation decision to maximize the 
expected value of its short-term asset portfolio at time 1. The objective function is the expected 
value of its asset portfolio, which are comprised of the risk free asset (x) and the short-term lending 
to another bank (y). As for the risk free asset, there is no change in value until time 1, meaning 
that there is no risk of default or devaluation. Thus, the value of risk free asset maintains x at time 
1. On the other hand, in case of the short-term lending to another bank, the value at time 1 will be 
either of ry with a probability of p or Ry with a probability of 1 − p. p is the probability that the 
borrower is in default on the loan at time 1. Thus, ry is the value of the lending when the borrower 
becomes in default. In this regard, it is assumed that r < 1 < R.  
 Objective function:  
E(portfolio value) = x + y[p⋅r + (1 − p)⋅R]      (3- 1) 
 We need to set up several constraints to find out the bank’s optimal allocation choice 
between a risk free asset and a short-term lending to another bank. The first constraint is the bank’s 
individual rationality (IR) constraint. It is assumed that there is a reservation level of the portfolio 
value given a default on the short-term lending at time 1. The reservation level means the minimum 
level of the portfolio value that the bank has to maintain even when the counterparty borrower is 
in default on the loan, i.e. in the worst scenario of the situation. The reservation level of the 
portfolio value is assumed to be z.  
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The second constraint is a participation constraint. If a bank does not allocate its surplus 
between the risk free asset and the short-term lending to another bank, the bank keeps the surplus 
as a cash. Cash does not change in value, but incurs a storage cost, which is c, to the bank. Thus, 
the net value of cash in time 1 will be 1 − c, given an initial value of one at time 0. In this regard, 
the participation constraint means that the expected value of the asset portfolio at time 1 should be 
at least the net value of cash at time 1 after deducting the storage cost. Third, the summation of x 
and y should be less than or equal to one. The last one is the incentive compatibility constraint. All 
the constraints are listed as follows.  
 IR constraint:  
E(portfolio value│default of lending) = x + ry ≥ z     (3- 2) 
 Participation constraint:  
E(portfolio value) = x + y[p⋅r + (1 − p)⋅R] ≥ 1 − c      (3- 3) 
 Feasibility constraint:  
x + y ≤ 1           (3- 4) 
 IC constraint: 
 𝑥,  𝑦 ∈ argmax
𝑥,𝑦
𝐸(𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) = argmax (𝑥  +  𝑦[𝑝 ⋅ 𝑟  +   (1  −  𝑝) ⋅ 𝑅]) 
𝑥,𝑦
  (3- 5) 
Another assumption in this analysis is that, in normal times, the default probability for the 
inter-bank lending at time 1 is close to zero. Given this assumption, the expected value of the short-
term lending at time 1 is always greater than the value of the risk free asset. In this setting, given 
p = ε (close to zero), as the composition of the short-term lending, y, increases, the expected value 
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for the portfolio, E(portfolio value), will also increase. In order to satisfy the IR constrain, the 
bank has to select x and y such that x + ry = z and x + y = 1.  
Figure 3.2: Expected value of portfolio and reservation level 
 
 
3.2.2 A bank’s expected amount of borrowing from an inter-bank network  
In the previous section, we see that a bank allocates the proportion y of total surplus into a 
short-term lending to another bank within the network. As a next step, I show a relation between 
size of inter-bank network and a bank’s expected amount of borrowing from the network by using 
a simple formula. Also, I present how the expected amount of borrowing is affected if new types 
of entities other than a bank like pension funds and endowment funds enter the network. In this 
study, I call the new entity as a liquidity provider because the new entity holds sufficient idle 
money and tends to supply the liquidities into the network rather than takes out money from the 
network.  
In general, assets of commercial banks are characterized by being long-term and illiquid. 
On the other hand, liabilities of the banks are short-term or demandable. Thus, the mismatches 
between a bank’s cash inflow and outflow are quite frequent. In contrast, other financial entities 
like pension funds and endowment funds tend to match the cash flows from funding and from 
investment. Those entities invest the collected endowments into several investment projects such 
as stocks and bonds and set aside a portion as a buffer. The buffer is injected to the network as a 
𝑟 𝑘 = 𝑥 + 𝑟𝑦 1 = 𝑥 + 𝑦 𝑥 + 𝑦[𝑝 ∙ 𝑟 + (1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝑅]
≈ 𝑥 + 𝑅𝑦
𝑅 
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form of the inter-bank lending or invested in a high quality liquid asset like a government bond. If 
a redemption by an investor is requested, part of invested assets are liquidated and paid to the 
original investors. Thus, the cash outflows from the funds to the original investor is usually 
matched with the cash inflows from the liquidation of assets. For this reason, the event of liquidity 
deficit will be less likely to occur for those entities, enabling them to act as liquidity providers 
rather than liquidity demanders in the inter-bank network.  
3.2.2.1 No Liquidity Provider in the network  
First, I analyze whether the expected amount of borrowing from the network increases as 
the size of network grows without any liquidity provider in the network. In this case, I assume that 
the extent of a bank’s money surplus or deficit at time 0 follows a discrete uniform distribution. 
There are three states – money surplus, balance, and deficit. The probability of each state is 
assumed to be 1 ⁄ 3. When a bank faces a money surplus or deficit, the amount of surplus or deficit 
is 1 and -1, respectively. As for a balance state, the amount should be zero. This assumption is 
applied to all the banks within the same network.  
Based on the specifications above, I calculate the expected amount of borrowing given a 
deficit as  
y ∙ ∑
1
3
𝑘
∙ (
𝑘
𝑘 − 𝑖
) ∙ ∑
𝑘 − 𝑖
𝑗
𝑖+1
𝑗=1
𝑘
𝑖=0
 
            (3- 6) 
where k refers to the number of counterparties within the network. In this case, all the 
counterparties are commercial banks, not the liquidity provider. Appendix 1 provides an 
explanation on how to derive the formula. If there are only two banks – the borrower bank and the 
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counterparty – in the network, the borrower bank’s expected amount of short-term borrowing at 
time 0 will be y ⁄ 3. If the number of entities in the market increases to three and four, the expected 
amount of borrowing will expand to 5y ⁄ 9 and 19y ⁄ 27, respectively. Consequently, the expected 
amount of borrowing from its counterparties in the market increases as the number of entities 
within the network expands.  
3.2.2.2 Entrance of Liquidity Provider into the network  
Next, we move on to the case where a new type of entity, called a liquidity provider, enters 
the inter-bank network. In the previous case, all the entities face the same uniform distribution for 
the state of money deficit or surplus. A liquidity provider is a different type of entity, which usually 
holds a sufficient amount of cash buffer and match its cash inflow and outflow in daily operation. 
As a result, a money deficit for the liquidity provider is less likely compared to the bank. For this 
reason, the key distinction between a liquidity provider and a bank is the formation of distribution 
for the money deficit or surplus case. Probability distribution of the liquidity provider for a money 
deficit or surplus moves to surplus side shown in Figure 3.3. Thus, the probability that a liquidity 
provider experiences a surplus becomes higher and the expected amount of lending by the liquidity 
provider is greater than that of a bank. Also, as more liquidity providers enter the network, 
competition to get a funding among counterparties in the network becomes less severe because the 
competition to get a funding is occurred only among banks within the network.  
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of distributions between bank and liquidity provider 
 
1. Discrete uniform distribution 
Bank Liquidity Provider 
  
 
 
- Probability of deficit = 1/3 
- Lending is possible with prob. of 1/3 
- Expected amount given surplus = 𝑦/3 
 
 
- Probability of deficit ≈ 0 
- Lending is possible with prob. of 1/2 > 1/3 
- Expected amount given surplus = 𝑦/2 
 
 
2. Normal distribution 
Bank Liquidity Provider 
  
- Probability of deficit ≈ 0.5 
- Lending is possible with prob. of 0.5. 
- Expected amount given surplus (A)  
= ∫ 𝑓(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
∞
0
 
- Probability of deficit ≈ 0 
- Lending is possible with prob. of almost 1 
- Expected amount given surplus (B)  
= ∫ 𝑓(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
∞
0
 →  A<<B 
 
  
-1 0 1 -1 0 1 
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Reflecting these consideration, I assume that the liquidity provider follows a uniform 
distribution with a probability of 1 ⁄ 2 for balance and 1 ⁄ 2 for surplus. Zero probability of deficit 
is assumed. Based on this setting, I assume that there are totally k + h counterparties within the 
network including h liquidity providers. Then, the expected amount of borrowing given a deficit 
is calculated as follows.  
∑
1
2
ℎ
∙ (
ℎ
ℎ − 𝑙
) ∙ 𝑦 ∙ ∑
1
3
𝑘
∙ (
𝑘
𝑘 − 𝑖
) ∙ ∑
𝑘 − 𝑖 + (ℎ − 𝑙)
𝑗
𝑖+1
𝑗=1
𝑘
𝑖=0
ℎ
𝑙=0
 
(3- 7) 
For example, if there are three counterparties including one liquidity provider, the expected 
amount of borrowing will be 49y ⁄ 54, which is greater than 38y ⁄ 54 = 19y ⁄ 27, the expected 
borrowing when there are three counterparties with no liquidity provider in the network. In other 
words, as more liquidity providers enter the network given the fixed number of total entities in the 
network, the available liquidity within the network expands but the competitions between entities 
to get the funding becomes less severe. As a result, a bank’s expected amount of borrowing from 
the network with more liquidity providers should be greater than the expected amount of 
borrowing from the network with less liquidity providers.  
3.2.3 The effect of a network on a bank’s liquidity management  
In the previous section, we see that as the number of counterparties in the network grows, 
the expected amount of borrowing expands. If the proportion of the liquidity providers increases 
among the counterparties in the network, the expected amount of borrowing is mounting up more. 
Table 3.1 summarizes the amount of expected borrowing computed regarding the previous 
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examples. The amount is varying by the combination of the number of counterparties and the 
number of the liquidity providers.  
Table 3.1: Expected amount of borrowing 
  
Number of liquidity providers  
  
0  1  2  3  
Number of counterparties  0  0  
   
 
1  0.333y  0.5y  
  
 
2  0.556y  0.75y  1y  
 
 
3  0.704y  0.907y  1.167y  1.5y  
 
The next step is to see why and how the size and composition of the inter-bank network 
affects a bank’s liquidity risk management. To see the effect, I introduce a new concept of a bank’s 
liquidity risk. In this study, the default event is defined as the situation where a bank’s available 
liquidity, which is a borrowing from another bank and a liquidity holdings of the bank, is less than 
the amount of deficit at time 1. The liquidity risk is defined as a bank’s expected amount of net 
deficit after deducting the expected amount of borrowing and the amount of liquidity holdings 
given the deficit event at time 1.  
In this section, I use a general form of a probability distribution function for a bank’s state 
of surplus and deficit instead of the simplified discrete uniform distribution. We assume that f(s) 
is the density function for each case of surplus or deficit for the amount of s. Then, the liquidity 
risk can be demonstrated as follows.  
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𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 =  ∫ 𝑓(𝑠) ∙ max[|𝑠| − 𝐸(𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔|𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡) − 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦, 0] 𝑑𝑠
0
−∞
 
(3- 8) 
Given the probability distribution for each state, the liquidity risk is dependent on the 
expected amount of borrowing and the amount of the liquidity holdings of the bank. As the 
expected borrowing is larger or the liquidity holdings is more, the liquidity risk to the bank 
becomes lower. In this regard, the expected amount of borrowing and the amount of liquidity have 
a complementary relation to each other in reducing the liquidity risk of the bank. One important 
assumption is that the amount of deposit is out of a bank’s control, meaning that a bank cannot 
increase the deposit amount immediately from a local deposit market in response to money deficit. 
An increase or a decrease of deposit amount is determined by depositors out of the bank’s control 
at time 1 in this model. Thus, given a deficit, the only funding source is the inter-bank borrowing 
from the network besides the amount of liquidity holdings. Another important assumption is that 
the amount of deficit, s, is the net amount after offsetting a realized value of the previous period 
(time 0)’s surplus, which is either a risk free asset or short-term lending or both, and this term 
(time 1)’s net cash outflows. Thus, the amount of liquidity does not include risk-free assets and 
short-term lending from the previous term’s surplus.  
To choose the optimal level of liquidity by a bank, we need an objective function, which 
is profitability of the bank. The profitability is a function of liquidity holdings. Profitability and 
liquidity holdings have a negative relationship. This is because liquidity does not generate any 
revenue to the bank. Let me assume that there is an alternative investment project with the same 
solvency risk as the liquid asset but with a greater illiquidity. Because of the liquidity premium, 
the alternative investment project such as a long-term commercial and industrial loan have a higher 
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yield of Y ( > 1). Thus, by holding more liquidities, the bank has to sacrifice the profit opportunity 
by Y − 1 per unit of investment even though there is no difference in the solvency risk between the 
two types of assets. Thus, the profitability and liquidity holdings are negatively correlated.  
As a next step, we need to think of the individual rationality constraint. This constraint 
implies that there is a reservation level of liquidity risk and a bank has to maintain the liquidity 
risk less than or equal to the reservation level. In this regards, the borrower bank will select the 
optimal level of liquidity to maximize its profitability while satisfying the constraint regarding the 
reservation level of the liquidity risk. By using both the objective function and the individual 
rationality constraint, we find out the optimal level of the bank’s liquidity holdings through the 
Lagrangian approach.  
 Objective Function: 
Profitability = g(liquidity status,  other factors)     (3- 9) 
 Maximize the profitability subject to  
Liquidity Risk ≤D (reservation level)       (3- 10) 
 Lagrangian:  
ℒ = g(liquidity status) + λ×(D–Liquidity Risk)      (3- 11) 
As the size of the inter-bank network expands or more liquidity providers enter the 
network, E(borrowing│deficit) will increase and the liquidity risk defined above will be 
reduced. If the liquidity risk is less than the reservation level by the expansion of the network, the 
bank does not need to hold some portion of liquidities. The bank can decrease the amount of 
liquidities until the liquidity risk reaches the point of reservation level again while improving the 
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profitability. For this reason, a bank will reduce its liquidity holdings as the number of entities 
within the network increases or as more liquidity providers enter the inter-bank network.  
Instead of reducing its liquidity holdings, a bank can choose to increase the proportion of 
the wholesale borrowings to improve the profitability while maintaining the liquidity risk under 
the reservation level. By increasing the borrowing, the bank can relax the budget constraint and 
invest in a profitable project. In this case, rather than adjusting the term of 
max[|s | − E(borrowing |deficit) − liquidity, 0] from the definition of liquidity risk (Formula (3-
8)), the probability distribution on a state of bank’s money deficit or surplus will move to the left 
as shown in Figure 4. This is because, as a bank depends more on wholesale borrowing, roll-over 
risk from the funding becomes greater and the bank can face a state of money deficit more likely. 
Thus, if a bank increases the proportion of the wholesale borrowing, the liquidity risk (Formula 
(3-8)) will grow due to an increase in probabilities for deficit events. For this reason, an increase 
in E(borrowing│deficit) after the network expansion can be offset by the change of the density 
function caused by larger dependence on wholesale borrowing, leading to maintaining its liquidity 
risk at the reservation level. For this reason, the bank can enjoy better profitability by investing the 
fund from more wholesale borrowing into profitable projects, being less concerned about its 
liquidity risk because of greater expected borrowing from the expanded network.  
If all banks within the network increase the probability of deficit by depending more on 
the wholesale borrowing in response to an expansion of network, the probability that the 
counterparty lender experiences a surplus will decrease. The expected amount of borrowing from 
counterparties to a borrower bank will also decrease. If the expected borrowing decreases, the 
bank’s liquidity risk will rise, all other things being equal. Even in this case, however, the expected 
amount of borrowing can still increase as long as the network keeps expanding and more and more 
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liquidity providers enter the network despite the less likelihood of each counterparty’s surplus than 
before.  
Figure 3.4: Movement of distributions by the dependence on the short-term borrowing 
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3.2.4 Liquidity evaporation within the network after a shock  
In this part, I discuss why the inter-bank lending and borrowing within the network 
suddenly stop at the onset of financial crisis. The liquidity evaporation within the network causes 
a serious liquidity problem for each bank that has reduced its liquidity holdings and depended 
excessively on wholesale borrowing. To identify the cause of the liquidity evaporation, I return to 
the initial objective function (Formula (3-1)) regarding a bank’s allocation of a surplus between 
the risk free asset and inter-bank lending at time 0. A bank with a surplus allocates its portfolio 
between the risk free asset and short-term lending to another bank to maximize its expected value 
of the portfolio at time 1 subject to a constraint of x + ry ≥ z, which means the portfolio value 
given a default at time 1 has to be at least the reservation level, z. Now, I decompose the probability 
of default (p) for the inter-bank lending as follows.  
 Probability of default:  
 p = ε + 𝟙 (exogenous shock = 1)⋅Prob(indiscernible)⋅Prob(affected) (3- 12) 
In normal times, the probability of default is ε, which is close to zero, regardless of 
Prob(indiscernible) or Prob(affected). Once a negative exogenous shock occurs, the 
probability of default can change dramatically depending on the level of Prob(indiscernible) and 
Prob(affected). The term of (exogenous shock = 1) is an indicator function that takes a value of 
one if there is an exogenous shock. Prob(indiscernible) is a probability that a bank cannot 
identify a financial soundness of a counterparty within the network. Prob(affected) is a 
probability that the network is directly affected by the shock. In other words, the probability that 
at least one entity within the network experiences an insolvency problem due to the shock. If either 
of Prob(indiscernible) or Prob(affected) is equal to zero, the probability of default given an 
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exogenous shock is still just ε, close to zero. If both Prob(indiscernible) and Prob(affected) 
become higher after the shock, the probability of default at the onset of financial crisis will rise 
sharply.  
A key point in this model is that both Prob(indiscernible) and Prob(affected) are highly 
related to the size of the network. If the size of the inter-bank network becomes larger, the bank 
will be less likely to distinguish a solvent bank from an insolvent bank, making 
Prob(indiscernible) close to one. Also, as the network expands, the probability that the network 
is directly affected by the exogenous shock will increase. For example, if a local bank forms a 
network with several other local banks within the same geographical area, the bank becomes better 
informed about each other’s financial health because of a long-run close relationship with each 
other within the region. Also, because each entity is connected to other banks only within the same 
local network, the entities become less likely to be affected by the external shock. On the other 
hand, if a bank lends and borrows money in a huge global inter-bank network, the probability that 
an entity within the network is directly affected by a shock will be high and each bank will be less 
likely to differentiate the counterparties that are subject to the shock and those that are not. In other 
words, uncertainty for the inter-bank transaction increases substantially given an external negative 
shock when the network is huge.  
Once both Prob(indiscernible) and Prob(affected) become close to one at the outset of 
crisis, the probability of default, p, will jump sharply. If p rises significantly, the expected value 
of the short-term portfolio asset, x + y[p⋅r + (1 − p)⋅R], can be lower than the nominal value of one 
unless the bank allocates all the surplus to the risk free assets. This is because x + y[p⋅r + (1 − p)⋅R] 
≈x + ry < 1. In this situation, a bank with a surplus does not have any reason to make a short-term 
lending to another bank within the network because an investment to the risk free asset guarantees 
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the nominal value of one. Thus, a bank with a surplus suddenly shift its investment from inter-
bank lending to the risk free asset when an external shock occurs. This phenomenon will stand out 
for a bank within a huge network due to a higher uncertainty within the network, which is measured 
by Prob(indiscernible) and Prob(affected).  
If x increases and y decreases, the expected amount of borrowing to a bank with deficit 
will suddenly shrink. According to Formula (6), the expected amount of borrowing shrinks as y 
decreases. If the expected borrowing is reduced, the borrower bank’s liquidity risk will increase as 
we can see from Formula (8). In this case, the liquidity risk rises above the reservation level, 
exposing many banks to high liquidity risk at the onset of the financial crisis.  
Now, the findings of the theoretical analysis is presented by a graphical illustration. In 
Figure 5, there are two graphs. The first one demonstrates the relationship between the liquidity 
risk and the liquidity management of a bank. The second one visualizes the relation between a 
bank’s profitability and the liquidity management of the bank. The degree of a bank’s liquidity 
management is determined by the bank’s holdings of liquid assets or dependence on a wholesale 
borrowing. As a bank increases its liquidity holdings or reduces a wholesale borrowing, the level 
of liquidity management improves. There is an inverse relationship between a bank’s liquidity risk 
and the liquidity management of the bank as seen in Formula (8). Also there is a negative 
relationship between a bank’s profitability and the liquidity management as explained above.  
In the first graph of Figure 5, a bank initially chooses the point a, which is the intersection 
of the reservation level of the liquidity risk and the initial downward sloping curve (straight line) 
relating the liquidity risk to the liquidity management. As the network expands and it becomes 
easier for banks to borrow money from the network, the downward sloping curve moves down and 
 136 
a bank will choose point b, which is the intersection of the reservation level of the liquidity risk 
and the new downward sloping curve (bottom dotted line). As shown in the second graph, the bank 
can enjoy better profitability while maintaining the same level of the liquidity risk by choosing 
point b. During the onset of financial crisis, however, the downward sloping curve relating the 
liquidity risk to the liquidity management moves up as the uncertainty within the inter-bank market 
increases. In this situation, a bank faces a higher liquidity risk at point c in the first graph, which 
represents much higher liquidity risk than the reservation level. Consequently, the bank is exposed 
to a greater difficulties in its liquidity management after the negative external shock hits the 
market.  
Figure 3.5: Graphical illustration 
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3.3 Extension of the analysis  
3.3.1 Why is a liquidity evaporation unexpected to a bank?  
According to Formula (1), which presents the expected value of the short-term asset 
portfolio for the bank with a surplus, the probability of default (p) is assumed to be close to zero 
during normal times. Because of that, the bank with a deficit overestimates its expected borrowing 
from the bank with a surplus, and thus the deficit bank’s asset and liability structure becomes 
vulnerable to a liquidity risk. At the outset of the crisis, however, the amount of the actual 
borrowing shrank suddenly unlike the deficit bank’s expectation due to the liquidity evaporation 
within the inter-bank network, leading to an explosion of the liquidity risk to the bank.  
This leads to a question of why a bank would not take the possibility of the liquidity 
evaporation during crisis times into account in managing its liquidity risk in normal times. First, 
we find the answer from the market’s strong belief that there is almost no chance of the frozen 
inter-bank market because of the long standing active inter-bank network. Since the Great 
Depression, there had not been a serious collapse of the banking sector in U.S. history. Further, 
diverse forms of market stabilizers like the federal deposit insurance system have been 
implemented since that time. In addition, the market had a belief of a money-move to the banking 
system for a safety during a market stress based on past experiences. Because of those reasons, a 
collapse of the inter-bank network might be unexpected and underestimated.  
Second, the banking sector had never been exposed to that huge inter-bank network with 
many liquidity providers in U.S. history. During the 2000s, the banking sector experienced 
unprecedented expansion of the financial network through a new technology like the securitization 
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and an emergence of a gigantic bank holding company group that affiliates different types of 
financial companies. Before the expansion of the network, most banks were exposed only to a 
smaller local network, and thus the probability of default for lending to another bank within the 
network given a shock was also expected to be small because both Prob(indiscernible) and 
Prob(affected) are low in a small network. Because of those reasons, a bank tends to 
underestimate the possibility of liquidity evaporation at the onset of the financial crisis even after 
being exposed to a bigger network.  
Another reason why a bank fails to manage its liquidity risk is that a bank might expect a 
bail-out from the government or a liquidity provision from the central bank during a potential 
future crisis. If there was a past experience regarding a government intervention to stabilize the 
financial market during the crisis, the expected borrowing from the market will not shrink even 
during crisis times. As a result, the necessity to strictly manage the bank’s liquidity risk in normal 
times is reduced. Furthermore, if a bank expects that the network collapse is a remote future event 
and the management’s concern is only a short-term performance due to a compensation scheme, 
the incentive to strictly manage its liquidity risk by sacrificing the current earnings will be reduced.  
3.3.2 How can a government intervention mitigate the liquidity evaporation?  
Once a financial crisis occurs, the government or the central bank usually adopts various 
types of market stabilization measures. Those measures include a temporary guarantee for debt 
securities by the government, provision of a backstop liquidity by the central bank and a stress test 
for major banks by the regulator. The main objective for those policies is to reduce the market 
uncertainty that has been rising quickly during the early stage of the financial crisis. Those actions 
will mitigate the probability of default (p) for the inter-bank lending by affecting both the 
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Prob(indiscernible) and Prob(affected) in Formula (12). As a result, those policy measures can 
normalize the inter-bank transaction within the network by maintaining expected value of short-
term asset portfolio defined in Formula (1).  
Among the various market stabilization measures, the stress test for the major banks can 
convert Prob(indiscernible) into near zero. Prob(indiscernible) is a probability that a bank 
cannot identify a financial soundness of a counterparty within the network. The release of the stress 
test result for each major bank can mitigate the asymmetry of information regarding the solvency 
status of each bank within the network. Thus, the bank without any insolvency problem can borrow 
money from the network again by confirming its solvency status from its regulator. Only the bank 
with a serious insolvency problem will have a difficulty in financing from the network.  
The government guarantee for debt securities and the central bank’s backstop liquidity can 
relieve the liquidity evaporation by reducing Prob(affected), the probability that an entity within 
the network experiences an insolvency problem. Those measures can mitigate the impact of the 
shock on each bank. In doing so, the probability of default for the inter-banking lending becomes 
lower, making the inter-bank lending and borrowing possible again. This means that the 
government intervention enables the money to move back to the inter-bank network by reducing 
the uncertainty within the network. Consequently, the banks with less liquidity and higher roll-
over risk can escape from the liquidity evaporation situation.  
3.3.3 How does a deposit movement affect the liquidity risk?  
Deposit inflows and outflows have not been considered in this model because the focus of 
this study is a short-term liquidity problem, which is highly related to a bank’s direct borrowing 
rather than its deposit collection. Then, we can have a question on what will happen to a bank’s 
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liquidity risk during the financial crisis if we consider the deposit movement to and from a bank 
account.  
According to a previous study (Gatev and Strahan, 2006), there is a flight-to-safety toward 
the banking system for deposit accounts if the level of the market’s stress is increasing. This is 
because a bank deposit is regarded as being a safe asset compared to other types of investment that 
can be contaminated by the shock. Another research paper (Acharya and Mora, 2015), however, 
finds that a flight-to-safety into the banking system for deposits could not be observed in the early 
stage of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. The paper argues that if the shock has occurred within the 
banking system, a bank deposit would not be a safety any more, and thus the money does not move 
to the banking system. Only after the implementation of market stabilization measures like an 
increase in deposit insurance limit from $100,000 to $250,000 through the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act, the amount of deposit in a bank account started to increase.  
From those analyses, we can expect that if the shock is created outside of the network, there 
will be a flight-to-safety into the banking system for the deposit. The flight-to-safety to banking 
will mitigate the liquidity risk of a bank from the liquidity evaporation in the market. On the other 
hand, if the shock occurs inside the network, the bank within the network cannot enjoy the liquidity 
windfall made by the flight to the banking sector. This will exacerbate the liquidity problem of the 
bank during the early stage of the financial crisis. If the shock occurs within the network, 
Prob(affected), the probability that an entity within the network experiences an insolvency 
problem, will be even higher. Then, a bank will have greater difficulty in getting funding from the 
network due to a higher default probability of the inter-bank lending as well as in obtaining a fund 
from the deposit market due to the inverse flight-to-safety out of the banking system.  
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3.3.4 Shock to the banking system as a result of the network expansion  
In this study, I focus on a bank’s liquidity risk given a shock while assuming that the shock 
to the banking system is an exogenous one. We can question whether a network transformation 
can generate a shock within the banking system, i.e. whether the network formation affects the 
asset quality and solvency risk of a bank within the network.  
Various research papers point out that deregulation and the housing market boom were key 
factors that caused the 07-09 financial crisis. Among those factors, the securitization is considered 
to be one of the important seeds for the financial crisis. Many papers emphasize that there is a 
positive causal relationship between the securitization of mortgages and the deterioration of the 
loans’ quality (Keys, Hukherjee, Seru and Vig (2010), Purnanadam (2010)). Those papers 
conclude that the lax screening for the mortgages that are supposed to be securitized leads to a 
deterioration of the asset quality.  
The boom of the securitization is also highly related to the network expansion. Initially, 
the securitization technique contributes to an expansion of the network by enabling a bank to get 
funding through an asset securitization from the capital market beyond the conventional local inter-
bank borrowing. As a next step, the expanded network can bring about a boom of the securitization. 
In other words, the securitization becomes much more active as the network become wider and 
deeper. This is because the securitization is possible only when there are sufficient potential buyers 
for the asset-backed securities. Otherwise, the originator bank has to hold the underlying assets. 
Thus, if the network is not wide enough, the securitization will not be active and the level of 
screening against mortgage loans will be strengthened. This might suppress the mortgage supply 
to the housing market to some extent, possibly mitigating the housing market boom. In short, the 
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network formation not only affects the liquidity risk of each bank within the network but also 
possibly generates a negative shock on the banking system through an excessive mortgage supply.  
3.4 Empirical analysis  
3.4.1 Testable hypotheses  
The theory section in this paper suggests several testable predictions regarding a relation 
between a bank’s liquidity risk management and the bank’s exposure to its surrounding inter-bank 
network. First, if the size of the network is larger, the bank’s asset and liability structure becomes 
more vulnerable to a liquidity risk. Second, during a market stress, a bank’s funding difficulty 
becomes greater if the bank is connected to a bigger network.  
Hypothesis 1: If a bank is exposed to a bigger network, the bank’s asset and liability 
structure becomes more prone to liquidity risk.  
 
Hypothesis 2: If a bank is exposed to a bigger network, the spread of the bank’s deposit 
interest rate against the risk free rate will be wider during a market stress.  
In this empirical analysis, I make a proxy for a bank’s exposure to an inter-bank network. 
The proxy is the number of financial institutions that a bank’s parent bank holding company (BHC) 
makes a relationship with via a loan syndication arrangement. As the number of participated 
lenders in a loan syndication that is arranged by the BHC is larger, the affiliated bank is exposed 
to a bigger network through its parent BHC.  
To measure a weakness of a bank’s liquidity status, I observe a bank’s asset and liability 
structure. As a proportion of liquidities among a bank’s total assets decreases, the bank will be 
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more vulnerable to a liquidity shock. In addition, as a proportion of wholesale borrowing expands 
among a bank’s total funding, the bank’s liquidity risk becomes larger. This is because the bank 
with less liquidities and more wholesale funding experiences greater difficulties in surviving the 
liquidity crunch situation triggered during the onset of the financial crisis as seen in the theory 
section.  
To measure the level of each bank’s funding difficulty given an exogenous shock in the 
market, I employ a spread between each bank’s deposit interest rate and the risk free rate during 
the market stress. If a bank faces a greater difficulty during the market stress, a spread on the 
bank’s deposit rate against the risk free rate will be wider.  
3.4.2 Data and empirical methodology  
3.4.2.1 Data Source  
In this empirical analysis, I use several data sources. First, I utilize “Dealscan” database 
provided by Thomson Reuters LPC in order to measure the size of a network that a bank is 
connected to. The Dealscan database contains information on syndicated loan packages including 
lenders and borrowers. Following the method used in Charkraborty, Goldstein and MacKinlay 
(2014), I select the lead agent of each syndicate loan facility and manually match the Dealscan 
lead lender to a bank holding company of the Summary of Deposit through its name. From this 
dataset, I can identify the number of syndicate loan deals that each lead lender arranges and the 
lists of other participating lenders in the same deals. As a result, we can identify the number of 
entities that each bank’s parent BHC has relationship with through a loan syndication.  
Second, I collect financial statement data of the U.S. banks from the Call Report. This data 
source contains information on a bank’s asset and liability structure, which is part of main outcome 
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variables of this empirical analysis. We can also identify a bank’s parent BHC group through the 
Call Report. Other control variables such as a bank’s capital ratio, non-performing loan ratio and 
leverage ratio are also collected from this data source.  
Third, I make use of the data of the Summary of Deposits from the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in order to identify a local bank’s geographic location. From this 
dataset, we observe the amount of deposits for each branch office of all FDIC-insured institutions 
as of June 30th of each year. Using this data source, we identify whether the bank is a local bank 
that concentrates its business on a certain county. Further, by using this data source, I calculate a 
local bank’s deposit market share and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for a county-level deposit 
market to measure a competitiveness of the market around the local bank.  
Fourth, I obtain the data for a bank holding company from FR Y-9C. This data source 
provides a consolidated financial data of the U.S. BHC. From this data source, I identify each BHC 
group’s consolidated asset size and calculate each banking entity’s relative asset size within a BHC 
group.  
Fifth, I obtain a bank’s branch level deposit interest rate from the RateWatch. This dataset 
includes interest rates for various deposit products such as Money Market, Certificate of Deposit, 
and Checking Account. After converting the weekly observations into monthly frequency, I 
analyze a monthly spread on a bank’s funding rate during the market stress against the risk free 
rate. To identify the market stress period, I calculate a spread on three month commercial paper 
yield against the Treasury bill rate, which are available from the Federal Reserve.  
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Finally, I use a bank and bank holding company merger data from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago for the Instrument Variable (IV) regression. A variation in a bank’s network 
exposure is instrumented by the bank or bank holding company merger event.  
3.4.2.2 Dataset  
This empirical analysis focuses on a U.S. local bank that is affiliated in the U.S. 
incorporated BHC group. A local bank is defined as a bank that collects at least 65 percent of total 
deposits from a single county following Cortes (2014). The reason for focusing on a local bank is 
that there is a fundamental difference between a local and non-local bank in terms of its balance 
sheet structure. Thus, I need to remove the effect made by the difference between local and non-
local banks on their balance sheet structures. Also, a non-local bank is likely to be exposed to other 
forms of network such as open access to the capital market and widespread geographical branch 
network beyond the inter-bank network formed via loan syndication. In other words, a local bank 
will have a limited exposure to an inter-bank network due to the bank’s locality unless the bank is 
able to utilize the network formed by its parent BHC group. Thus, the network effect on a bank’s 
asset and liability structure can be more pronounced for a local bank.  
The reason that I focus on a bank affiliated in a BHC group is that there could be a 
fundamental difference between an independent bank and a subsidiary bank to a BHC group in 
their balance sheet composition. A bank’s affiliation in a BHC group itself can be regarded as 
being exposed to a network within a BHC group, thus affiliation in a BHC can alter a bank’s asset 
and liability structure substantially regardless of the degree of a bank’s exposure to an inter-bank 
network formed by participation in a loan syndication. In this regard, I need to control for the effect 
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on a bank’s liquidity risk by the difference between the two groups – an independent bank and a 
subsidiary bank to a BHC group.  
After restricting samples to a local bank that is affiliated in a BHC group, I aggregate the 
number of relationship that the BHC group makes with other financial institutions through a loan 
syndication. If the parent BHC does no have any experience of arranging a loan syndication during 
the sample period at all, the subsidiary local banks are removed from the samples. After the sample 
selection, I classify samples into either treated or control ones based on the aggregated number of 
relationships. If the aggregated numbers of relationship are large enough to surpass the cutoff level 
(top 25 percent), the affiliated local bank becomes a treated group.  
As a result of the sample selection, I construct two panel datasets. One is a quarter × bank 
panel with 76,582 observations for analyzing a bank’s balance sheet structure. The other one is 
month × bank with 133,616 observations for analyzing a bank’s deposit rate spread. Sample 
periods are ranging from 1999 to 2013 by a monthly or quarterly basis. Number of banks are 4,020 
in a quarter × bank panel and 2,010 in a month × bank panel. The reduction in the number of banks 
is due to the limited coverage of RateWatch dataset for a bank that reports its deposit rate compared 
to those of Call Report and SOD.  
3.4.2.3 Empirical methodology  
As the first step, I analyze the effect of a bank’s exposure to a network on the bank’s 
liquidity status measured by asset and liability composition. In this regression, I employ the 
Instrument Variable (IV) approach to minimize an endogenous issue regarding a bank’s exposure 
to a network. In this IV approach, a bank’s network exposure is instrumented by the merger events 
of a bank or its parent bank holding company. The regression models are designed as follows.  
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Activei , t = β0 + β1⋅PostMerger i , t + Γ⋅Xi , t + δt + δi + εi , t     (3- 13) 
Yi , t = β0 + β1⋅𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡̂  + Γ⋅Xi , t + δt + δi + εi , t      (3- 14) 
Equation (3-13) represents the first-stage regression that relates a bank’s exposure to 
network to whether the bank or its parent BHC experienced a merger with other banks or BHCs 
within a year. Equation (3-14) shows the second-stage regression that relates a bank’s balance 
sheet structure to the bank’s estimated exposure to inter-bank network. The subscript of i refers to 
bank and t refers to time (quarter), respectively. Xi , t is a vector of control variables. δt and δi imply 
quarter-fixed and bank-fixed effect, respectively. Activei , t is a dummy variable that identifies the 
bank that belongs to the top 25 percent among total samples in terms of the number of 
counterparties that its parent BHC makes relationship with via its loan syndication. PostMerger i , t 
is also a dummy variable that takes a value of one if it is within a year after a merger of the bank 
or its parent BHC. Yi , t is a set of dependent variables that represent the bank’s asset and liability 
composition, which are, Liquidity ⁄ Asset i , t, Borrowing ⁄ Liabilityi , t and Loan ⁄ Deposit i , t. The 
first variable measures a bank’s asset structure and the second item shows a bank’s liability 
composition. The last one measures the overall liquidity status of the bank. Appendix provides 
description of each variable. In this IV regressions, the samples are restricted to the time periods 
within one year before and after the merger event to focus on the variation of a bank’s network 
exposure around the bank merger. From the coefficients of ^Activei ,  t, we can find whether a 
bank’s exposure to a big network weaken the bank’s liquidity strength measured by its asset and 
liability structure.  
Next, I move on to an analysis on whether a bank’s balance sheet structure is related to the 
bank’s trouble in funding during a market stress. The regression models are designed as follows.  
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Spreadi , m = β0 + β1⋅Weaki , t  − 1⋅Stressm + β2⋅Weaki , t  − 1 + Γ⋅Xi , t  − 1 + δm + δi + εi , m  
            (3- 15) 
 
Spreadi , m = β0 + β1⋅Weaki , t  − 1⋅Stressm + β2⋅Weaki , t  − 1⋅Crisism07 − 08 +        
                    β3⋅Weaki , t  − 1⋅Crisism08 − 09 + β4⋅Weaki , t  − 1 + Γ⋅X + δm + δi + ε i .m  
(3- 16) 
The subscripts of i, m and t refer to each bank, month and quarter, respectively. The 
subscript t − 1 refers to a lagged quarter value. Xi , t is a vector of control variables. δm and δi imply 
a month-fixed and bank-fixed effect, respectively. Weaki , t  − 1 is a dummy variable that identifies 
a group of banks with a weak liquidity position, being the main independent variable of this 
regression model. To measure weakness of a bank’s liquidity status, I use different sets of criteria 
based on a bank’s asset and liability structure. A bank is vulnerable to a liquidity shock if the 
bank’s balance sheet structure is characterized by a lower Liquidity ⁄ Asset i , t, a higher 
Borrowing ⁄ Liabilityi , t or a higher Loan ⁄ Deposit i , t. If a bank belongs to a group of banks that 
have liquidity problems measured by the balance sheet structure above, the dummy variable of 
Weaki , t  − 1 takes a value of one for the bank. Stressm is a dummy variable that identifies a month 
of market stress, which is within the top 25 percent measured by a monthly average spread between 
yield on a commercial paper and the Treasury bill. Thus, the interaction term, 
Weaki , t  − 1 × Stressm, shows how severely a bank experiences a problem in external funding in 
terms of deposit rate spread if the bank has a liquidity problem. In the second model, Stressm is 
decomposed into Stressm, Crisism
07 − 08 and Crisism
08 − 09. Crisism
07 − 08 is a time dummy variable 
that identifies the early phase of the 07-09 financial crisis, which ranges from August 2007 to 
August 2008. Crisism
08 − 09 is another time dummy variable that identifies the later phase of the 
07-09 financial crisis, which ranges from September 2008 to May 2009. The decomposition tells 
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us whether the funding trouble of the weak liquid bank is different during the 07-09 financial crisis 
from other market stress times.  
As the final stage, I analyze the effect of a bank’s exposure to a network on the bank’s 
trouble in funding given a market stress by replacing Weaki , t  − 1 with ^Activei ,  t  −  1. In this 
regression, I also employ the IV approach through instrumenting a bank’s network exposure 
(Activei , t) with an experience of a bank’s merger (PostMerger i , t). From this regression, we 
directly identify whether a bank with an exposure to a wide network is related to the bank’s deposit 
rate spread during a market stress time. The first and second stage regression models are listed as 
follows. 
Active i , m⋅Stressm = β0 + β1⋅PostMerger i , m⋅Stressm + Γ⋅X i , t  − 1 + δm + δi + εi , m  (3- 17) 
Spread i , m = β0 + β1⋅𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑚 ⋅ 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚̂  + β2⋅Active i , m + Γ⋅Xi , t  − 1 + δm + δi + ε i , m  (3- 18) 
3.4.3 Summary Statistics  
Table 3.2 reports the summary statistics for key dependent and independent variables in 
this analysis. Appendix provides a detailed description on each variable. The first to the fifth rows 
of the table report a bank’s deposit rate spread against the risk free rate. We see that the average 
deposit rate spread is 0.188 percent point during the entire sample periods, which are defined as 
within two years around a bank merger from 1999 to 2013. However, the mean values of the 
deposit rate spread are quite different depending on time. In normal times, the mean of the spread 
is 0.139 percent point, but increase to 0.352, 0.697 and 1.909 percent point during the market stress 
time, the first phase of the 07-09 crisis and the second phase of the crisis, respectively.  
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The next three rows report the ratios regarding a bank’s asset and liability structure. First, 
in the asset side, a bank’s liquidity account for around 22.4 percent of a bank’s total asset. Second, 
in the liability side, borrowing account for around 5.9 percent of the bank’s total liability. As a 
result, a bank’s loan is around 88.2 percent of total deposit. This means that the banks usually 
make loans under the limit of total deposits. However, the relative portion of each asset and liability 
item also vary across banks and over time as we see from this table and Figure 1.  
Next, this table reports summary statistics for the main independent variable, which is 
Activei , t. The mean value of Activei , t is 0.232, which implies that around top 25 percent of total 
observations are assigned to the treated group. The treated group consists of a U.S. local bank 
affiliated in a U.S. BHC group that maintains close relationships with other financial institutions 
through a loan syndication.  
We employ several control variables. The first set controls for the size and total numbers 
of loan syndication deals that the parent BHC group arranges. The second set is about the 
characteristics of the parent BHC group. The set includes a consolidated asset size of the BHC and 
the individual bank’s relative asset size compared to the BHC. The third set is about the bank 
specific characteristics, which include the bank’s capital ratio, non-performing loan ratio, leverage 
ratio, and whether the bank is federally regulated or not. The last set is about a market structure of 
where the local bank is located. This set consists of the market share of the bank in the county and 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) that measures a concentration of the bank’s nearby deposit 
market.  
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics  
This table reports summary statistics for key regression variables. The sample periods range 
from 1999 to 2013. Appendix provides a description of each variable. 
 
    Percentile Distribution  
 N  Mean  S.D.  25th  Median  75th  
Spreadi , m(total)  3710  0.188  0.758  -0.192  0.237  0.551  
Spreadi , m(Stressm = 0)  2859  0.139  0.663  -0.118  0.247  0.488  
Spreadi , m(Stressm = 1)  851  0.352  0.998  -0.276  0.143  1.004  
Spreadi , m(Crisism
07 − 08 = 1)  263  0.697  0.616  0.340  0.766  1.104  
Spreadi , m(Crisism
08 − 09 = 1)  141  1.909  0.551  1.492  1.845  2.278  
Liquidity ⁄ Asset i , t  4679  0.224  0.151  0.122  0.189  0.292  
Borrowing ⁄ Liability i , t  4679  0.059  0.080  0.000  0.030  0.082  
Loan ⁄ Deposit i , t  4679  0.882  0.281  0.746  0.901  1.046  
Activei , t  4679  0.232  0.422  0.000  0.000  0.000  
PostMerger i , t  4679  0.583  0.493  0.000  1.000  1.000  
Log (Syndicate Loan)i , t  4679  18.320  10.874  15.761  23.479  25.867  
Log (Number of Deal)i , t  4679  3.949  3.132  0.693  4.060  6.372  
Log (BHC Asset)i , t  4679  16.888  1.963  15.746  16.667  17.543  
Relative Sizei , t  4679  0.184  0.520  0.011  0.032  0.108  
Log (Bank Asset)i , t  4679  13.447  1.796  12.348  13.084  14.343  
Federal Regulator i , t  4679  0.346  0.476  0.000  0.000  1.000  
Capital Ratioi , t  4679  0.240  0.548  0.109  0.125  0.164  
NPL Ratioi, t  4679  0.011  0.017  0.002  0.005  0.012  
Leverage Ratioi , t  4679  11.620  3.371  10.357  12.165  13.538  
Market Sharei , t  4679  0.128  0.162  0.014  0.056  0.195  
HHIi , t  4679  0.205  0.128  0.124  0.177  0.239  
 
Table 3.3 reports the results of univariate tests for the null hypothesis, where the mean 
differences of variables between the bank that has bigger exposure to a network and the bank that 
has smaller exposure to a network are equal to zero.  
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Table 3.3: Univariate Test Results  
This table reports the results of the univariate test for the null hypothesis that differences in 
mean values of the dependent and independent variables between the treated and control groups 
are equal to zero. Appendix provides a description of each variable. Statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
 Activei , t = 0  Activei , t = 1  
Mean Diff  
 Mean  Median  Mean  Median  
Spreadi , m(total)  0.176  0.235  0.218  0.240  -0.042  
Spreadi , m(Stressm = 0)  0.133  0.248  0.154  0.246  -0.021  
Spreadi , m(Stressm = 1)  0.337  0.145  0.383  0.125  -0.046  
Spreadi , m(Crisism
07 − 08 = 1)  0.740  0.829  0.607  0.628  0.134  
Spreadi , m(Crisism
08 − 09 = 1)  1.997  1.896  1.776  1.717  0.221*  
Liquidity ⁄ Asset i , t  0.230  0.197  0.204  0.135  0.026***  
Borrowing ⁄ Liability i , t  0.048  0.030  0.097  0.034  -0.050***  
Loan ⁄ Deposit i , t  0.875  0.897  0.903  0.923  -0.028**  
PostMerger i , t  0.586  1.000  0.573  1.000  0.013  
Log (Syndicate Loan)i , t  15.543  21.129  27.507  28.001  -11.964***  
Log (Number of Deal)i , t  2.812  2.639  7.709  8.227  -4.897***  
Log (BHC Asset)i , t  16.139  16.258  19.366  19.776  -3.227***  
Relative Sizei , t  0.215  0.041  0.082  0.007  0.133***  
Log (Bank Asset)i , t  13.168  12.962  14.369  14.292  -1.201***  
Federal Regulator i , t  0.256  0.000  0.646  1.000  -0.391***  
Capital Ratioi , t  0.157  0.117  0.515  0.163  -0.359***  
NPL Ratioi, t  0.010  0.005  0.012  0.007  -0.002***  
Leverage Ratioi , t  12.133  12.363  9.920  10.379  2.213***  
Market Sharei , t  0.128  0.062  0.130  0.037  -0.002  
HHIi , t  0.185  0.165  0.273  0.225  -0.088***  
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3.4.4 Results  
3.4.4.1 Effect on a bank’s balance sheet structure  
Table 3.4 to 3.10 present the regression results of this study. In Table 3.4 and 3.5, we see 
the results of the IV regression designed in Equation (3-13) and (3-14) regarding the Hypothesis 
1. The regression relates a bank’s balance sheet composition to the extent of the bank’s exposure 
to a big network. In Table 3.4, we see the first stage IV regression that relates a bank’s network 
exposure to the bank’s merger event. The F-statistics is 16.56, which means that the instrument 
meets the relevance condition (F-statistic > 10). The estimated value is also positive and 
statistically significant.  
Table 3.4: Network exposure and a bank’s B/S structure (1st Stage)  
This table reports the result of the first-stage IV regression that relates a bank’s balance sheet 
structure to the bank’s exposure to an inter-bank network network. The regression model of the 
first-stage is as follows. Activei , t is instrumented by PostMergeri , t.  
 
Activei , t = β0 + β1⋅PostMerger i , t + Γ⋅Xi , t + δt + δi + εi , t  
 
Xi , t is a vector of bank-level control variables, which include Log (Syndicate Loan)i , t, Log 
(Number of Deal)i , t, Log (BHC Asset)i , t, Relative Sizei , t, Log (Bank Asset)i , t, Federal 
Regulator i , t, Capital Ratioi , t, NPL Ratioi , t, Leverage Ratioi , t, Market Sharei , t and 
HHIi , t. Xi, t also includes M&A control variable, which are PostBankMerger i , t and 
PostBHCMerger i , t. δt and δi imply quarter-fixed and bank-fixed effect, respectively. Standard 
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Appendix provides a description of each variable. 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
The t-statistics are in parenthesis. To conserve space, constant and control variables are not 
reported. 
 
 
Activei , t  
PostMerger i , t  0.0765***   
(4.07)  
Observations  4605  
F Statistics  16.56  
Quarter FE  Y  
Bank FE  Y  
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In Table 3.5, the second stage regression result is reported. In Column 1, the outcome 
variable is a bank’s liquidity-to-asset ratio. As we see from the table, 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡̂  is negative and 
statistically significant. This result implies that if a BHC group makes a relationship with many 
other financial institutions through a loan syndication, the affiliated local bank has a tendency to 
reduce its liquidity-to-asset ratio. The finding of this column is that if a local bank is connected to 
a huge inter-bank network through its parent BHC, the affiliated local bank has an incentive to 
reduce its liquidity holdings compared to the size of its total asset. This result accords with the 
hypothesis.  
As a next step, we analyze a bank’s liability structure in Column 2 of Table 3.5. A bank’s 
borrowing-to-liability ratio is used as the dependent variable. The estimated values of 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡̂  in 
Column 2 is positive and statistically significant. From this result, we can confirm that a bank 
tends to reallocate its funding structure from deposit to borrowing if the bank has more 
relationships with other financial institutions through its parent BHC group’s active involvement 
in a loan syndication with other participants. Because of the short-term nature of borrowing and a 
potential problem in rolling-over the borrowing during a market stress, borrowing is regarded as 
being more vulnerable to liquidity problem than deposit. In this sense, if a bank is able to rely on 
a wide network, the bank’s liability structure becomes weaker in liquidity risk perspective.  
The last part of this subsection is about a bank’s loan-to-deposit ratio. The regression 
results are reported in Column 3 of Table 3.5. Loan-to-deposit ratio is widely used to measure a 
bank’s liquidity or funding risk. If a bank makes more loans compared to its deposit balances, the 
bank’s loan-to-deposit ratio becomes higher. This means that the bank needs to fund the loan by 
additional borrowing other than the deposit or the bank has to reduce its liquidity holdings to make 
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additional loans. Thus, the higher loan-to-deposit ratio means weaker liquidity status of the bank. 
In Column 3, the coefficients of 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡̂  are positive and statistically significant.  
Table 3.5: Network exposure and a bank’s B/S structure (2nd Stage)  
This table reports the result of the second-stage IV regression that relates a bank’s balance sheet 
structure to the bank’s exposure to an inter-bank network network. The regression model of the 
second-stage is as follows.  
 
Y i , t = β0 + β1⋅𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ̂  + Γ⋅Xi , t + δt + δi + εi , t 
 
Xi , t is a vector of control variables, which are the bank-level and M&A control variables used 
in Table 4. δt and δi imply quarter-fixed and bank-fixed effect, respectively. Standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity. Appendix provides a description of each variable. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. The t-
statistics are in parenthesis. To conserve space, constant and control variables are not reported. 
 
 
Liquidity ⁄ Asset i , t  Borrow ⁄ Liabi, t  Loan ⁄ Deposit i , t  
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ̂  -0.168*  0.125**  0.412**  
 
(-1.84)  (2.18)  (2.33)  
Observations  4605  4605  4605  
Adjusted R2  -0.180  -0.239  -0.230  
Quarter FE  Y  Y  Y  
Bank FE  Y  Y  Y  
 
Regarding the exclusivity condition of the IV, I conduct a placebo test for the relationship 
between the bank merger and the bank’s balance sheet structure change. Table 3.6 shows the result. 
In this placebo regression, I keep the observations in which the bank does not change the value of 
Activei , t during the entire sample periods. From this regression, we can identify whether the 
merger event affects the bank’s balance sheet structure in spite of no significant change in the 
bank’s network exposure. The table presents that the estimated values of PostMerger i , t are not 
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significant for all three columns (Liquidity ⁄ Asset i , t, Borrowing ⁄ Liabilityi , t and 
Loan ⁄ Deposit i , t). This implies that the merger event does not have a significant influence on the 
bank’s asset structure unless the network exposure of the local bank is severely affected. In other 
words, the exclusivity condition of the IV can be maintained.  
Table 3.6: Placebo test for the relation between bank merger and B/S structure  
This table reports the result of the placebo regression that relates a bank’s balance sheet 
structure to the bank’s merger event. The regression model is as follows.  
 
Yi , t = β0 + β1⋅PostMerger i , t + Γ⋅Xi , t + δt + δi + εi , t  
 
Xi , t is a vector of control variables, which include Activei , t and all the bank-level and M&A 
control variables used in Table 4. δt and δi imply quarter-fixed and bank-fixed effect, 
respectively. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Appendix provides a description 
of each variable. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and 
***, respectively. The t-statistics are in parenthesis. To conserve space, constant and control 
variables are not reported 
 
 
Liquidity ⁄ Asset i , t  Borrow ⁄ Liabi, t  Loan ⁄ Deposit i , t  
PostMerger i , t  -0.009  0.007  0.019  
 
(-1.32)  (1.48)  (1.32)  
Observations  4011  4011  4011  
Adjusted R2  0.846  0.802  0.840  
Quarter FE  Y  Y  Y  
Bank FE  Y  Y  Y  
 
3.4.4.2 Effect of liquidity status on a bank’s deposit rate given a stress  
In Tables 3.7, we compare a bank’s deposit rate spread between banks with different 
liquidity status during a market stress. This part reports the test results of Equation (3-15) and (3-
16) to address the Hypothesis 2. The extent of a bank’s weakness in liquidity status is measured 
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by a bank’s asset and liability structure. In columns 1 and 2, we measure a bank’s liquidity status 
by the bank’s liquidity-to-asset ratio. If a bank’s liquidity-to-asset ratio is below median value 
among entire samples, the bank is assigned to a weak liquid bank group. In the first column, the 
interaction term of Weaki , t  − 1 × Stressm is the coefficient of our interest. The estimated value is 
positive and statistically significant. This means that if a bank is weak in liquidity status measured 
by its liquidity-to-asset ratio, the bank’s deposit rate spread becomes higher than the bank with 
stronger liquidity position during a market stress. In the second column, Stressm is decomposed 
into Stressm, Crisism
07 − 08 and Crisism
08 − 09, by which we see whether the difference in deposit 
rate spread between two types of banks during a market stress changed in the earlier or later stage 
of the 07-09 financial crisis. In this regression, the coefficient of Weaki , t  − 1 × Stressm is still 
positive and statistically significant but the coefficients of Weaki , t  − 1 × Crisism07 − 08 and 
Weaki , t  − 1 × Crisism08 − 09 are not significant. Those results imply that a higher deposit rate spread 
of the bank with lower liquidity-to-asset ratio during a market stress time can be still applicable to 
the 07-09 financial crisis without any significant difference.  
Next, in columns 3 and 4, we focus on a bank’s borrowing-to-liability ratio in measuring 
the weakness of the bank’s liquidity status. If a bank belongs to top 25 percent in terms of its 
borrowing-to-liability ratio, the bank is assigned to the group with the weaker liquidity position. 
In column 3, the coefficient of Weaki , t  − 1 × Stressm is not statistically significant. However, if we 
decompose the dummy variable of Stressm into Stressm, Crisism
07 − 08 and Crisism
08 − 09, we see 
a positive and statistically significant regression result for the coefficient of 
Weaki , t  − 1 × Crisism08 − 09 in column 4. The estimated value for Weaki , t  − 1 × Stressm is still 
negative and statistically significant, but the magnitude of Weaki , t  − 1 × Crisism08 − 09 is much 
larger than that of Weaki , t  − 1 × Stressm. Thus, we conclude that, during the later stage of the 07-
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09 financial crisis, the bank with higher borrowing-to-liability ratio faces bigger liquidity problem 
through higher deposit rate spread than the bank with lower borrowing-to-liability ratio.  
In the last two columns of this table, we measure the weakness of a bank’s liquidity position 
through a bank’s loan-to-deposit ratio. If a bank’s loan-to-deposit ratio is higher than the median 
value among the entire samples at each time, the bank is considered to be the bank with a weak 
liquidity status. In column 5, the coefficient of Weaki , t  − 1 × Stressm is positive and statistically 
significant. This result implies that if a bank makes a great amount of lending compared to its 
deposit balance, the bank can have a big problem in its liquidity management and face a higher 
funding cost during a market stress time. In column 6, we can find the statistically significant result 
only in the coefficient of Weaki , t  − 1 × Crisism08 − 09. This means that the phenomenon can be 
observed only in the financial crisis after the Lehman’s collapse, not in the general market stress 
times.  
Figure 3.6: Yield Spread of Commercial Paper (3M) against Treasury Bill (3M) 
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Table 3.7: A bank’s B/S structure and deposit rate 
This table reports a regression that relates a spread on a bank’s deposit interest rate to the 
bank’s liquidity status measured by its asset and liability structure during a market stress time. 
The regression models are as follows.  
 
Spreadi , m = β0 + β1⋅Weaki , t  − 1⋅Stressm + β2⋅Weaki , t  − 1 + Γ⋅Xi , t − 1 + δm + δi + εi , m  
 
Spreadi , m  = β0 + β1⋅Weaki , t  − 1⋅Stressm + β2⋅Weaki , t  − 1⋅Crisism07 − 08     
 + β3⋅Weaki , t  − 1⋅Crisism08 − 09 + β4⋅Weaki , t  − 1 + Γ⋅X + δm + δi + εi .m  
 
The subscript t − 1 refers to a lagged quarter-end. Xi , t − 1 is a vector of control variables, which 
are the bank-level control variables used in Table 4. δm and δi imply month-fixed and bank-fixed 
effect, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at a bank level. Appendix provides a 
description of each variable. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted 
by *, ** and ***, respectively. The t-statistics are in parenthesis. To conserve space, constant 
and control variables are not reported. 
 
 
Spread i , m  
Weaki , t  − 1is measured by  Liquidity ⁄ Asset i , t  Borrowing ⁄ Liab i , t  Loan ⁄ Deposit i , t  
Weaki , t  − 1 × Stressm  0.043***  0.047***  -0.020  -0.055***  0.026**  0.011*  
 
(3.40)  (7.38)  (-1.34)  (-6.92)  (2.18)  (1.66)  
Weaki , t  − 1 × Crisism07 − 08  
 
-0.016  
 
0.064***  
 
0.019*  
  
(-1.39)  
 
(4.67)  
 
(1.69)  
Weaki , t  − 1 × Crisism08 − 09  
 
0.002  
 
0.125***  
 
0.073***  
  
(0.13)  
 
(8.43)  
 
(5.92)  
Weaki , t  − 1  0.025**  0.025***  -0.009  -0.010***  0.007  0.006**  
 
(2.07)  (7.80)  (-0.76)  (-2.75)  (0.64)  (1.99)  
Observations  133604  133604  133604  133604  133604  133604  
Adjusted R2  0.829  0.829  0.829  0.829  0.829  0.829  
Month FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Bank FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
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3.4.4.3 Effect of network exposure on a bank’s deposit rate given a stress  
Until now, we relate the deposit rate spread during a market stress to an extent of a bank’s 
weakness in its liquidity management measured by the bank’s asset and liability structure. As the 
next step, I directly relate the deposit rate spread during the stress to a degree of a bank’s exposure 
to an inter-bank network formed through its parent BHC’s active involvement in a loan 
syndication. Instead of Weaki , t  − 1, I enter Activei , m in the regression model. Like in the first set 
of regressions, IV approach is employed. The network exposure is instrumented by the bank 
merger event. Table 3.8 reports the first stage regression results. In those first stage regressions, 
Activei , m⋅Stressm, Activei , m⋅Crisism07 − 08, Activei , m⋅Crisism08 − 09are instrumented by 
PostMerger i , m⋅Stressm, PostMerger i , m⋅Crisism07 − 08 and PostMerger i , m⋅Crisism08 − 09. The F-
statistics for all the four first stage regressions are much higher than 10, which means that the 
relevance conditions are met in these IV regressions.  
Table 3.8: Network exposure and a bank’s deposit rate (1st Stage)  
This table reports the results of the first-stage IV regressions that relate a spread on a bank’s 
deposit interest rate to the bank’s exposure to a wide inter-bank network during a market stress 
time. The regression model of the first-stage is as follows. In the first one below, 
Activei , m⋅Stressm is instrumented by PostMerger i , m⋅Stressm. In the second to fourth 
regressions below, Stressm is decomposed into Stressm, Crisism07 − 08 and Crisism08 − 09. 
 
Activei , m⋅Stressm = β0 + β1⋅PostMerger i , m⋅Stressm + Γ⋅Xi , t  − 1 + δm + δi + εi , m  
 
Activei , m⋅Stressm  = β0 + β1⋅PostMerger i , m⋅Stressm + β2⋅PostMerger i , m⋅Crisism07 − 08     
 + β3⋅PostMerger i , m⋅Crisism08 − 09 +  Γ⋅Xi , t  − 1 + δm + δi + εi , m  
Activei , m⋅Crisism07 − 08  = β0 + β1⋅PostMerger i , m⋅Stressm + β2⋅PostMerger i , m⋅Crisism07 − 08     
 + β3⋅PostMerger i , m⋅Crisism08 − 09 +  Γ⋅Xi , t  − 1 + δm + δi + εi , m  
Activei , m⋅Crisism08 − 09  = β0 + β1⋅PostMerger i , m⋅Stressm + β2⋅PostMerger i , m⋅Crisism07 − 08     
 + β3⋅PostMerger i , m⋅Crisism08 − 09 +  Γ⋅Xi , t  − 1 + δm + δi + εi , m  
 
The subscript t − 1 refers to a lagged quarter-end. Xi , t − 1 is a vector of control variables, which 
include Activei , t and the bank-level control variables used in Table 4. δm and δi imply month-
fixed and bank-fixed effect, respectively. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
 161 
Appendix provides a description of each variable. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. The t-statistics are in parenthesis. To 
conserve space, constant and control variables are not reported. 
 
 
Activei , m⋅Stressm  
PostMerger i , m⋅Stressm  0.2704***  
 
(17.57)  
Observations  3707  
F Statistics  308.88  
Month FE  Y  
Bank FE  Y  
 
 
Active i , m⋅Stressm  Active i , m⋅Crisism07 − 08  Active i , m⋅Crisism08 − 09  
PostMerger i , m⋅Stressm  0.2491***  -0.0086***  -0.0034  
 
(12.64)  (-2.58)  (-0.77)  
PostMerger i , m⋅Crisism07 − 08  0.0876***  0.4029***  -0.0295***  
 
(2.55)  (11.89)  (-3.21)  
PostMerger i , m⋅Crisism08 − 09  -0.0430  -0.0539***  0.2580***  
 
(-1.19)  (-2.37)  (5.77)  
Observations  3707  3707  13707  
F Statistics  106.09  51.04  16.85  
Month FE  Y  Y  Y  
Bank FE  Y  Y  Y  
 
Next, in Table 3.9, we see the second stage regression results. In the first column, the 
coefficient of 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑚× 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚̂  is positive and statistically significant. This means that if a 
bank belongs to the group that is exposed to a bigger network, the bank faces a higher deposit rate 
spread during the market stress. In the second column, we can see that the coefficients of 
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𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑚× 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑚
07−08̂   and 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑚× 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑚
08−09̂   are also positive and significant. This 
means that the increase of deposit rate spread during the market stress time for the bank exposed 
to a big network is driven by the cases in the 07-09 financial crisis. 07-09 crisis is special in terms 
of the fact that the shock is occurred within the banking system. In other words, if the shock is 
originated inside of the banking system, the liquidity shock to the bank with an exposure to a wide 
network becomes more severe.  
Table 3.9: Network exposure and a bank’s deposit rate (2nd Stage)  
This table reports the result of the second-stage IV regression that relates a spread on a bank’s 
deposit interest rate to the bank’s exposure to a wide inter-bank network during a market stress 
time. The regression model of the second-stage is as follows.  
 
Spreadi , m = β0 + β1⋅𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑚 ̂ ⋅Stressm + Γ⋅Xi , t  − 1 + δm + δi + εi , m  
 
Spreadi , m  = β0 + β1⋅𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑚 ̂ ⋅Stressm + β2⋅𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑚 ̂ ⋅Crisism
07  −  08     
 + β3⋅𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑚 ̂ ⋅Crisism
08  −  09 + Γ⋅Xi , t  − 1 + δm + δi + εi , m  
 
The subscript t − 1 refers to a lagged quarter-end. Xi , t − 1 is a vector of control variables, which 
include Activei , t and the bank-level control variables used in Table 4. δm and δi imply month-
fixed and bank-fixed effect, respectively. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
Appendix provides a description of each variable. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. The t-statistics are in parenthesis. To 
conserve space, constant and control variables are not reported.  
 
 
Spreadi , m   
(1)  (2)  
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑚× 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚̂   0.397***  -0.919***   
(3.06)  (-5.01)  
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑚× 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑚
07−08̂      
 
2.562***  
  
(9.57)  
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑚× 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑚
08−09̂    
 
5.939***  
  
(6.79)  
Observations  3707  3707  
Adjusted R2  0.081  -0.379  
Month FE  Y  Y  
Bank FE  Y  Y  
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In this IV regression, I also conduct a placebo test regarding the relation between the bank 
merger and the bank’s deposit rate spread change given a market stress in order to identify the 
exclusivity condition of the IV. We can see the results from Table 3.10. Like in the table 3.6, I 
keep only the observations in which the bank does not change the value of Activei , t during the 
entire sample periods. From this regression, we can see whether the merger event affects the bank’s 
deposit rate spread during the market stress time in spite of no significant change in the bank’s 
exposure to an inter-bank network. The table presents that the estimated values for the interaction 
terms with PostMerger i , t are not significant or have opposite signs compared to the IV regression. 
This implies that the merger event does not drive the rise of the bank’s deposit rate spread during 
the crisis time unless the network exposure of the local bank expanded. In other words, the 
exclusivity condition of the IV can be maintained again in this regression.  
Table 3.10: Placebo test for the relation between bank merger and deposit rate  
This table reports the result of the placebo regression that relates a spread on a bank’s deposit 
interest rate to the bank’s merger event. The regression model is as follows.  
 
Spreadi , m = β0 + β1⋅PostMerger i , m⋅Stressm + β2⋅PostMerger i , m + Γ⋅Xi , m + δm + δi + εi , m  
 
Spreadi , m  = β0 + β1⋅PostMerger i , m⋅Stressm + β2⋅PostMerger i , m⋅Crisism07 − 08     
 + β3⋅PostMerger i , m⋅Crisism08 − 09 + β4⋅PostMerger i , m + Γ⋅Xi , m + δm + δi + εi , m  
 
Xi , m is a vector of control variables, which include Activei , t and the bank-level and M&A 
control variables used in Table 4. Additionally, interaction terms between M&A dummies 
(PostBankMerger i , m and PostBHCMerger i , m) and time dummies (Stressm, Crisism07 − 08 
and Crisism08 − 09) are also included as control variables. δm and δi imply month-fixed and bank-
fixed effect, respectively. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Appendix provides a 
description of each variable. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted 
by *, ** and ***, respectively. The t-statistics are in parenthesis. To conserve space, constant 
and control variables are not reported. 
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Spreadi , m   
(1)  (2)  
PostMerger i , m⋅Stressm  -0.043  0.007   
(-0.63)  (0.09)  
PostMerger i , m⋅Crisism07 − 08  
 
-0.069    
(-0.45)  
PostMerger i , m⋅Crisism08 − 09  
 
-0.664***    
(-4.24)  
Observations  2968  2968  
Adjusted R2  0.869  0.871  
Month FE  Y  Y  
Bank FE  Y  Y  
 
3.5 Conclusion  
This study examines how a network transformation can affect a bank’s incentive to manage 
its liquidity risk. As the size of a network expands or a number of liquidity providers enter the 
network, an individual bank can borrow money from a potential lender within the network more 
easily and tends to relax the management of its liquidity risk by reducing its liquidity holdings or 
by depending more on wholesale borrowings. This is because, if a bank can borrow money more 
easily from the network, the bank can improve its profitability by less strictly managing its liquidity 
risk while being less concerned about its potential funding difficulty. The relaxation of a bank’s 
liquidity risk management, however, will ultimately lead each bank to face a liquidity crisis due to 
a liquidity evaporation within the network given a negative shock on the financial market.  
The empirical analysis of this study also supports the predictions of the theory model. As 
a bank is connected to a wide network through its parent bank holding company (BHC)’s active 
participation in a loan syndication arrangement, the bank’s liquidity status becomes relatively 
weak when measured by its asset and liability composition. During a market stress time, the bank 
that has an exposure to a huge inter-bank network made by its parent BHC group’s relationship 
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with other financial institutions faces a greater difficulty in its external financing due to a higher 
spread on its deposit interest rate against the risk free rate.  
From this study, we see that a market can fail by itself after an expansion of a network 
unless there is a proper level of control on a bank’s internal risk management process. This is 
because individual entities usually tend to focus on new profit opportunities made by a network 
expansion but underestimate accompanying unprecedented risks coming from the sudden break-
up of the network. In other words, an individual entity tends to conduct its business and manage 
its risk based on a strong belief that the current inter-bank network continues to function well in 
the future.  
In many cases, the network expansions are triggered by a policy or regulatory reform in 
the financial sector. The partial repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 is one good example. After 
this deregulation, the inter-bank network expanded substantially, possibly being a seed for the 
financial crisis later. We can also observe other policy reforms in the financial system before major 
financial crises such as the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the Savings and Loan (S&L) crisis 
in the middle of the 1980s. A new opening of a country’s domestic capital markets to foreign 
investors before the Asian financial crisis and a deregulation on depository institutions’ savings 
products before the S&L crisis are also good examples of the triggering events that caused the 
network expansions before major financial crises.  
From this anecdotal evidence and the theoretical/empirical analyses of this study, we can 
make an important policy implication that the policy reform or deregulation that leads to an 
expansion of the network has to go with a reconstitution of a supervisory work and a regulation, 
both of which control for a potential malfunction of each bank’s risk management. Without any 
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external control, individual banks are more likely to focus on the upside and fail to detect and 
manage new types of financial risks coming from the network expansion. In this sense, regardless 
of some disagreement on the specific form and procedure, we need to recognize the necessity of 
the strengthened bank liquidity regulation that requires banks to hold sufficient amounts of liquid 
assets and reduce its dependence on short-term wholesale borrowing. This regulation can be an 
effective tool that mitigate a future potential market failure coming from a bank’s excessive 
dependence on the widened inter-bank network.  
The findings of this study can be applicable to other types of network. There are many 
multi-national companies that operate their businesses in different markets across borders of 
countries. These firms are exposed to a multi-national network and utilize a good profit opportunity 
generated by the network. However, the network made beyond a national boundary can be subject 
to a sudden collapse due to an international political event. New protectionism in international 
trade and political tension between neighboring counties are also good examples for a sudden 
change of the network environment. If a multi-national firm which used to exploit an inter-market 
network formed between counties does not fully prepare for the sudden collapse of the 
international network, the firm could have great difficulty in forgoing part of network across 
countries. In short, firms operating across borders need to make a sufficient preparation for a 
sudden uncontrollable break-up of the international network of trade or supply-chain to endure the 
difficulties until the network becomes restored. This can be compared to the situation where a bank 
needs to hold sufficient liquidities and reduce an excessive dependence on wholesale borrowing 
in preparation for inter-bank network collapse to survive the liquidity evaporation until the market 
stress is relieved. 
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3.7 Appendices 
3.7.1 Variable Definition 
Variable* Definition Source** 
Asset & Liability Structure  
Liquidity ⁄ Asset i , t  Ratio of a bank’s liquidity over the bank’s total 
asset. Liquidity is sum of cash and securities. 
Winsorised at the 1st and 99th percent level  
Call  
Borrowing ⁄ Liability i , t  Ratio of a bank’s borrowing over the bank’s 
total liability. Borrowing is sum of other 
borrowing, trade liability and sub-note. 
Winsorised at the 1st and 99th percent level  
Call  
Loan ⁄ Deposit i , t  Ratio of a bank’s total loan over the bank’s 
total deposit. Winsorised at the 1st and 99th 
percent level  
Call  
Activei , t  Dummy variable that identifies a bank that 
belongs to top 25 percent in terms of the 
number of counterparties that the bank’s parent 
BHC have a relationship with through a loan 
syndication arrangement among total samples  
Deal & Call  
PostMerger i , t  Dummy variable that identifies an observation 
that belongs to the time periods within 12 
months after an event of merger of the bank or 
the bank holding company that the bank is 
affiliated with.  
Merger  
PostBankMerger i , t  Dummy variable that identifies an observation 
that belongs to the time periods within 12 
months after an event of merger of the bank.  
Merger  
PostBHCMerger i , t  Dummy variable that identifies an observation 
that belongs to the time periods within 12 
months after an event of merger of the bank 
holding company that the bank is affiliated 
with.  
Merger  
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Variable* Definition Source** 
Log (Syndicate Loan)i , t  Log of the amount of total syndicate loans that 
are arranged by the parent BHC  
Deal  
Log (Number of Deal)i , t  Log of total number of syndicate loan deals that 
are arranged by the parent BHC  
Deal  
Log (BHC Asset)i , t  Log of the parent BHC’s total consolidated 
asset  
Y9C  
Relative Sizei , t  A ratio of a bank’s total asset over its parent 
BHC group’s total consolidated asset  
Call & Y9C  
Log (Bank Asset)i , t  Log of a bank’s total asset  Call  
Federal Regulator i , t  Dummy variable that identifies a bank’s 
regulator that is a Federal agency such as 
Federal Reserve, FDIC, and OCC  
SOD  
Capital Ratioi , t  Ratio of a bank’s regulatory capital (sum of tier 
1 and tier 2 capital) over the bank’s total risk-
weighted asset  
Call  
NPL Ratioi, t  Ratio of non-performing loan over total loan  Call  
Leverage Ratioi , t  Ratio of a bank’s total asset over the bank’s tier 
1 capital.  
Call  
Market Sharei , t  A bank’s deposit market share in the county 
where the bank collects at least 65 percent of its 
total deposits  
SOD  
HHIi , t  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for county-level 
deposit market where the bank collects at least 
65 percent of its total deposits  
SOD  
Deposit Interest Rate Spread  
Spreadi , m  A spread of a deposit rate for a Certificate of 
Deposit (CD) with an account size of 10,000 
USD against the yield on 30 days Treasury Bills  
RW  
Weaki , t  − 1
liquidity  ⁄ asset  Dummy variable that identifies a bank that 
belongs to bottom 50 percent in terms of the 
bank’s liquidity-to-asset ratio as of recent 
quarter-end 
Call  
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Variable* Definition Source** 
Weaki , t  − 1
borrowing  ⁄ liability  Dummy variable that identifies a bank that 
belongs to top 75 percent in terms of the bank’s 
borrowing-to-liability ratio as of recent quarter-
end  
Call  
Weaki , t  − 1
loan  ⁄ deposit  Dummy variable that identifies a bank that 
belongs to top 50 percent in terms of the bank’s 
loan-to-deposit ratio as of recent quarter-end  
Call  
Stressm  Dummy variable that identifies a month of 
market stress, which is within top 25 percent 
measured by a monthly average spread between 
yield on a commercial paper and Treasury bill  
RW  
Crisism
07 − 08  Dummy variable that identifies the early phase 
of 07-09 financial crisis (August 2007 to 
August 2008)  
-  
Crisism
08 − 09  Dummy variable that identifies the later phase 
of 07-09 financial crisis (September 2008 to 
May 2009)  
-  
 
* i = bank, t = quarter, m = month  
 
** SOD = Summary of Deposit, Call = Call Report, Deal = Dealscan, Y9C = FR Y9C, RW = 
RateWatch, Merger = Bank or BHC merger data (Fed)  
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3.7.2 Calculation on the expected borrowing  
3.7.2.1 One counterparty within a network  
First, I assume that there is only one counterparty in the network. In other words, there are 
only two banks in the network – the borrower bank and the counterparty. In this case, total expected 
amount of borrowing for the borrower bank will be exactly the same as the expected amount of 
lending for the counterparty. Borrowing from the counterparty is available only when the 
counterparty experiences a money surplus at time 0. By the uniform distribution, the probability 
that the counterparty experiences a money surplus will be 1 ⁄ 3. Because the amount of money 
surplus is one, the expected amount of surplus for the counterparty will be 1/3. In subsection 1.1, 
we see that a bank with net cash inflow at time 0 will allocate the total surplus to a risk free asset 
by x and to a short-term lending by y. Thus, the expected amount of lending by the counterparty 
will be y ⁄ 3. Because, in this network, there are only two banks – the borrower bank and the 
counterparty, the borrower bank’s expected amount of short-term borrowing at time 0 will also be 
y ⁄ 3 because there is no competition with other banks to borrow money from the counterparty with 
the money surplus.  
3.7.2.2 Two counterparties within a network  
In this section, I demonstrate how the expected amount of borrowing from the network 
changes if the number of counterparties in the network increase from one to two. In this case, total 
number of entities in the network will be three.  
Totally, there are nine different cases regarding the combination of two counterparties’ 
states. Due to the discrete uniform distribution, the probability of each case is 1 ⁄ 9. The first case 
 173 
is that both the counterparties experience surpluses at time 0. In this situation, the expected amount 
of total lending from the two counterparties will be 2×y×1 ⁄ 9 = 2y ⁄ 9. The borrower bank with 
deficit can borrow the whole amount of 2y ⁄ 9 without any competition with other banks because 
there is no other deficit bank which needs money. Second, only one counterparty experiences a 
surplus and the other counterparty is balanced at time 0. Depending on which counterparty 
experiences the surplus, there are two different cases for this scenario. The borrower bank’s 
expected amount of borrowing from either of the two counterparties will be 2×y×1 ⁄ 9 = 2y ⁄ 9 in 
this scenario. Third, only one counterparty experiences a surplus and the other one faces a deficit 
at time 0. There are also two cases for this scenario depending on who enjoys the surplus. In this 
scenario, we need to consider a competition between the borrower bank and the other deficit 
counterparty to borrow money from the surplus counterparty. Thus, there is only half chance for 
borrowing from the surplus counterparty to the borrower bank. The expected amount of borrowing 
is 2×1 ⁄ 2×y×1 ⁄ 9 = y ⁄ 9. Next, there are remaining four scenarios in which both the counterparties 
does not have any surplus. In all of the last four cases, the borrower bank’s expected borrowing is 
zero because there is no surplus from counterparties at all.  
All things considered, the borrower bank’s expected amount of borrowing from the 
counterparties in the network will be 2y ⁄ 9 + 2y ⁄ 9 + y ⁄ 9 = 5y ⁄ 9, which is greater than 
3y ⁄ 9 = y ⁄ 3, the expected amount of borrowing when there is only one counterparty in the network.  
3.7.2.3 Three and more counterparties within a network  
Next, we can apply the same logic to the cases where total number of counterparties are 
three in the network. Totally, there are 27 different cases. Thus, the probability of each scenario is 
1 ⁄ 27.  
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First, all three counterparties experience the surplus. Then, the borrower bank’s expected 
amount of borrowing from the three counterparties is 3×y×1 ⁄ 27 = y ⁄ 9. The second possibility is 
that two counterparties experience surpluses and the other one is balanced. For this scenario, there 
are three different cases depending on who faces the balance. The borrower bank’s expected 
amount of borrowing will be 3×2×y×1 ⁄ 27 = 2y ⁄ 9. Third, two counterparties experience surpluses 
and the other one faces a deficit. Because there is another bank which also needs to borrow money, 
there is only half chance to get the borrowing from the two surplus counterparties to the borrower 
bank. Thus, the borrower bank’s expected amount of borrowing will be 3×2×1 ⁄ 2×y×1 ⁄ 27 = y ⁄ 9 
for this scenario. The fourth case is that only one counterparty experiences surplus and the other 
two counterparties are balanced. We can also think of three different cases depending on who is 
the bank with surplus. The expected amount of borrowing will be 3×1×y×1 ⁄ 27 = y ⁄ 9. Fifth, one 
counterparty experiences surplus and the other two face deficit. Like the previous scenarios, there 
are three different cases based on who is the bank with surplus. We also need to consider the 
competition among banks because there are other counterparties which also need to borrow from 
the network. In this case, three banks including the borrower bank compete to borrow money from 
one surplus counterparty. The expected amount of borrowing is 3×1×1 ⁄ 3×y×1 ⁄ 27 = y ⁄ 27. Next, 
only one counterparty has a surplus and the other two counterparties face either of balance or 
deficit. In other words, all three counterparties faces different situations. There are six different 
cases for this scenario. Because there is another counterparty which needs to borrow money, we 
have to consider the competition. The expected borrowing will be 6×1×1 ⁄ 2×y×1 ⁄ 27 = y ⁄ 9. 
Finally, the remaining scenarios are the cases where all the other counterparties do not have any 
surplus. In this case, the expected amount of borrowing should be zero.  
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All things considered, the borrower bank’s total expected amount of borrowing from the 
network will be y ⁄ 9 + 2y ⁄ 9 + y ⁄ 9 + y ⁄ 9 + y ⁄ 27 + y ⁄ 9 = 19y ⁄ 27, which is bigger than 
15y ⁄ 27 = 5y ⁄ 9, the expected amount of borrowing when the number of counterparties in the 
network is only two.  
More generally, provided that there are k counterparties in the network, the expected 
amount of borrowing given the deficit is calculated as follows. 
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3.7.2.4 Entrance of Liquidity Provider into the network  
Now, I show how the expected amount of borrowing changes if a new type of entity called 
a liquidity provider enters the inter-bank network. I change the setting of the previous example by 
assuming that one counterparty is the liquidity provider. Also, I assume that the liquidity provider 
follows a different uniform distribution of the probability 1 ⁄ 2 for balance and 1 ⁄ 2 for surplus. 
There is zero probability for deficit. Then, the borrower bank’s expected amount of borrowing 
from the network becomes 49y ⁄ 54, which is greater than 38y ⁄ 54 = 19y ⁄ 27, the expected 
borrowing when there are three counterparties without any liquidity provider in the network. 
Figure 3A.3 illustrates how to obtain the expected amount of the borrowing in case that there are 
three counterparties with one liquidity provider in the network.  
More generally, if we assume that there are totally k + h counterparties in the network and, 
among them, h counterparties are liquidity providers, the expected amount of borrowing given the 
deficit is as follows  
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Figure 3A.1: Expected borrowing with two counterparties 
 
1. Probability of each scenario 
  Counterparty 2 
  Surplus Balance Deficit 
 
Counterparty 1 
Surplus 1/9 1/9 1/9 
Balance 1/9 1/9 1/9 
Deficit 1/9 1/9 1/9 
 
2. Amount of Borrowing for each scenario 
  Counterparty 2 
  Surplus Balance Deficit 
 
 
Counterparty 1 
Surplus (1,1)→2y (1,0)→y (1,-1)→y/2 
Balance (0,1)→y (0,0)→0 (0,-1)→0 
Deficit (-1,1)→y/2 (-1,0)→0 (-1,-1)→0 
 
∙ (i,j) = the vector for the state of each counterparty i and j 
∙ 1 = surplus, 0 = balance, -1 = deficit 
 
3. Expected Amount of Borrowing = 1/9 × (2y + y + y + y/2 + y/2) = 5y/9 
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Figure 3A.2: Expected borrowing with three counterparties 
1. Amount of borrowing for each scenario 
 
i. Counterparty 3 = Surplus Counterparty 2 
  Surplus Balance Deficit 
 
Counterparty 1 
Surplus (1,1,1)→3y (1,0,1)→2y (1,-1,1)→2y/2 
Balance (0,1,1)→2y (0,0,1)→y (0,-1,1)→y/2 
Deficit (-1,1,1)→2y/2 (-1,0,1)→y/2 (-1,-1,1)→y/3 
 
ii. Counterparty 3 = Balance Counterparty 2 
  Surplus Balance Deficit 
 
Counterparty 1 
Surplus (1,1,0)→2y (1,0,0)→y (1,-1,0)→y/2 
Balance (0,1,0)→y (0,0,0)→0 (0,-1,0)→0 
Deficit (-1,1,0)→y/2 (-1,0,0)→0 (-1,-1,0)→0 
 
iii. Counterparty 3 = Deficit Counterparty 2 
  Surplus Balance Deficit 
 
Counterparty 1 
Surplus (1,1,-1)→2y/2 (1,0, -1)→y/2 (1,-1, -1)→y/3 
Balance (0,1, -1)→y/2 (0,0, -1)→0 (0,-1, -1)→0 
Deficit (-1,1, -1)→y/3 (-1,0, -1)→0 (-1,-1, -1)→0 
 
∙ (h,i,j) = the vector for the state of each counterparty h,i, and j 
∙ 1 = surplus, 0 = balance, -1 = deficit 
 
2. Probability of each scenario = 1/27 
 
3. Expected Amount of Borrowing = 19y/27 
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Figure 3A.3: Expected borrowing with three counterparties (one liquidity provider) 
 
1. Amount of borrowing for each scenario 
 
i. Counterparty 3 (Liquidity Provider) = Surplus 
 Counterparty 2 
  Surplus Balance Deficit 
 
Counterparty 1 
Surplus (1,1,1)→3y (1,0,1)→2y (1,-1,1)→2y/2 
Balance (0,1,1)→2y (0,0,1)→y (0,-1,1)→y/2 
Deficit (-1,1,1)→2y/2 (-1,0,1)→y/2 (-1,-1,1)→y/3 
 
 
ii. Counterparty 3 (Liquidity Provider) = Balance 
 Counterparty 2 
  Surplus Balance Deficit 
 
Counterparty 1 
Surplus (1,1,0)→2y (1,0,0)→y (1,-1,0)→y/2 
Balance (0,1,0)→y (0,0,0)→0 (0,-1,0)→0 
Deficit (-1,1,0)→y/2 (-1,0,0)→0 (-1,-1,0)→0 
 
∙ (h,i,j) = the vector for the state of each counterparty h,i, and j 
∙ 1 = surplus, 0 = balance, -1 = deficit 
 
2. Probability of each scenario = 1/18 
 
3. Expected Amount of Borrowing = 49y/54 
